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Abstract 
 
Negotiation is a vital component of electronic trading (e-Trade). It is the key 
decision-making approach used to reach consensus between trading partners. 
Generally, the trading partners implement various negotiation strategies in an attempt 
to maximize their utilities. There has not been enough work on mobile agent-based 
multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade negotiation that secures the data 
exchanged during negotiation and manages the risk of losing top utility offers that 
expire before the client’s negotiation deadline. In this thesis, we propose a secure 
and efficient mobile agent-based multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade 
negotiation framework. The framework consists of: (1) system architecture that 
integrates mobile agents in multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade 
negotiation; (2) negotiation protocol that defines the rules of allowable interactions 
between negotiating agents in multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade 
negotiation; (3) flexible and rational negotiation strategy that efficiently manages the 
critical risk of losing top utility offers that expire before the client’s negotiation 
deadline and also considers key factors including: trading competition between 
vendors, market search space, and various temporal constraints including: client’s 
negotiation deadline, vendor’s negotiation deadline, and network time delay in 
addition to client’s price limits and vendor’s offer price; (4) enhanced utility function 
that considers client’s negotiation deadline, vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. 
offer expiry time), and completed market search space and thus provides accurate 
evaluation and ranking of offers, which assists the negotiation strategy in optimizing 
decision making; (5) sound security protocol that preserves the various security 
  
xv 
 
properties of data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation including: strong integrity, 
privacy, authenticity, non-repudiation, and anonymity. The one-to-many bilateral 
negotiation model is discussed in details with respect to negotiation phases, 
functionalities and interactions between the various components (i.e. hosts and 
agents) of the model, and different modules of the negotiating agent. The general 
rules of the negotiation protocol are defined without presenting formal representation 
or properties verification of the protocol since the thesis mainly focuses on system 
architecture, negotiation strategy, utility function, and security negotiation protocol. 
Different experiments are carried out to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
negotiation strategy in terms of client’s utility and negotiation time. The experiments 
compare the proposed negotiation strategy with patient and partially patient 
negotiation strategies in various negotiation settings and test the impact of key 
factors on client’s utility. The factors include: trading competition, market search 
space, client’s negotiation deadline, and vendor’s negotiation deadline. The 
experimental analysis shows that the proposed negotiation strategy results in the 
client’s maximum utility when compared with the other two strategies. It also shows 
that the proposed strategy shortens negotiation time, and ensures adequate market 
search. Proofs of validity of the proposed utility function are presented. The security 
protocol is formally verified for various security properties including: privacy, 
authenticity, strong integrity, anonymity, and non-repudiation. The verification 
results show that the protocol is free of security flaws and hence the data exchanged 
during e-Trade negotiation is secured.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Negotiation is a critical process in various daily activities including: service level 
agreements, electronic trade, group conflict resolution, personnel acquisition, 
corporation establishment, business transaction, supply chain management, and 
obligation distribution. It is a critical, frustrating, and time consuming process. 
Negotiation entities enter into negotiation to enhance their utilities while trying to 
reach a consensus with other negotiating entities (He, Jennings, & Leung, 2003; 
Ermolayev, Keberle, Matzke, & Vladimirov, 2005). Entities may lack the necessary 
negotiation skills; and thus may respond in an emotional, rational, disdainful, or 
apprehensive manner during negotiation that would lead to unfavorable outcomes 
(Murugesan, 2000).  
 
Negotiation has been classified into four different models based on the 
interaction domain. The models are mainly: one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, 
and many-to-many negotiation (Rahwan, Kowalczyk, & Pham, 2002). One-to-many 
and many-to-many negotiations have been modeled as multiple one-to-one 
negotiations carried out simultaneously or sequentially (An, Sim, Tang, Li, & Cheng, 
2006; Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2010; Hamed Kebriaei & Majd, 2008; Louta, Roussaki, & 
Pechlivanos, 2008; Rahwan et al., 2002). Negotiation has also been classified into 
single issue and multi-issue negotiation based on the number of negotiated issues. 
For example, negotiation can be for three issues such as buying a laptop, a printer, 
and a scanner. 
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1.1 E-Negotiation and Research Focus 
E-Negotiation has been proposed as a promising environment that handles 
negotiation over the Internet without human intervention or supervision. It has 
proven effectiveness in facilitating electronic trading (e-Trade) and generating better 
outcomes (Stubblebine & Syverson, 1999; Babanov, Ketter, Babanov, & Gini, 2003; 
Jaiswal, Kim & Gini, 2004; Wimalasiri, Ray, & Wilson, 2004; Ramchurn, 2004; 
Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2010, 2012c; Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2005). It 
facilitates negotiation through the Internet as being free from place and time 
constraints. It also offers broader space of negotiation alternatives and concludes 
verifiable and more favorable agreements in a reasonably short time. Moreover, it 
saves negotiators time and effort they usually spend in trying to reach an agreement. 
 
E-Negotiation designates software intelligent agents: stationary or mobile agents 
to act on behalf of negotiating entities. Agents implement different negotiation 
tactics and strategies and autonomously make decisions without the need of human 
intervention.  Agents submit a client’s Request for Offer (RFO) for goods/services of 
interest and wait for offers from vendors. They interact with vendor agents and 
engage in dialogues till an acceptable agreement is reached or negotiation aborts (Gil 
Iranzo, 2005; Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2012c). They might generate counter-offers or 
search for alternative offers whenever an agreement is not reached (Calisti, 2002; 
Faratin, Sierra, & Jennings, 1998). The counter-offers are generated by making 
concessions on some of the negotiated constraints of the client’s request based on 
particular concession functions (Neumann, Benyoucef, Bassil & Vachon; Sim & 
Wong, 2001).  The sequence of offers and counters-offers between two negotiating 
agents that ends with an Accept or Reject action is referred to as a negotiation thread 
(Faratin et al., 1998). 
 
 Negotiation strategies have a significant effect on the outcomes of negotiation. 
They manage beliefs and goals of negotiating entities, and try to resolve conflicts by 
generating offers or searching for acceptable alternatives (Calisti, 2002; Faratin, 
Sierra, & Jennings, 2002). They advise on the best course of action during 
negotiation that is feasible and acceptable to opponents, satisfies client constraints 
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and preferences, and maximizes the outcomes of negotiation (Ermolayev et al., 2005; 
He et al., 2003). This course of action can take different forms: accept, reject, 
critique offers, or generate counter-offers (Louta et al., 2008; Sokolova & 
Szpakowicz; 2005). Constraints are such as price limit and preferences are such as 
non-stop flight route. Critiques can be such as proposing new negotiation constraints 
or relaxing particular constraints. 
 
 Negotiation strategies advise on counter-offer generation in the next negotiation 
round based on functions that determine concessions on negotiated constraints 
(Neumann et al., 2003; Sim & Wong, 2001; Ge & Dong, 2010). The functions 
determine the recommended relaxation amount on the negotiated constraints in the 
next negotiation round (Sim & Wong, 2001; Neumann et al., 2003). There are two 
types of concession functions: (1) static functions that are based on predefined 
concession rates (Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2006); (2) 
adaptive functions that are based on the dynamics of e-Marketplace (An et al., 2006; 
Sim & Wong, 2001; Ĺi, Sycara, & Giampapa, 2005). An et al. (2006) and Sim & 
Wong (2001) pointed out that the market-driven strategies that implement adaptive 
functions motivate negotiation and result in more beneficial outcomes. The 
negotiation outcomes are assessed based on achieved utilities that range from 0 to 1.0 
indicating worst and best outcomes, respectively (Chen & Huang, 2009). The offer 
utility can be evaluated using utility functions that assign particular value to the offer 
based on the values of offer attributes. The evaluation of offer utilities in one-to-
many negotiation can be delayed or immediate (Collins, Ketter, Gini, & Mobasher, 
2002). The former delays the evaluation till all offers are received; whereas the later 
starts the evaluation of each offer as soon as it is received.  
  
 Negotiation strategies are of four types (Rahwan et al., 2002; Ge & Dong, 2010; 
Nguyen & Jennings, 2003): desperate, patient, partially patient, and optimized 
patient. The desperate strategy tries to reach a consensus the soonest possible and 
terminates search/negotiation once it finds an offer that meets client's preferences 
and constraints. The patient strategy continues negotiation till the client’s negotiation 
deadline and then chooses the offer that has the top utility. The partially patient 
strategy continues negotiation till the client’s negotiation deadline unless the expiry 
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time of a top utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The 
optimized patient strategy addresses one-to-many negotiation and continues 
negotiation till the client’s negotiation deadline. It does not immediately settle an 
agreement once it finds an acceptable offer. It evaluates the outcomes of a 
negotiation round and accordingly amends the target utility in the subsequent 
negotiation round based on the achieved utility in the current negotiation round so as 
to improve the outcomes of negotiation. The strategy continues on offer collection 
and negotiation till it reaches the most possible utility prior the client’s negotiation 
deadline. The strategies: patient, partially patient, and optimized patient select the 
most appropriate tactic to implement during negotiation. Tactics advise a negotiating 
agent on the most appropriate action that would lead to an agreement that maximizes 
client’s utility. The tactics have mainly been classified into three types: time-
dependent tactics, resource-dependent tactics, and behavior-dependent tactics 
(Faratin et al., 1998). A time-dependent tactic is affected by the client’s remaining 
negotiation deadline. A resource-dependent tactic is affected by the remaining 
resources such as remaining bandwidth, money, or number of clients, and number of 
servers. A behavior-dependent tactic is affected by the previous behavior of the 
opponent negotiating agent. Negotiation procedures define the sequence in which 
multiple issues would be negotiated. Negotiation procedures vary from package deal, 
sequential, to simultaneous procedures (Fatima et al., 2006; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; 
Fershtman, 2000; Busch & Horstmann, 1997).  
  
 The literature shows that the focus has mainly been on one-to-one bilateral 
negotiation, e.g. bargaining and one-to-many unilateral negotiation, e.g. auction. The 
negotiation systems have mainly been based on the deployment of stationary agents. 
Researchers have developed many system architectures, protocols, tactics, 
procedures, and strategies as briefly listed below.  
 
 System architectures 
 Auction-based negotiation (Collins et al., 2002; Ketter et al., 2003)  
 Multi-attribute one-to-one bilateral cooperative negotiation (Brazier, Jonker, 
& Treur, 2000; Jonker, Robu, & Treur, 2007)  
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 Multi-attribute one-to-one bilateral competitive negotiation (Braun et al., 2006) 
 Multi-attribute one-to-many bilateral competitive negotiation model (Chen & 
Huang 2009; Hindriks, Jonker, & Tykhonov, 2008)  
 Multi-issue one-to-many bilateral competitive negotiation model (Benyoucef,  
Alj, Vézeau, & Keller, 2001) 
 Negotiation protocols (Wanyama & Homayoun Far, 2007; Winoto, McCalla, & 
Vassileva, 2002; Reaidy, Massotte, & Diep, 2006; Cranor & Resnick, 2000; Li, 
Wang, & Jing, 2008; Dastani, Hulstijn, & Toree, 2000; McBurney & Parsons, 
2003; Klein, Faratin, Sayama, & Bar-Yam, 2003a, 2003b) and the design rules of 
protocols (Kersten & Lai, 2007; Kersten, Strecker, & Law, 2004). 
 Negotiation procedures, tactics, and strategies (Collins, Jamison, Gini, & 
Mobasher, 1997; Fatima et al., 2003, 2004, 2006; Lee, Chang, & Lee, 2000; 
Levati & Maciejovsky, 2001; Sandholm & Vulkan, 1999; Si, Edmond, Dumas, & 
Hofstede, 2007).  
 Some work has been done on negotiation security (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c; Vogler, Spriestersbach, & Moschgath, 1999; Rocha et al, 2010; 
Chakraborty, Sehgal, & Pal, 2005).  
1.2 The Problem 
The literature shows that there has been little work on one-to-many bilateral 
negotiation and it has merely been modeled as multiple one-to-one negotiation 
threads carried out simultaneously (An et al., 2006; Hamed Kebriaei & Majd, 2008; 
Louta et al., 2008; Rahwan et al., 2002). The following assumptions have been 
considered:  
 
- A single stationary agent carries out the multiple negotiation threads 
simultaneously or designates a number of stationary sub-agents to carry out the 
individual negotiation threads and it coordinates the sub-agents. 
- Offers and counter-offers are exchanged between vendor agents and client agent 
either directly or through a mediator.  
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- Offers and counter-offers are communicated by implementing the Message 
Passing Paradigm (Cardellini & Colajanni, 1999; Cao, Sun, Wang, & Das, 2003). 
- The client’s negotiation deadline has not been tampered with during negotiation. 
- Client and vendor hosts at which agents are executed are trusted hosts. 
 
The existing negotiation system is not efficient and suffers from the following 
deficiencies: 
 
- It incurs excessive communications loads and costs. It mostly deploys stationary 
agents while mobile agents have distinctive characteristics that make them 
outperform stationary agents. Mobile agents migrate to the hosts of potential 
vendors in the marketplace and directly collect offers from these vendors 
avoiding the large communication complexity problem of systems that deploy 
stationary agents (Anthony, Hall, Dung Dang, & Jennings, 2001; An et al., 2006; 
Chen, Lui, & Chen, 2008). 
 
- Negotiation may not achieve the client’s maximum utility; particularly whenever 
the expiry time of top utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. 
The offer would expire before the negotiation is completed and hence the top 
utility offer would be missed out. The negotiation strategies have not considered 
the risk of missing out on top utility offers that expire before the client’s 
negotiation deadline (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2010). The strategies should interrupt 
negotiation and award the bid to the top utility offer that has an expiry time 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline and its price is considerably lower 
than the price of other offers. The existing strategies have only considered 
particular factors such as client’s negotiation deadline, market status, and 
incomplete knowledge of opponents’ data (An et al., 2006; Apt & Markakis, 
2009; Ermolayev et al., 2005; Fatima et al., 2005, 2006; Sim, 2002). They have 
not considered opponents’ negotiation deadlines and have assumed that they are 
private. This assumption is not accurate though, since they are not always private. 
In e-Trade for example, vendors tend to announce deadlines of their special 
offers as they believe that deadlines motivate clients to work toward agreements 
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before the deadline passes and force them to concede more quickly than they 
usually do. Vendors would also announce deadlines of special offers whenever 
the expiry time of goods/services is approaching and they might become outdated 
or invalid. Thus, vendors can get more and better purchases. Usually, special 
offers have top utilities and might probably expire before the client’s negotiation 
deadline. There is a significant problem with the existing negotiation strategies. 
They would not accurately achieve the client’s maximum utility due to the 
following facts: (1) offer evaluation and counter-offer generation are delayed 
until all offers are collected from vendors in the agent itinerary; (2) bid award is 
delayed until the client’s negotiation deadline is reached; (3) top utility offers 
might expire before the client’s negotiation deadline and hence would be missed 
out. An example of such negotiation problem is a client who seeks a flight on a 
specific date and has a preference of a non-stop route and a constraint on price. 
The client defines a Request for Offer (RFO) and assigns a mobile agent to act on 
its behalf. The agent would then collect offers from potential vendors in the 
marketplace and negotiate for the lowest possible price. The mobile agent 
initially sets a client’s negotiation deadline and tries to make a thorough market 
search with the aim of satisfying client’s request and maximizing his/her utility. 
There is a crucial risk that the top utility offer is collected in last few minutes of 
its validity and before the agent completes a thorough market search. Usually, the 
agent continues on negotiation till client’s negotiation deadline, which might be 
few minutes later than the validity of the offer. The agent would then miss out on 
the offer and hence, client’s utility would not be maximized.  
 
- The offers are not accurately evaluated and ranked. They are evaluated and 
ranked using the existing utility functions that are basically based on client’s 
price limits and vendor’s offer price (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2012a). The functions 
assign the same value to two similar offers of different validities; whereas the 
offer of later validity is more favorable and should be given a greater value. Also, 
the functions assign a greater value to an offer of a price that is slightly lower 
than the price of another offer of considerably longer validity; whereas the later 
offer is more favorable as it remains valid till the client’s negotiation deadline 
and hence allows for broader market search space. The existing functions do not 
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evaluate offers accurately. They should consider three key factors that indicate 
the significance of a collected offer. The factors are: vendor’s negotiation 
deadline (i.e. offer expiry time), client’s negotiation deadline, and completed 
market search space. For example, the least priced offer that would expire before 
both the client’s negotiation deadline and the completion of adequate market 
search space should be degraded. The existing functions would assign the offer 
the same value as a similar offer that expires before the client’s negotiation 
deadline but after the completion of adequate market search space. 
 
- Negotiation may not achieve the client’s maximum utility since the offers and 
counter-offers that vendors and clients exchange are susceptible to various 
malicious acts of adversaries while in transit (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2007a, 2007b, 
2007c). For example, malicious vendors might append fake offers or capture 
offers of competitive vendors and then delete, replace or tamper with the offers 
so as to win the bid. The malicious acts include: (1) deleting or tampering with 
communicated offers; (2) breaching privacy of communicated offers; (3) 
repudiating a communicated offer; (4) masquerading the genuine provider of an 
offer; (5) transmitting fake offers (6) tampering with client’s Request for Offer 
(RFO), purchase orders or payment orders. These acts would restrain negotiation 
strategies from achieving the client’s maximum utility. The literature shows that 
the malicious acts have not been addressed adequately and agents were assumed 
to execute on trusted hosts (Collins & Gini, 2006; Mobach, 2007; Ssekibuule, 
2010). It is essential to devise a security protocol for e-Trade negotiation that 
truly secures data exchanged during negotiation. The security protocol should 
implement proper security mechanisms that can prevent or at least detect the 
various malicious acts of adversaries.  
1.3 Contribution 
 In this thesis, we consider the different deficiencies in the existing negotiation 
system and establish a secure and efficient mobile agent-based multi-constraint one-
to-many bilateral e-Trade Negotiation framework. The framework establishes a 
system architecture that deploys mobile agents in e-Trade Negotiation. Also, it 
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develops a negotiation strategy that considers the risk of missing out on top utility 
offers that expire before the client’s negotiation deadline. The strategy considers 
various temporal constraints including: vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. offer 
expiry time), client’s negotiation deadline, and network time delay, which includes 
processing, queuing, transmission, and propagation delays. It also considers market 
search space and trading competition between potential vendors. Moreover, the 
framework considers the various security threats to data exchanged during 
negotiation and proposes a sound security protocol that can prevent or at least detect 
any possible attack.  
1.3.1 Approach 
 The negotiation framework we present in this thesis introduces many advantages. 
It maximizes client's utility and maintains the security of data exchanged during e-
Trade negotiation. It ensures adequate market search and accurate assessment of 
trading competition at the marketplace. It also reduces communication loads in large-
scale agent-based e-Negotiation systems, and shortens negotiation time. Moreover, it 
establishes inter-dependencies between negotiation threads among vendors. 
 
The framework consists of the following: 
 
- Mobile agent-based system architecture that integrates mobile agents in multi-
constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade Negotiations. Mobile agents migrate to 
vendor hosts at marketplaces and sequentially negotiate with vendors (Jaljouli & 
Abawajy, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2010). The architecture is proposed since the 
deployment of mobile agents in e-Negotiation results in more efficient systems 
than the existing systems that deploy stationary agents (Cao et al., 2003; Chen & 
Huang, 2009; Du, Li, & Wei, 2005). The systems that deploy stationary agents 
suffer from the problem of large communication complexity (Shin & Jung, 2004; 
An et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008). On the other hand, mobile agents exhibit 
special characteristics including: heterogeneous execution, autonomous decision-
making, dynamic adaptation to environmental changes, learning capability, 
cooperative ability, mobility potential, and fault tolerance (Murugesan, 2000; 
Wong, Fang, & Leung, 2004). They utilize distributed resources over the Internet 
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and carry out negotiation sequentially with vendors rather than concurrently. 
Thus, they reduce latency, and communication loads and costs. In general, the 
deployment of mobile agents in e-Negotiation results in more flexible and 
asynchronous systems.  
 
- Negotiation protocol that defines the rules of interaction between negotiating 
agents. Only the general rules of the negotiation protocol are outlined as the 
thesis predominantly focuses on the deficiencies of the one-to-many bilateral 
negotiation system that relate to: system architecture, negotiation strategy, utility 
function, and security protocol.   
 
- Negotiation strategy that manages the critical risk of missing out on top utility 
offers that expire before the client’s negotiation deadline. The strategy boosts 
client’s utility and shortens search/negotiation time. It takes into account various 
temporal constraints including: client’s negotiation deadline, vendor’s 
negotiation deadline, and network time delay, which includes processing, 
queuing, transmission, and propagation delays. It also considers two significant 
factors: (1) trading competition between vendors; (2) market search space in 
addition to client’s price limits and vendor’s offer price. The strategy has two 
distinctive characteristics: (a) flexibility; (b) rationality. It is flexible in deciding 
when to evaluate offers. It does not wait until the client’s negotiation deadline is 
reached and, conversely it carries out preliminary evaluation of each offer as 
soon as it is collected in contrast to the patient strategy that delays offer 
evaluation till all offers are collected. It is rational in finalizing negotiation. The 
strategy ranks offers based on their utilities and would make an early decision of 
accepting an offer before the client’s negotiation deadline is reached having 
satisfied three important conditions relating to the following: selection criteria, 
market search space, and trading competition. The selection criteria condition 
verifies that the offer meets client’s constraints and preferences. The market 
search space condition verifies that the client agent has completed an adequate 
market search, which is represented in terms of the minimum number of vendors 
the client agent has to search. The adequate market search space can be deduced 
from similar past negotiation scenarios. The client agent might consider the 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
11 
 
search of five vendor agents as an adequate market search space. The trading 
competition condition verifies that the offer highly competes with other offers 
through testing two indexes. The two indexes are: (1) offer utility index; (2) offer 
validity index. The offer utility index compares utilities of current offer and top 
ranked offer with respect to client’s target utility. It indicates if there is a 
marginal/significant difference between the two offers in terms of utility. The 
offer validity index compares expiry times of current offer and top ranked offer 
with respect to the current time. It indicates if the expiry time of the current offer 
is marginally/significantly longer than that of the top ranked offer. During 
negotiation, the strategy updates client’s target utility in a negotiation round 
whenever the achieved utility in the preceding negotiation round is greater than 
the target utility. The strategy effectively avoids the loss of a top utility offer that 
expires before the client’s negotiation deadline while ensuring adequate market 
search. It continuously monitors the client’s negotiation deadline and negotiation 
deadlines of vendors of top utility offers, which expire before client’s negotiation 
deadline, during negotiation. The strategy extends negotiation near the expiry 
time of the top utility offer, which expires before the client’s negotiation 
deadline, and only awards the bid to the offer provided: (1) adequate market 
search is completed; (2) the offer utility is significantly higher than utilities of 
other collected offers, or its validity is slightly shorter than that of other offers. 
The strategy uses the cloning feature of mobile agents, and assigns a sub-itinerary 
to a replica of the agent to shorten negotiation time and be able to complete 
negotiation before the top utility offer expires.   
 
- Utility function that enhances the existing utility function and more accurately 
evaluates offers, taking into account: vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. offer 
expiry time), client’s negotiation deadline, and completed market search space, 
all of which would have an impact on negotiation outcomes, especially when the 
expiry time of the top utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. 
 
- Security negotiation protocol that considers the various security threats of 
intruders and non-trusted hosts and implements appropriate security mechanisms 
that would preserve the security of data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation. 
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The mechanisms include: (1) splitting critical and non-critical negotiation data 
and functions among multiple mobile agents that cooperate during negotiation; 
(2) utilization of a Trusted Server that provides a secure environment for the 
verification of collected offers, decision making on the winning vendor, and 
issuing purchase or payment orders; (3) implementation of cryptography for the 
encryption of sensitive data exchanged during negotiation; (4) securely storing a 
record of the actual agent itinerary, which includes the identities of visited vendor 
hosts and the times at which the mobile agent got executed at the respective 
vendor hosts, for verifying the integrity of collected offers; (5) binding a 
collected offer to the initial negotiation parameters for detecting integrity attacks; 
(6) securely storing the initial negotiation parameters for detecting data 
masquerading or tampering attacks. (7) encrypting the agent itinerary and only 
making it accessible to a Trusted Server, which would handle the agent migration 
and clear the identity of the preceding host from the connection table, to ensure 
anonymity of hosts in the agent itinerary; (8) requesting each visited vendor host 
to clear its memory from any data acquired as a result of executing the mobile 
agents before the host dispatches the mobile agents to the succeeding vendor host 
in the agent itinerary for hindering colluding attacks; (9) requesting each visited 
vendor host to create and sign a trace of the execution of agents at its host so that 
any denial of the clearing request or tampering with the agents’ dynamic data can 
be detected. The protocol also generates a random nonce that uniquely identifies 
a protocol run and instantiates four mobile agents: Supervisor Agent (SPA), 
Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA), Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA), and 
Purchasing Agent (PA). The SNA agent collects encrypted offers from a set of 
potential vendors and stores non-critical functions. The IRA agent securely stores 
the actual agent itinerary including the times at which the mobile agent got 
executed at the respective vendor hosts. The SPA agent stores critical data and 
functions. Also, it securely stores the initial parameters that are used to verify the 
integrity of collected offers upon the completion of negotiation such as client’s 
RFO, client’s negotiation deadline, protocol nonce, hash of the identity of client 
host, and contact details of the client. The SPA agent is responsible of 
integrating, verifying and evaluating the outcomes of SNA and IRA agents. The 
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PA agent securely stores the bank account details of the client. The implemented 
security mechanisms preserve the privacy, strong integrity, authenticity, 
anonymity and non-repudiation of data exchanged during negotiation. Also, the 
protocol can recover from malicious attacks of non-trusted hosts that might capture the 
SNA agent and obstruct it from returning to the Trusted Server and completing its task. 
The protocol utilizes the offers that have been provided to the SPA agent prior to the 
attack.  
1.3.2 Applicability 
We prove the applicability of the presented mobile agent-based multi-constraint one-
to-many bilateral e-Trade negotiation framework. In the first part of our contribution, 
we first define the different components of negotiating agents. We then define the 
different components of the system architecture and the corresponding 
functionalities. We then discuss the use of heuristic approaches in quantifying any 
qualitative preferences in client’s RFO, and the implementation of Q-learning 
approach in setting the weights of negotiated constraints (Zen, 2009; Li & Cao, 
2004; Von-Wun & Chun-An, 2002). We then describe the different phases of one-to-
many bilateral e-Trade negotiation model and the interaction between the different 
components of the system. Next, we recommend the most applicable mobile agent 
framework for the implementation of the proposed negotiation system architecture.  
 
 In the second part of our contribution, we outline the general rules of the 
negotiation protocol and discuss the assumptions on which the negotiation strategy is 
established. We then describe the different algorithms of the strategy including: 
negotiation strategy algorithm, offer expiry alert algorithm, early candidate selection 
algorithm, and evaluation and negotiation algorithm. We show the strict conditions 
of aborting the negotiation for a top utility offer that expires before the client’s 
negotiation deadline. The conditions are on market search space and trading 
competition between vendors at the marketplace. The market search space condition 
verifies that an adequate market search space is satisfied. The trading competition 
condition verifies that the top utility offer, which expires before the client’s 
negotiation deadline, highly competes with other top utility offers in terms of utilities 
and vendors’ negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer expiry times). The algorithms show the 
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effectiveness of the strategy in maximizing client’s utility by making two strategic 
actions. The first action refers to the designation of a replica agent that searches and 
negotiates a sub-set of potential vendors so negotiation can be completed in a shorter 
time and before the top utility offer expires. The second action refers to amending 
client’s target utility based on the achieved utility in the preceding negotiation round. 
The action is only applicable if the achieved utility is greater than the client’s target 
utility. 
 
 In the third part of our contribution, we discuss the concepts on which the 
enhanced utility function is formulated. We then discuss the theorems to which the 
utility function should conform and present proofs on the fulfillment of the theorems. 
We then simulate the negotiation system in various settings of trading competition, 
market search space, client’s negotiation deadline, and vendor’s negotiation deadline. 
For simplicity, we assume that the network time delay is fixed. We use the utility 
function to analyze the performance of the proposed negotiation strategy. We 
compare the performance of the strategy to that of patient and partially patient 
strategies considering critical scenarios where the top utility offer expires before the 
client’s negotiation deadline. We also reason the outcomes of the proposed 
negotiation strategy to those of patient and desperate strategies in terms of client’s 
utility, market search space, communication loads, resources consumption, and client 
satisfaction. 
 
 In the fourth part of our contribution, we discuss the assumptions on which the 
security protocol is established. We then describe the protocol algorithms that 
implement a number of proper security mechanisms so the security of data 
exchanged during the different phases of e-Trade negotiation is preserved. The 
algorithms include: request initiation algorithm, offer-collection algorithm, offer-
verification algorithm, itinerary-verification algorithm, offer-negotiation algorithm, 
and bid-award algorithm. We then argue the accomplishment of the different security 
properties including: strong integrity, non-repudiation, anonymity, privacy, and 
authenticity in the view of various malicious acts of intruders and non-trusted hosts. 
We then model the security protocol and specify the different asserted security 
properties using formal methods of verification. Next, we verify the protocol and 
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show the results of the verification of various security properties to present a proof 
on robustness of the security protocol against all possible security threats. 
1.4 Terminology  
Throughout the thesis some terms will be used interchangeably. The opponent’s 
negotiation deadline will also be referred to as vendor’s negotiation deadline, offer’s 
expiry time, or end time of offer validity. The counter-offer that the client agent 
generates in response to offers it receives from vendor agents will also be referred to 
as new Request for Offer (RFO). The bidder will also be referred to as client. The 
bidder’s utility will also be referred to as client’s utility. A vendor agent acts on 
behalf of a vendor and executes at the vendor host. The vendor has a name and the 
vendor host has an identity, which cannot be forged. 
1.5 Thesis Organization  
The thesis is organized as follows.  
 
In Chapter 2, background to e-Negotiation, negotiation strategies, and security of 
mobile agent-based system is discussed. Also, the existing e-Negotiation frameworks 
are discussed and the respective deficiencies are highlighted. The focus is on 
particular issues including: system architecture, negotiation protocols, negotiation 
strategies, utility functions, and security negotiation protocols. Moreover, the 
different formal methods of protocol verification and the respective advantages and 
drawbacks are discussed.  
 
In Chapter 3, the mobile agent-based system architecture for multi-constraint one-to-
many bilateral e-Trade Negotiation and the architecture of negotiating agents are 
described. The interaction between the different negotiating agents and the 
corresponding functionalities of agents are also discussed.  
 
In Chapter 4, the problem of missing out on top utility offers that might expire before 
the client’s negotiation deadline is discussed and a real example is presented for 
illustration. The general rules of the negotiation protocol are outlined and the 
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proposed negotiation strategy is described in details including the various negotiation 
algorithms.  
 
In Chapter 5, the enhancements to the existing utility function are discussed and 
proofs on its correctness are presented. The results of simulating the negotiation 
system in all possible critical scenarios and comparing the performance of the 
proposed negotiation strategy to that of patient and partially patient strategies are 
presented.  The results of reasoning the outcomes of the proposed strategy to those of 
desperate and patient strategies in terms of client’s utility, market search space, 
communication loads, resources consumption, and client satisfaction are also 
discussed. 
 
In Chapter 6, the various security threats to data exchanged during e-Trade 
negotiation are discussed. The proposed security protocol is also described in details 
including the security algorithms. Detailed argumentation on the accomplishment of 
various security properties in the view of all malicious acts of intruders and non-
trusted hosts is outlined.  
 
In Chapter 7, the formal verification of the proposed security protocol is described in 
full details and the results of verification of the various security properties of the 
protocol are presented.  
 
In Chapter 8, the conclusions and future works of the devised negotiation framework 
are discussed.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Background and Related Works 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we present background to e-Negotiation, negotiation strategies, and 
security of mobile agent-based system. We then discuss the existing e-Negotiation 
frameworks relating to particular areas including: system architectures, negotiation 
protocols, negotiation strategies, utility functions, and security protocols. We focus 
on one-to-many bilateral frameworks. We then identify the deficiencies in the 
frameworks and the necessary enhancements. We then discuss the existing formal 
methods of verification of security protocols. 
2.1 Background to e-Negotiation 
In this section, we discuss the different issues that relate to e-Negotiation including 
(2012c). We outline application domains of e-Negotiation and identify taxonomy of 
e-Negotiation and negotiation parameters. We also describe mobile agent-based e-
Negotiation system in terms of participants, components, and mobile agent system.  
 
 Negotiation can be defined as a process in which two or more parties have 
conflicting requirements in terms of goals and demands and try to reach mutual 
agreement through concession or change in requirements (Pruitt, 1981). E-
Negotiation refers to negotiation conducted over the Internet and it has been 
proposed to facilitate negotiation and generate better outcomes. It is an automated 
process that tries to maximize utilities of negotiating entities through iteration. It 
facilitates negotiation through the Internet as being free from place and time 
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constraints. It also saves negotiators time and effort they usually spend in trying to 
reach an agreement.  
 
 E-Negotiation is a hot research topic and represents a strategic stage in e-Trade 
(Sandholm & Vulkan, 1999). It manages beliefs and goals of negotiating entities, and 
tries to resolve conflicts through concessions and search for affordable and 
acceptable alternatives (Calisti, 2002). It overcomes limitations of human negotiation 
that suffers from emotional, rational, disdainful, or apprehensive responses 
(Murugesan, 2000). It also keeps a record of negotiation traces for later verification 
or jury cases. Moreover, it allows extensive comparisons between wide varieties of 
goods/services at the market and results in error-free calculations that promote 
customer satisfaction and trust in e-Negotiation.  
 
 E-negotiation can be fully automated through the deployment of software 
intelligent agents. Agents can autonomously carry out negotiation on behalf of 
negotiating entities. Agents can be stationary or mobile. Agent-based e-Negotiation 
has recently received much attention (Faratin et al., 1998; Kraus, Wilkenfeld, & 
Zlotkin, 1995; Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2002, 2004; Luo, Jennings, 
Shadbolt, Leung, & Lee, 2003; Li & Tesauro, 2003; Sandholm & Vulkan 1999).  
2.1.1   Application Domains of e-Negotiation 
E-negotiation has significant applications in a broad range of areas including 
economics, politics, manufacturing, business, commerce, military, etc. We discuss 
the following applications of e-Negotiation. 
 
- Negotiating business transaction 
- Negotiating resource allocation 
- Negotiating tasks allocation/obligation distribution 
- Negotiating corporation establishment 
- Negotiating service level agreement 
- Negotiating resolution of group conflicts 
- Negotiating personnel acquisition 
- Negotiating a service quotation 
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- Negotiating supply-chain process 
 
Negotiating business transaction  
Two parties negotiate the attributes of goods of interest e.g. price, warranty period, 
etc. It takes place in business-to-business, business-to-consumer, and business-to-
government transactions. 
 
Negotiating resource allocation 
Two or more parties negotiate the split of shared facility or resource, e.g. meeting 
room, printer or scanner at business premises to ensure fair resource distribution and 
avoid disputes or collisions. 
 
Negotiating task allocation/obligation distribution and scheduling 
In organizations, managers and leaders employ automated negotiation to effectively 
distribute obligations/tasks among employees based on their expertise and 
qualifications. A contractor may distribute tasks among sub-contractors and schedule 
tasks accordingly.  
Negotiating corporation establishment 
Partners negotiate terms of contract for the formation of a corporation inclusive 
taxation liability, management responsibilities, allocation of business profits and 
losses, and personal liability for lawsuits.   
 
Negotiating service level agreement 
A service consumer negotiates with a service provider the quality of service of 
interest. 
 
Negotiating resolution of group conflicts 
Law firms may negotiate issues of conflict and analyze common preferences and 
interests of disputed entities in a group to arrive at grounds of settlement. Negotiation 
can also take place between politicians, philosophers, linguistics. 
 
Negotiating personnel acquisition 
Employers can deploy negotiating agents to continuously search e-Marketplaces on 
their behalf for personnel of specific qualifications and experience till a nearly match 
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or a match is captured. Moreover, agents can negotiate contractual terms (Kurbel & 
Loutchko, 2005). 
 
Negotiating a service quotation 
A client may search for quotations from several service providers to build a network 
and negotiate quotations (Faratin & Rodriguez, 2005). 
 
Negotiating supply-chain process 
Negotiation takes place between individual supply chain partners as regards the 
different phases of transforming raw material into products to be delivered to the 
customer. Manufacturers may negotiate with vendors for raw material; wholesalers 
negotiate with manufactures for manufacturing capacity; manufactures negotiate 
with logistics channels for distribution; retailers negotiate with logistics channels for 
delivery services (Wong et al., 2004).    
2.1.2   Taxonomy of e-Negotiation Models 
We present taxonomy of e-Negotiation models. The taxonomy is based on different 
features as described below. 
 
- Interaction domain 
- Negotiation procedure 
- Interaction styles 
- Negotiation pattern 
 Number of negotiated issues 
 Number of constraints 
 Interaction route 
 Negotiators attitude 
 Number of negotiation rounds  
- Negotiation environment 
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2.1.2.1   Interaction Domains 
Negotiation can be classified based on the number of negotiating entities into three 
domains: one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many negotiation. The three domains 
are discussed below. 
 
One-to-one e-Negotiation  
One-to-one bilateral negotiation is used in bargaining systems, where agents carry 
out bilateral negotiations exchanging offers and counter-offers (kfir-dahav, 
Monderer, & Tennenholtz, 2000). The price-based negotiation is an example where 
both buyer and vendor try to maximize their own utilities. The client negotiates for 
the least possible pay and the vendor negotiates for the most possible gain. They 
have conflicting goals and different client’s negotiation deadlines. They have 
incomplete information about each other and bargaining is under time constraints in 
terms of client’s negotiation deadlines. They have deadlines as private information 
and the negotiating entity with an earlier deadline has a weak bargaining power. 
They can jointly reach an agreement that meets their acceptable and most possible 
utilities. At a bargaining equilibrium, a negotiating entity cannot be better off without 
causing a drop in the utility of its opponent.  
 
 A buyer who has an interest in multiple goods/services represents one-to-one 
bilateral multi-issue negotiation model (Lomuscio, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2003). 
The buyer may need to buy a desktop, scanner, and printer from a particular vendor. 
He may also negotiate multiple constraints as regards the goods/services to buy. For 
example, he may negotiate three constraints: a price limit of 850 AUS$ for a laptop; 
warranty period of two years; and installment plan of 18 months from a particular 
vendor.  
 
One-to-many e-Negotiation 
The one-to-many negotiation has been modeled as multiple threads of negotiation 
(Rahwan et al., 2002). Negotiation threads might act independently or interactively 
(An et al., 2006). The negotiation can be bilateral or unilateral. The unilateral 
negotiation is implemented in auctions such as Vickery, English, and Dutch 
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(Sandholm, 1996), whereas, the bilateral negotiation is implemented in bargaining 
systems (Robenstein & Wolinsky, 1985).  
 
The negotiation can be modeled based on the following approaches: 
 
- Simultaneous approach  
 Single complex stationary agent would carry out simultaneous one-to-one 
negotiation threads (Hamed Kebriaei & Majd, 2008).  
 Stationary manager agent would assign stationary sub-agents to carry out 
one-to-one negotiation threads individually. The threads would be carried out 
concurrently. The manager agent would then control the sub-agents 
(Neumann et al., 2003; An et al., 2006; Sim & Wong, 2001; Rahwan et al., 
2002; Hamed Kebriaei & Majd, 2008).  
 
- Sequential approach where single or multiple mobile agents would traverse the 
Internet and carry out negotiation threads with opponents in succession (Louta et 
al, 2008; Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2010, 2012c).  
 
There are some problems with the approach that deploys a single stationary agent. 
The problems include: (1) limiting the implemented negotiation strategies to a single 
strategy; (2) scalability as the agent conducts tremendous number of simultaneous 
negotiations; (3) single point of failure if the agent got captured or destroyed; (4) 
mass storage as the buyer agent is expected to store the simultaneous negotiations at 
once in its state. Also, there is a problem with the simultaneous approach as it results 
in excessive communication loads and costs. The sequential approach overcomes the 
problem as mobile agents move to vendor hosts and directly negotiate with vendors. 
The approach saves time and cost and reduces the communication loads.  
 
Many-to-one e-Negotiation 
Many-to-one bilateral multi-constraint negotiation takes place when a group of 
participants on one side negotiate a deal/contract with one participant on the other 
side (Fershtman, 2000). Each participant in the group may have specific preferences 
and priorities as regards the negotiation agenda that conflict with others. An example 
is a couple having interest in home mortgage where the husband is concerned about 
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the first payment and the wife is concerned about the installment plan. They should 
firstly agree on a negotiation agenda and can negotiate the constraints of concern 
sequentially or simultaneously with the vendor. 
2.1.2.2   Negotiation Procedures and Agendas 
A negotiating entity being interested in multi-issues has to decide on the sequence in 
which issues are negotiated. A negotiation procedure defines a particular sequence in 
which issues can be negotiated. There are three key procedures: (1) Package deal 
procedure (Fatima et al., 2006; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976); (2) Simultaneous procedure 
(Fershtman, 2000); (3) Sequential procedure (Busch & Horstmann, 1997). All issues 
are bundled together and negotiated in the package deal procedure, whereas, the 
issues are negotiated simultaneously but independently of each other in the 
simultaneous procedure. The issues are discussed one after another in the sequential 
procedure. The three procedures lead to different outcomes (Fershtman, 2000). The 
package deal produces the Pareto optimal outcomes (Fatima et al., 2006), which 
maximizes an agent’s utility. There is an agenda for selecting a negotiation procedure 
(Fatima et al., 2004). The negotiating entity can select from two agendas: (a) 
exogenous, and (b) endogenous. The exogenous agenda defines a negotiation 
procedure before the start of negotiation, whereas, the endogenous agenda allows 
negotiating entities to decide on the order in which issues are negotiated during the 
course of negotiation.  
2.1.2.3   Negotiation Interaction Styles 
There are different types of interaction between entities involved in negotiation. 
They can be classified as follows (Robenstein & Wolinsky, 1985; Kraus et al., 1995). 
 
- Cooperative interaction 
 Symmetric 
 Asymmetric 
- Symmetric competitive interaction 
- Conflict interaction 
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Symmetric cooperative interaction 
Negotiating entities gain from negotiation and try to reach mutually favored 
agreement. They try to maximize the sum of all their utilities/gains even if their 
individual utilities are low in negotiation outcome and, hence are referred to as 
devoted entities. In multi-attribute negotiation, agents have different preferences, but 
are cooperative and need to reach a compromise agreement. They can reach Win-
Win agreement on attributes of preference by conceding on attributes of less 
importance and exploiting the less favored attributes of their opponents. 
 
Asymmetric cooperative interaction 
One negotiating entity gains while the other entity loses at the conclusion of an 
agreement. They try to maximize the sum of all their utilities/gains even if their 
individual utilities are low in negotiation outcome and, hence are referred to as 
devoted entities. In single attribute negotiation, negotiating entities have different 
preferences, but are cooperative and need to reach an acceptable agreement. One 
entity has to concede till the other entity reach Win-Lose agreement on the 
negotiated issue. 
 
Symmetric competitive interaction 
Negotiating entities take actions that are rational for themselves irrespective of other 
entities benefits. They make compromises throughout negotiation till an agreement is 
concluded. They try to satisfy preferences and maximize utilities/gains of their own. 
They do not cooperate with each other and, hence are referred to as self-interested 
entities. They do not trust each other and try to hide their preferences during 
negotiation to limit any exploitation actions the opponent may take that might lower 
their utilities (Hindriks & Tykhonov, 2008). Entities would have incomplete 
information about opponents and, thus are subject to limited-rationality as they 
cannot be sure of the best action to take. They need time to learn and build 
knowledge through negotiation about opponent's attitudes and intentions. They may 
not surely reach maximum utility.   
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Conflict interaction 
All negotiating entities are not willing to make any compromise and, hence 
negotiation aborts. 
2.1.2.4   Negotiation Pattern 
Entities can negotiate a single issue (e.g. an airline ticket) or multiple issues (e.g. a 
holiday deal that consists of airline tickets, car hire, and accommodation). The 
negotiation might be single-constraint negotiation (e.g. purely price-based) or multi-
constraint negotiation (e.g. price, warranty period, and delivery options). Multi-
constraint negotiation involves complex decisions that take into account multiple 
factors. Also, negotiation can be bilateral or unilateral. In bilateral negotiation, 
negotiating entities exchange offers and counter-offers, whereas in unilateral 
negotiation offers flow in one direction. Auction is an example of unilateral 
negotiation as buyers send offers to a bidding agent. Negotiating entities can be 
patient or impatient. The impatient entity tries to end the negotiation the soonest 
possible and once an acceptable offer is available, while the patient entity tries to 
extend the negotiation as long as possible to improve its individual utility. 
Negotiation can be scheduled as a single-round negotiation or multi-round 
negotiation (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2007b). 
2.1.2.5   Negotiation Environment 
The negotiation environment can be static or dynamic (Lomuscio et al., 2003). The 
static environment is one in which the marketplace conditions remain fixed. The 
variables, objectives, attributes, and utility function remain fixed during the course of 
negotiation. The dynamic environment is one in which the marketplace conditions 
dynamically change. The variables, objective, attributes, and utility function may 
change during the course of negotiation.  
2.1.3   Negotiation Parameters 
Clients should firstly verbalize their requirements into negotiation parameters that 
include the following:  
 
- Issues 
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- Attributes 
- Preferences 
- Constraints 
 
 A client may be interested in a holiday package that includes multiple issues: 
airline ticket, care hire, and accommodation. Attributes can be destination, travel dates, 
and number of travelers. Constraints can be price limit (upper and/or lower) or booking 
confirmation deadline. Preferences can be non-stop route or particular carrier. The 
negotiation problem can be considered as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) and 
the negotiation process can be modeled as a constraint based reasoning (Kumar, 1992; 
Sycara, Roth, Sadeh, & Fox, 1991; Yokoo, 2001; Kowalczyk & Bui, 2001).  
 
 Preferences are set as variables with associated domains. Constraints can be on 
the domains of variables and should remain private during negotiation. A negotiating 
agent may deduce some information about the constraints of its opponent from offers 
and accept-reject decisions the opponent makes. Negotiating agents try to reach a 
mutual agreement through search for alternatives. 
 
 A client agent needs to set temporal constraints that define the time needed to 
complete each of the negotiation phases. The temporal constraints have effect on the 
negotiation agenda and are listed in Table 2.1. They can be defined based on 
knowledge of similar past negotiation episodes can be dynamically allocated 
according to changes in the environment. Normally, temporal constraints do not 
overlap as depicted in Figure 2.1. There is a time slot ('t) between different 
negotiation phases that refers to network time delay, which is acquired to processing, 
queuing, transmission, and propagation delays. The client agent may start offer 
evaluation before the bid deadline, particularly; an advantageous offer has an expiry 
time earlier than bid deadline. 
 
 The client agent should maintain the privacy of temporal constraints, particularly, 
bid deadline ( ாܶ஻) and client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே). It should not disclose 
temporal constraints to any negotiated vendor. A vendor agent that learns a temporal 
constraint (e.g. ாܶ஻) would maliciously delay its offer to limit market search and 
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negotiation. It may also try to capture the client agent for a while so the agent would 
not have enough time for an adequate market search and negotiation, and thus the 
vendor agent would have better chances to win the request. 
Table 2.1 Temporal constraints in e-Negotiation 
Notation Time constraint 
ோܶ 
ௌܶ஻ 
Request time 
Bid start time 
ாܶ஻ Bid  deadline 
ௌܶா Evaluation start time 
ாܶா Evaluation deadline 
ௌܶே Negotiation start time 
ாܶே Client’s negotiation deadline 
ௌܶௌ Settlement start time 
ாܶௌ  
ாܶ஽  
Settlement deadline 
Expected delivery time of goods/services 
 
  At initiation, the client agent sets a deadline for offers collection ሺ ாܶ஻ሻ. The 
deadline should allow enough time for the completion of an adequate market search. 
It is expected that the longer the bid time is the broader is the search space. The 
client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) should also be earlier than the expected delivery 
time ሺ ாܶ஽ሻ, which the client has initially set. It should give enough time for settling 
an agreement with the winning vendor. It should also take into account the network 
time delay, which relates to processing, queuing, transmission, and propagation 
delays. The client agent estimates the deadlines based on similar past negotiation 
episodes. 
 
 A vendor agent might set a validity time for the offer it provides ሺ ாܶ௏ሻ, 
particularly a hot offer. It is recommended that the client agent completes the various 
negotiation phases before the end time of the validity of the most advantageous offer 
and the expected delivery time of goods/services ሺ ாܶ஽ሻ, which the client has initially 
set.  
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Figure 2.1 Negotiation temporal constraints 
2.1.4   Mobile Agent-based e-Negotiation System 
Mobile agents have been deployed in a wide range of real-world applications (White, 
Bieszczad, & Pagurek, 1998; Gray, 2000; Choy, Srinivasan, & Cheu, 2003; Mobach, 
2007; Outtagarts, 2009; Chen, Cheng, & Palen, 2009; Kok, Warmer, & Kamphuis, 
2005; Paurobally & Jennings 2005; James, Cohen, Dodier, Platt, & Palmer 2006; 
Jaljouli & Abawajy 2010). Several applications are listed below. 
 
 Forensic management 
 Network management 
 Traffic management 
 Distributed resource management 
 Control in electricity infrastructure  
 Web service negotiation and agreement 
 Stock management 
 Mobile healthcare (e-Healthcare) 
 Transportation planning 
 E-Trade 
 Distributed energy management (efficiency & metering) 
 Grid computing and grid services 
 Distributed data mining 
 E-learning 
 Climate environment and weather 
 Wireless multimedia sensors 
 E-Negotiation 
 
  
Negotiation Evaluation Bidding Settlement 
 
ாܶ஽
Planning
ாܶௌௌܶௌாܶே ௌܶே ாܶா ௌܶா ாܶ஻ ௌܶ஻ ோܶ
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 The deployment of mobile agents in e-Negotiation has shown that they are more 
efficient than stationary agents as they exhibit distinctive characteristics (Bieszczad, 
Pagurek, & White, 1998; Lange, 2002; Lange & Oshima, 1999; Ylitalo, 2000; Shin 
& Jung, 2004; Chen et al, 2008; Bădică, Ganzha, & Paprzycki, 2007): (1) ability to 
reduce communication  loads and costs; (2) dynamic adaptation to changes in 
environments; (3) ability to overcome network latency; (4) asynchronous and 
autonomous execution of agents on heterogeneous environments; (5) support off-line 
computations; (6) software distribution across the Internet; (7) utilization and 
management of remote network resources; (8) autonomous decision-making 
capability. Hence, mobile agents have been recommended for e-Negotiation (Faratin 
et al., 1998; Kraus et al., 1995). 
 
 Recently, mobile agents have been deployed in e-Trade applications (Jaljouli & 
Abawajy, 2010). They act on behalf of clients and traverse the Internet in search of 
goods/services that meet clients’ requirement profiles in terms of preferences and 
constraints such as payment method, price limits, warranty period, installment plan, 
etc. They may carry out multiple negotiation rounds with potential vendors in the 
marketplace trying to achieve clients’ maximum utilities. They evaluate the market 
status and make decisions based on clients’ eagerness for goods/services, vendors' 
reputation record, clients’ target utility, and clients’ client’s negotiation deadlines. 
They autonomously handle negotiation, decision-making, agreement settlements, and 
payment transactions. They work independently of the connection with client hosts 
that might go off. Mobile agents have shown effectiveness in automating e-
Negotiations. They introduce several advantages including (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 
2007a): (1) concluding verifiable agreements; (2) facilitating global trading; (3) 
exploring a wider variety of negotiation alternatives; (4) maximizing clients’ utilities; 
(5) ensuring timely delivery of services/resources; (6) shortening search and 
negotiation time and costs; (7) reducing resources allocation.  
2.1.4.1   Mobile Agent System 
The mobile agent system is composed of five components: agent, agent platform, 
operating system, hardware, and communication infrastructure. The FIPA 
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(Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) has defined the agent platform to be 
managed by a set of key agents as depicted in Figure 2.2 (Bellifemine, Poggi, & 
Rimassa, 1999; Chen, Lin, & Lien, 1999; Java World, 2011): (1) Agent Management 
System AMS, (2) Agent Communication Channel ACC, (3) Directory facilitator DF, 
(4) Agent communication language ACL.  
 
The Agent Management System is the agent that has control over the use and 
access to the platform. It authenticates resident agents and controls registrations. The 
Agent Communication Channel is the agent that provides the route for basic contact 
between agents residing on different platforms. The Directory facilitator is the agent 
that provides the agent platform with a yellow page service. The Agent 
Communication Language specifies the standard message language including 
encoding, semantics, and pragmatics of the messages. 
 
 The mobile agent system has to possess a set of features that are essential to 
support the development and execution of mobile agents. The features include (Silva, 
Romão, Deugo, & Mira, 2001): (i) Execution Environment; (ii) Identity 
Management; (iii) Agent Types Management; (iv) Persistence Capability; (v) 
Security Framework; (vi) Migration Capability; (vii) Communication Capability; and 
(viii) Access to external resources. 
 
 An Execution Environment is an important component of the system. It provides a 
runtime software system that is necessary for mobile agent execution. It also 
provides a common interface for interaction between communicating agents, or 
agents and respective platforms at which they execute. Moreover, it provides services 
for creation, migration and termination of agents The Identity Management identifies 
agents and execution environments distinctively, while Agent Types Management 
provides a mechanism to access and search for types or classes of agents and to grasp 
how agents are instantiated. The Persistence Capability provides storage for the 
agent’s state that could be used when agent transmits from one platform to another 
platform. The Security Framework focuses on the integrity, authenticity, repudiation, 
access control, privacy, and control of resources consumption. The Migration 
Capability supports migration primitives (Wilhelm, 1999). Migration can be 
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classified relating to the agent execution state as strong mobility or weak mobility. 
Strong mobility is the ability of the agent programming language to allow agents to 
move their code and execution states to a different server. Weak mobility is the 
ability of the agent programming language to allow agents at a host to be bound 
dynamically to code coming from a different server. Migration can also be classified 
relating to the agent code as entire code migration, incremental code migration, and 
no code migration. The Communication Capability ensures that agent migration do 
not interfere with agent communications, while Access to external resources 
provides agents with a controlled access to external resources such as file system, 
user interface devices, communication channels, etc. 
Agent server
Operating System
Agent platform
ACLAMS DF
Mobile Agent
Agent server
Operating System
Agent platform
ACLAMS DF
Mobile Agent
ACC
 
Figure 2.2 Mobile agent system 
2.1.4.2   Participants 
McDonald, Yasinsac, & Thompson in (2005) have classified participants in a mobile 
agent-based e-Negotiation system into three groups: users, agents, and hosts.  
 
- A user is either an agent owner who made the request for goods/services or an 
agent developer who generated agent's code that would accomplish a particular 
task on behalf of the agent owner.  A single or multiple agents may be designated 
to act on behalf of the agent owner in search of goods/services.  
- Agents might have different codes or identical code but different itineraries. 
Agents would collaboratively act to accomplish a complex task. They can be a 
blend of stationary and mobile agents. Stationary agents remain at the user host 
during their life-times, whereas mobile agents traverse the Internet in search of 
requested goods/services. An agent is usually composed of code, static data, 
dynamic data, itinerary, identifier, log, and policy. The code represents the static 
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code of the agent. The static data represents fixed data that was set at the 
initiation of the agent. Dynamic data represents global variables and data the 
agent acquired during its execution at remote hosts. It is also referred to as 
agent’s state. The itinerary and identifier denote the scheduled itinerary of the 
agent and a unique identifier of the agent's run that binds agent's code to its state, 
respectively. The log and policy represent a record of agent's activities and an 
implemented security policy, respectively.  
- Hosts represent a set of hosts that have provided execution environment for the 
agent during its migration. Hosts may provide information, computation, 
communication, security, and management services or resources. The host is 
composed of resource, service, identifier, policy, and log. The identifier and 
policy represent a unique identifier of the agent's run and a trust relationship the 
host establishes with the agent, respectively. The log refers to a record of host's 
activities. Hosts are of three types: Initiator Host (IH), Executing Host (EH), and 
Trusted Server (TS) (Pagnia, Vogt, Grtner, & Wilhelm, 2000). 
 
 Initiator Host is the host from which the client made a request for 
goods/services and initiated a client agent to act on its behalf.  
 Executing Host is a scheduled vendor host in agent itinerary and at which the 
agent gets executed.  
 Trusted Server provides verification services for the client host on the safe 
execution of an agent from an unknown and non-trusted host (McDonald et 
al., 2005). It verifies the agent and establishes a particular trust level between 
the host and agents it executes. It also provides verification services for 
agents on the integrity of execution results or secure communication services 
with the initiator host. Upon the detection of violation of the integrity of the 
agent, the Trusted Server accordingly communicates that to other hosts and 
agents in the system. Moreover, it can advise on the next host in agent 
itinerary. The Trusted Server has an installed Tamper-Proof Hardware (TPH) 
or implements a security policy that defines an access control level (ACL). 
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2.1.4.3   Components 
The mobile agent-based e-Negotiation system comprises of several components 
(McDonald et al., 2005): hosts, agents, registry, ontology, negotiation protocol, 
negotiation strategy, trust, and security mechanisms.  
 
- Registry has information about vendors in the marketplace including their 
identities, products, capabilities, and interests for the purpose of matchmaking in 
e-Trade applications (Collins et al., 2002).  
- Ontology refers to a standardized declarative language for expressing rules of 
communication between negotiating agents. It includes attributes, interests, and 
relation between concepts and facts for consistency verification and deduction. It 
enables meaningful and effective data interchange and conversion between 
different negotiating agents. FIPA ACL, FIPA SL, and KQML are the most 
widely deployed agent communication languages (Collins et al., 2002). 
- Negotiation protocol defines the rules that specify the allowable actions of negotiating 
agents and the sequence of actions during the interaction of agents. Negotiating 
agents must agree on the implemented protocol prior to the start of negotiation. 
- Negotiation strategy specifies the best action an agent can make during the 
course of negotiation in response to actions of other negotiating agents that 
would maximize its utility. It makes decisions based on preferences and 
constraints, which the negotiating agent has initially set. The agent has a variety 
of negotiation strategies from which it can choose and employ with a particular 
protocol. Each strategy yields a different outcome. The strategy an agent 
implements should be kept private during the negotiation, however opponent 
agents may try to predict it through the responses they receive from the agent 
(Bartolini, Preist, & Jennings, 2005). 
- Trust can be expressed in terms of four parameters: initial knowledge, trust level, 
security, and timeliness. A participant might regard its initial knowledge about 
another participant in the system as: well known, known, and unknown. Also, it 
may regard its trust in another participant as: highly trusted, trusted, 
undetermined trust, non-trusted, and highly non-trusted. The trust level can be 
deduced based on old, recent, or frequent interactions with other participants. 
Trust relationship can be expressed as a mapping between two participants (A1, 
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A2) with a trust relationship (T), i.e. G(A1, A2): T. Security defines a security level 
a mobile agent or host might require. The mobile agent security relates to the 
security of agent’s code or agent’s data, particularly dynamic data. The security 
of agent’s data refers to integrity, privacy, authenticity, non-repudiability, and 
anonymity properties, whereas, the security of agent’ code refers to anonymity, 
accountability, integrity, availability, and agent platform authentication 
properties. The host security relates to the security of hosts that execute mobile 
agents. It refers to accountability, agent authentication, and anonymity 
properties. Timeliness refers to the delivery of goods/services before the 
negotiated delivery deadline.  
- Security mechanisms define security management activities the agent implements 
including security policy, credentials checking and assignment, and trust 
allocation (Blaze, Feigenbaum, & Lacy, 1996). The agent's security layer 
determines which mechanisms to implement during its interaction with hosts. 
2.2 Background to Negotiation Strategy 
Negotiation strategies direct negotiation entities on the best course of action to be 
taken at a certain negotiation stage in response to changes in the environment and 
which would result in agreements that maximize the utilities of negotiating entities. 
Generally, strategies advise a negotiating entity on how to generate an initial offer, 
how to interpret a received offer, and how to generate counter-offers.  
  
 Usually, negotiating entities with conflicting goals/interests, engage in 
negotiation seeking somewhat midpoint that is agreeable to all negotiating entities. 
They may need to relax some bid constraints and preferences if they were not able to 
reach an agreement during negotiation. The magnitude of relaxation of constraints 
and preferences is referred to as concession.  
 
 Negotiation strategies advise on concession with regards to its probability and 
rate for each negotiation round. Strategies try to capture information about the 
negotiation strategies of opponents to learn their preferences and target utilities, and 
hence minimize concession rates in their own strategies (Wilkes, 2008; Hindriks et 
al., 2008).  
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 It is assumed that negotiating entities are willing to make concessions during 
negotiation; however concessions may be overlooked, ignored, or unacknowledged. 
It is advisable that negotiating entities make fractional and contingent concessions so 
as to be appreciated and reciprocated by their opponents. They should also avoid 
concessions on high priority attributes and could make concessions on low priority 
attributes, which might be of high priority to their opponents. Moreover, the privacy 
of the implemented negotiation strategies should be maintained during negotiation to 
limit the tendency of opponents trying to exploit the goodwill of a negotiating entity.  
 
 A negotiation strategy implements negotiation tactics that establish new values of 
negotiated attributes for the generation of counter-offer in the next negotiation round. 
The strategy may use a combination of tactics during the course of negotiation. A 
tactic may advise a negotiating entity to respond in different ways to an opponent's 
offer based on predefined concession rates. Assuming a price-based negotiation, a 
buyer agent can respond to a seller's offer as follows (Ge & Dong, 2010). 
 
- Conceder: the buyer agent rapidly increases the price of its counter-offer to the 
reserved price since the early time of negotiation till the client’s negotiation 
deadline. Conversely, the seller agent rapidly decreases the price of its offer to 
the reserved price since the early time of negotiation till the client’s negotiation 
deadline. 
 
- Boulware: the buyer agent almost keeps the initial price of its counter-offer 
during the course of negotiation, but as the client’s negotiation deadline 
approaches it then rapidly increases the price of its counter-offer till the client’s 
negotiation deadline is reached. Conversely, the seller agent almost keeps the 
initial price of its offer during the course of negotiation, but as the client’s 
negotiation deadline approaches it then rapidly decreases the price of its offer till 
the client’s negotiation deadline is reached. 
 
- Linear: the buyer agent gradually increases the price of its counter-offer during 
the course of negotiation. Conversely, the seller agent gradually decreases the 
price of its offer during the course of negotiation. 
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 Another tactic may advise a negotiating entity to respond in different ways to an 
opponent's offer based on the interaction style between negotiating entities and as 
follows (Krovi, Graesser, & Pracht, 1999). 
 
- Reciprocating: a negotiating entity imitates its opponents. 
- Exploiting: a negotiating entity makes less concession whenever the opponents 
are competitive. 
- Cooperating: a negotiating entity makes more concession whenever the 
opponents are cooperative. 
 
 The outcomes of negotiation are affected by the implemented negotiation 
protocol and strategy, in addition to the following factors (Fatima et al., 2003; 
Rahwan et al., 2002; Lomuscio et al., 2003): 
 
- Participant’s preferences and constraints 
- Attributes of the utility function 
- Knowledge of opponent's information such as the reserve price or client’s 
negotiation deadline 
- Negotiation procedure and negotiation agenda  
 
 It is essential to implement an appropriate negotiation strategy to optimize 
negotiation outcomes. The implementation of a particular negotiation strategy is 
dependent on the goal of negotiation (Roussaki & Louta, 2003).  
2.3 Background to Security of Mobile Agent-based System 
Participants in mobile agent-based system are not always trusted. Honest agents 
might execute on non-trusted hosts or may be intercepted by intruders during their 
migration. Also, there might be malicious agents that are concurrently executing at a 
host that executes honest agents. Moreover, adversaries might intercept mobile 
agents during their migration between hosts in the Internet or intercept the 
communication between mobile agents. On the other hand, an honest host might 
execute malicious agents that try to breach its security. Hence, the system is subject 
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to different types of security threats of intruders that may attack mobile agents, hosts, 
agent communications, or agent transmissions.  
 
 The mobile agent security focuses on agent’s code and agent’s data. Agent’s data 
refers to two types of data: (i) Static data. (ii) Dynamic data (Maggi & Sisto, 2002b). 
The dynamic data consists of the following data types, as Fischer classified in 
(2003):  
 
• Fixed size changeable are the values that are set at the initiation of a mobile agent 
to which changes are permitted, e.g. global variables. 
• Dynamically allocated static are the results of executing a mobile agent at hosts in 
the agent itinerary to which changes are not permitted. 
• Dynamically allocated changeable are the results of executing a mobile agent at 
hosts in the agent itinerary to which changes are permitted, e.g. register contents and 
stack. 
 
 In this section, we only discuss the security of agent’s data as the thesis only 
focuses on the security of data exchanged during e-Negotiation (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 
2012a). We discuss the different security threats to agent’s data and required security 
level. We then outline the security properties of agent’s data and describe the related 
security mechanisms presented in the literature. The security of hosts is discussed in 
our work (2012a). 
2.3.1 Security Threats to Agent’s Data 
The security threats to agent’s data can be classified into the following three types: 
 
- Threats during agent execution at remote hosts 
- Threats during agent transmission between remote hosts 
- Threats during agent communication with other agents at different hosts  
2.3.1.1 Threats to agent execution 
Mobile agents might be executed at non-trusted hosts that would have full control 
over them. During execution, agents would be subject to direct security attacks of 
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intruders and non-trusted hosts that can perform any of the following malicious acts 
(Farmer, Guttman, & Swarup, 1996; Jaljouli, 2006b; Jansen & Karygiannis, 2000):  
 
- Truncation of the execution results. It is the most common and severe security 
attack and is referred to as colluding attack. The attack may take place whenever 
a visited host maliciously co-operate with a preceding host in the agent itinerary. 
A host truncates the execution results acquired at intermediary hosts and then 
sends the mobile agent back to the preceding host to substitute the execution 
result it had previously provided to the agent with new execution result to 
compete with other hosts. The attack would not be detected if the preceding host 
replaces the agent’s current state with the agent’s previous state when it firstly 
visited its host. Truncation might result in money fritter, particularly, in the case 
of shopping agents that search for the lowest priced goods where the offer of 
the most competing host has been truncated.  
 
- Alteration of execution results the mobile agent stores. The attack can take 
place if the mobile agent visits a host twice or two hosts collude. The alteration 
of the execution results can take different forms as described below. 
 
 A malicious host may send the mobile agent back to a preceding host in the 
agent itinerary and the host would then alter the execution results the agent 
stores as in colluding attack. 
 A malicious host may truncate the execution results and appends a fake 
stem at its discretion, if the input to all previous chaining relations is known 
and the validity of the chaining relation is maintained. 
 A malicious host may truncate the execution results and then sends the 
mobile agent to hosts of its choice. It would repeat the process until it is 
satisfied with the execution results.  
 
The initiator would never detect alteration of the execution results. The attack 
might result in money fritter, particularly, in the case of mobile agents that 
search for the lowest priced goods where the execution result of the most 
competing host has been altered. 
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- Breaching privacy of the execution results. An adversary may capture a mobile 
agent and then impersonates its genuine initiator so the executing hosts would 
encrypt their execution results with the adversary’s encryption key. The 
adversary would then be able to breach privacy of the execution results. 
 
- Transmitting the execution results of a host signed with the private key of a 
malicious host. Usually, an executing host signs the results of executing a 
mobile agent at its host with its private signing key. An adversary might capture 
the mobile agent and then extracts the signature from the execution results and 
signs them with its private key impersonating the genuine host that signed the 
results.  
 
- Replacing the execution results the mobile agent stores with the execution 
results of similar agents. An adversary might capture the mobile agent and then 
replaces the agent’s current state with the state of a similar agent.  
 
- Tracing the flow of agent execution and thus comprehend the point of execution 
in memory and point of storage in stack. 
- Alteration of static data, fixed size changeable data, or dynamically allocated 
changeable. 
2.3.1.2 Threats to agent communication 
Complex tasks that cannot be done by a single mobile are subdivided among multiple 
agents, which would communicate with each other by passing messages. The 
communicated messages may be intercepted by intruders that can perform any of the 
following malicious acts:  
- Eavesdrop messages that include confidential data if they are sent in plain text 
and are not encrypted. 
- Delete or manipulate the communicated message without being detected. 
- Falsify the communicated message or reply it at later time. 
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2.3.1.3 Threats to agent transmission 
Agents transport through unsecure communication channels, and thus intruders may 
intercept a migrating agent and attack it maliciously in different ways while it is in 
transit between successive hosts in the agent itinerary. An intruder can delay the 
agent execution by a denial of service attack or capture the agent and obstruct it from 
returning to the client. It can also redirect the agent to a host not scheduled in the 
agent itinerary or disturb the intended goals of the agent. The intruder might try to 
eavesdrop upon communications and read sensitive data sent as plain text within the 
agent. Supposedly the communicated data is encrypted then the intruder would try to 
impersonate the genuine initiator and hence breach the privacy of the gathered data. 
It may possibly intercept the agent that has a message signed by the initiator of an 
agent. It could then decrypt the signed message and sign the decrypted message with 
its private key impersonating the genuine initiator. Executing hosts in the agent 
itinerary would encrypt the data they provide to the agent with the public key of the 
intruder assuming it is the genuine initiator. Hence, the intruder would be able to 
breach the privacy of the collected data. In addition, the intruder might transmit 
others data signed by the private key of a malicious host. Usually, executing hosts in 
the agent itinerary send the data they provide to the agent signed with the 
corresponding private keys. An intruder might intercept the signed data. It could then 
decrypt the signed data and may sign the data of a particular host with its private key 
impersonating the genuine provider of the data. 
2.3.2 Security Requirements 
The wide deployment of mobile agents requires reliable mechanisms that provide 
safety and security for mobile agents and agent servers. The mobile agent system 
must fulfill a set of goals (Jansen, 2000; Loureiro, Molva, & Roudier, 2000). It 
should protect the mobile agent code and data from tampering and disclosure, either 
while it is in transit or while it is executed on an agent platform, by other agents 
running on the agent server or a malicious agent server. It should also be able to 
verify integrity of agent code or data accurately. Agents should be correctly 
transferred to desired hosts and be provided with appropriate resources. The 
communicated messages between agents residing at different platforms should be 
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protected. Cryptography is implemented to encrypt the exchanged messages for 
identification and authentication purposes. The agent platform should verify 
authenticity of agents accurately and execute authenticated agents correctly. It should 
prevent agents from interfering with each other or with the platform. It provides 
isolated domains for agents and controls their access to resources at the agent 
platform. The mobile agent system should be able to audit the security events taking 
place at the agent platform and manage agent platform deadlocks properly. It should 
also protect the data, software, hardware, and resources of the agent platform from 
the abuse of malicious mobile agents. 
2.3.3 Security Properties 
In this section, the various security properties of agent’s data will be described in 
details (Giansiracusa, 2003; IBM Aglets (2002); Jaljouli, 2006b; Jaljouli & Abawajy, 
2009; Karnik, 1998; Ng, 1999).  
 
There are common notations that are used in describing security properties of 
agent’s data (Fischer, 2003; Maggi & Sisto, 2003; Roth, 2001). A mobile agent gets 
executed at each host in the agent itinerary and the result of its execution at host ൫ ௝݅൯ for 
(1 d j d n) is stored as ൫ ௝݉൯ within the agent. The execution results are modeled as a 
chain: ൛݉ଵ ǡ݉ଶ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ respective to the order of executing hosts in the agent 
itinerary. Upon completion of agent itinerary, the agent returns with a chain of execution 
results but it might differ from the genuine execution result ൫ ௝݉൯ for (1 d j d n) due to 
tampering acts of adversaries. Hence, it is modeled as: ൛݉ଵ′ ǡ݉ଶ′ ǡ ڮ ǡ݉௡′ ൟ. The 
encryption of plain message ሺ݉ሻinto a ciphertext is written as ሺ݉ሻܭ௜೙, where ܭ௜೙ 
is the public key of host ሺ݅௡ሻwhich encrypted ሺ݉ሻdata. A digital signature is 
written as an encryption with a private signing key ൫ ௜ܵ೙ିଵ൯. Signing a plain message 
with the digital signing key is written as ሺ݉ሻ ௜ܵ೙ିଵ. It is assumed that it is possible to 
deduce the identity of the signer from a signature. It is possible to extract the digital 
signature from a signed message.  
 
 The security properties of agent’s data encompass: integrity, privacy, 
authenticity, non-repudiability, and anonymity properties (Fischer, 2003; Maggi & 
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Sisto, 2003) and are discussed below. In expressing the security properties of 
mobile agent, we assume the agent visits (n) executing hosts. When the agent gets 
executed at host ൫ ௝݅൯, it stores the result of execution ൫ ௝݉൯ for (1 d j d n).  The 
execution results are modeled as a chain: ൛݉ଵ ǡ݉ଶ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ respective to the order of 
executing hosts in the agent itinerary. The execution results that are returned upon the 
completion of e-Negotiation might differ from the genuine execution results due to 
security attacks and are modeled as a chain: ሼ݉ଵᇱ ǡ݉ଶᇱ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ᇱ ሽ. The security properties 
are described below. 
 
1. Data integrity: It requires that any tampering with agent's execution results has to 
be prevented or at least be detected. The execution results the mobile agent stores 
൫ ௝݉൯ for (1 d j d n) should be maintained intact during its transportation through 
the Internet or execution at (n) visited hosts, or at least any tampering with the 
execution results can be detected. The chain of execution results: ሼ݉ଵᇱ ǡ݉ଶᇱ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ᇱ ሽ 
the mobile agent returns upon completion of e-Negotiation has to match the 
genuine chain of execution results: ൛݉ଵ ǡ݉ଶ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ. Otherwise, a proof can be 
generated that shows that the genuine execution results had been tampered with. 
The data integrity property can be classified into the following classes of 
protection: 
 
 Insertion resilience: An execution result can only be appended to the chain 
of execution results ൛݉ଵ ǡ ڮ ǡ ௝݉ ൟ for ( j < n). 
 
 Deletion resilience: An execution result ൫ ௝݉൯ for (1 d j d n) cannot be 
deleted from the chain of results: ൛݉ଵ ǡ ڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ the mobile agent has, or at 
least its deletion can be detected upon completion of e-Negotiation. If an 
execution result ൫ ௝݉൯ is deleted so the chain of execution results concludes 
as: ൛݉ଵ ǡ ڮ ǡ ௝݉ିଵǡ ௝݉ାଵǡڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ, then there exists a proof that an execution 
result is deleted from the chain of results. 
 Truncation resilience: A chain of execution results: ൛݉ଵ ǡ ݉ଶ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ the 
mobile agent has cannot be truncated to a shorter chain: ൛݉ଵ ǡ ڮǡ  ௝݉ ൟ for 
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( j < n ), or at least any truncation of execution results can be detected upon 
the completion of e-Negotiation. Verifications compute particular parameters 
e.g. checksums or message authentication code using the execution results 
that are returned upon completion e-Negotiation and then compare them with 
the corresponding parameters the mobile agent has. Any difference between 
the two parameters indicates that the execution results had been truncated.  
 Strong forward integrity: An execution result is maintained intact during 
e-Negotiation. The property necessitates that each execution result ൫ ௝݉ᇱ൯ 
that is returned upon completion of e-Negotiation matches the genuine 
execution result ൫ ௝݉൯ for (1 d j d n). 
 Strong data integrity: The four protection classes: insertion resilience, 
deletion resilience, truncation resilience, and strong forward integrity are 
satisfied. 
 
2. Data non-repudiability: A proof can be generated on the identity of host ൫ ௝݅൯ 
that added an execution result ൫ ௝݉ᇱ൯ for (1 d j d n) to the chain of results: 
൛݉ଵᇱ ǡڮ ǡ ௝݉ᇱǡ ڮ ǡ ݉௡ᇱ ൟ. 
 
3. Data privacy: The execution results: ൛݉ଵ ǡڮ ǡ ௝݉ ǡڮ ǡ݉௡ ൟ the mobile agent 
stores can only be revealed to host that initiated the agent or authorized entities. 
Adversaries would not be able to learn the plaintext of the ciphered execution 
results that are stored within the mobile agent. Cryptography is implemented in 
ciphering the execution results, which seals the plaintext and prevents 
unauthorized retrieval of data. Only the host that initiated the agent and authorized 
parties can decrypt the ciphered text and learn the plaintext. An adversary might 
capture the ciphered execution results, shown below.   
ሺ݉ଵሻܭ௜భǡڮǡ൫ ௝݉൯ܭ௜ೕǡڮǡሺ݉௡ሻܭ௜೙ 
However, she/he would not be able to deduce the plaintext ൫ ௝݉൯ for (1 d j d n), as 
the decryption keys are private and thus the system is considered secure. It is 
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essential to maintain the privacy of the encryption keys during the conduct of e-
Negotiation. 
4. Data authenticity: There is a proof that an execution result ൫ ௝݉ᇱ൯ for (1 d j d n) has 
truly been provided by the host ൫ ௝݅൯ that claims the execution result. The property 
does not allow an adversary to impersonate a host. Usually, a host ൫ ௝݅൯ signs the 
result of executing the agent at its host with its private signing key so 
havingሺ݉ሻܵ௜ೕିଵ. It would be considered as a proof that the execution result has 
truly been provided by host ൫ ௝݅൯. 
5. Anonymity: The identity of host ൫ ௝݅൯ for (1 d j d n) that provided the execution 
result ൫ ௝݉൯ and appended it to the chain: ൛݉ଵ ǡ ௝݉ିଵൟ can only be known to the 
host that initiated the agent or authorized entities. An executing host ൫ ௝݅ାଵ൯ 
should not be able to deduce the identity of an already visited host ൫ ௝݅൯. Though, 
a malicious host ൫ ௝݅ାଵ൯ can deduce the identity of host ൫ ௝݅൯ at which the 
execution result ൫ ௝݉൯ was generated by analyzing the mobile agent’s dynamic 
data just before and after the agent visited the host ൫ ௝݅൯. Also, the network layer 
may reveal the identity of host ൫ ௝݅൯. Anonymity can be preserved using 
anonymous connections (Symbolic Model Prover, 2000) that hide the identity of 
the already visited hosts. 
2.3.4 Security Mechanisms Taxonomy 
In this thesis, the focus is on protecting agent’s data. The security mechanisms can 
be classified into two levels of security as protection and detection levels. The 
prevention level makes it impossible or very hard for an entity to implant a malicious 
attack, whereas the detective level can identify malicious attacks of malicious entities 
through verification processes. They may also be able to identify who should be held 
responsible for the act. The security mechanisms assume that the mobile agent is 
trusted and does not behave maliciously. Also, it assumes that the mobile agent trusts 
the client host that instantiated it.  
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 The agent protection mechanisms that are presented in the literature (Jaljouli & 
Abawajy, 2012a; Karnik, 1998; Loureiro et al., 2000; Nitschke, Paprzyeki, & Ren, 
2006; Ylitalo, 2000) are outlined and described below. 
2.3.4.1 Prevention Mechanisms 
The prevention mechanisms include the following mechanisms: Secure routing 
(agent routing security policy), co-operating agents, obfuscation (time-limited black 
box security), Tamper-Resistant Hardware, computing with encrypted functions, 
Environmental key generation, and Keylets.  
SECURE ROUTING (AGENT ROUTING SECURITY POLICY) 
It implements a routing security policy that restricts the agent itinerary to trusted 
servers only (Pagnia et al., 2000). Thus, agent platform has control over the 
migration of the agent and the agent would not be allowed to execute on non-trusted 
platforms. An agent creator or owner would not have to select a trusted server. It can 
send the mobile agent to gateways, which provide directory services to agents and 
guide them where to go to get executed. 
 The approach prevents tampering with the agent’s code and data. The drawback 
of the approach is the limited roaming of the agent that would restrain the potentials 
of mobile agents. 
CO-OPERATING AGENTS 
The agent’s critical data and functions are split among two or more agents that 
cooperate with each other. Agents execute on carefully selected disjoint platform 
domains to avoid the likelihood of platforms to conspire in an attempt of colluding 
attacks. Agents have to integrate their results to accomplish the main goal. Two 
agents might be cooperating to accomplish a task, a stationary agent and a migrating 
agent (Roth, 1999). The migrating agent traverses the Internet and the stationary 
agent resides at a trusted platform. They can access shared data securely and store 
data remotely. It is assumed that a malicious agent or non-trusted platform would not 
be able to attack the agent individually.  
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 The approach prevents non-trusted platforms from performing a malicious act. 
Platforms have to conspire to attack the agent which is not possible as the selected 
platform domains do not allow agents to execute on non-trusted platforms 
simultaneously. The approach has drawbacks: (1) Difficulty in selecting disjoint 
platform domains that avoid the simultaneous execution of agents on non-trusted 
platforms, and (2) Privacy is not addressed. 
OBFUSCATION (TIME LIMITED BLACK BOX) 
The mobile code is jumbled so platforms would find it very hard to analyze or even 
attack. Polynomials and rational functions are used to obfuscate code. The Induced 
code should be functionally identical to the original code. The code is called black 
box and has a validity interval. The interval is set so that a malicious entity would 
not be able to reveal sensitive data or tamper with the agent’s data, code or state.  If 
the validity interval expires, then the agent code and data are considered invalid. 
 
 The approach protects the entire agent temporarily and is effective in protecting 
short-term sensitive data. The drawbacks of the approach are: (1) It cannot be 
implemented for long-validity data such as credit card expiry date, (2) The 
protection interval set by the agent owner might be shorter than the time the agent 
needs to accomplish its intended task or it might be long enough to be tampered by 
a malicious entity, (3) The security related libraries enclosed by the agent have to be 
obfuscated, and (4) The obfuscated code can be reversed. 
TAMPER-RESISTANT HARDWARE 
It is a physically sealed environment that contains sensitive data and performs a 
task. Access to the internals is through a restricted interface the tamper-resistant 
hardware controls. Any violation to the rules would result in invalidation of the 
sealed sensitive data. Tamper resistant hardware devices are such as smart cards in 
payment systems and access control systems in secured communications. The 
drawback of the approach is that an attack might be able to violate the physical 
protection given enough time and resources. 
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COMPUTING WITH ENCRYPTED FUNCTIONS 
It uses cryptography to conceal functions so the agent platform would not be able to 
know the task a function completes. The function is encrypted using a particular 
encryption key and is then dispatched to the agent platform for execution. The 
platform would then execute the encrypted function for an input value and then gets 
an encrypted result. The result is dispatched to the agent owner that only can 
interpret the encrypted result using a particular decryption key. The drawbacks of 
the approach are: (1) An attacker might be able to recover an encryption function 
through iterative execution of the encrypted function, and (2) Interaction with the 
executing host is possible as results of functions are encrypted. The approach 
prevents intentional tampering of malicious entities unless the enforced penalties are 
not too high.  
ENVIRONMENTAL KEY GENERATION 
The approach (Jansen & Karygiannis, 2000) implements conditional decryption of 
the executable agent code. Upon specific environmental changes, a key is generated 
so the ciphered agent code can be decrypted. The condition is ciphered using one 
way hash function or public key encryption so as an adversary would not be able to 
reveal the condition. The drawbacks of the approach are: (1) The agent platform 
such as Java based system would not allow the execution of the ciphered code 
which it cannot trust, (2) The agent platform can capture the agent or may tamper 
with the ciphered code and thus restrains its intended goals, and (3) The agent 
platform can trigger the condition and thus read the code. 
KEYLETS 
The approach (Giansiracusa, 2003; Kim & Moreau, 2001) is based on partitioning 
the agent code, data, and state into self-contained components and then encrypting 
the components with different symmetric keys. The ciphered code would be neither 
executable nor interpretable. The symmetric keys should be propagated to the agent 
platform so as to decrypt the components and execute the agent properly. The 
symmetric keys should be ciphered before being propagated so as to preserve the 
integrity of the symmetric keys. It is proposed to encrypt the symmetric keys using 
the public key of the succeeding platform in the agent itinerary. The agent owner 
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might handle partitioning, encryption, and propagation tasks, nevertheless its 
platform might become into a bottleneck state and a focal point. It is advisable that 
the owner delegate a third party of key generation and propagation. The drawbacks 
of the approach are: (1) It introduces a considerable increase in communication 
loads, task duration and computation complexity, (2) The agent platform may not be 
willing to support the complex approach, (3) It requires a third party for key 
generation and propagation, and (4) Risk of incomplete key propagation. 
2.3.4.2 Detection Mechanisms 
The detection mechanisms can be classified into the following detection levels: 
 Detection after the agent execution is terminated 
 Detection during the agent execution 
 Instantaneous detection that require an action 
 The detection mechanisms include the following mechanisms: Execution traces, 
partial results encapsulation, detecting objects, itinerary recording, secret splitting, 
reference states, and cooperating agents. 
EXECUTION TRACES 
The agent platform creates a log of the agent execution including the lines of code 
executed at the platform and the external values read by the agent while it is running 
on the platform (Tan & Moreau, 2002). The platform computes a cryptographic hash 
of the log and then sends the agent with the computed hash and the agent’s 
intermediate state both signed by its private key to the succeeding platform in the 
agent itinerary. The signature acts as attestation on the platform’s responsibility for 
the change in the agent’s state as a result of the proper execution of the agent. Each 
platform in the agent itinerary creates a log of the agent execution and encloses it 
with the previous logs. It would then send cumulative logs together with the mobile 
agent to the succeeding host in the agent itinerary. The process continues till the 
agent returns to the client. The agent owner can verify execution traces by simulating 
the agent execution, starting from the agent’s initial state. The agent owner can then 
detect if any platform has executed the agent improperly. 
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 The approach can detect any malicious act of non-trusted platforms after the 
agent execution is terminated and identify malicious entities.  It can also hinder 
malicious platforms from executing agents improperly due to the risk of being caught 
and penalized. Execution traces can stand as legal proofs at courts. However, they 
have some drawbacks. They result in heavy communication loads and necessitate 
large amounts of storage resources and thus are too expensive and impractical. They 
also need time synchronization among the executing platforms and a secure protocol 
for the transfer of cryptographic hashes and agent’s states. 
PARTIAL RESULT ENCAPSULATION 
The security of the execution results is built based on the implementation of one or 
more of the following security techniques: public key encryption, digital signature, 
message authentication code, backward chaining, one-step forward chaining, and 
code-result binding. The methods are described in details in (Aziz et al., 2001). 
 
 The public key encryption encrypts the execution result at a host with the public 
encryption key of the host that initiated the agent to preserve privacy of execution 
results. The results can only be decrypted by the host that initiated the agent, i.e. 
initiating host. 
 The digital signature signs the execution result at a host with the private signing 
key of the host to provide a proof that the execution result has truly been provided 
by the host. 
  The message authentication code appends the identity of the succeeding host and 
some characteristics of the execution result at the preceding host to the execution 
result at the current host.  
 The backward chaining appends some characteristics of the execution result at the 
preceding host to the execution result at the current host.  
 The one-step forward chaining appends the identity of the succeeding host to the 
execution result at the current host.  
 The code-result binding binds the agent’s signed code to its execution results to 
make sure that the returned results belong to the agent of concern.  
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The approach preserves privacy, non-repudiation and authenticity of execution 
results. It can also detect any tampering with agent’s code as the agent returns to the 
initiating host and the agent owner verifies the returned code with the original one. 
Moreover, the approach keeps a trace of visited hosts and thus the agent owner can 
verify if trace actually corresponds to the initial agent itinerary. The drawback of the 
approach is that it cannot maintain strong integrity of execution results. It mostly 
fails to detect two types of attacks: data truncation by colluding platforms and fake 
data insertion. 
DETECTING OBJECTS 
It inserts dummy data into the execution results database that would not be included 
in any computations and should stay intact until the agent execution is terminated. A 
malicious entity that attempts to tamper with the execution results may alter the 
dummy data. Upon the agent’s return, the agent owner can suspect tampering with 
the execution results if any of the dummy data items is altered or deleted. 
 
The approach can detect tampering with execution results. The drawbacks of the 
approach are that the dummy data items have to be instantiated for each particular 
type of mobile codes, and they should not be distinguished such that a malicious 
entity would surely attack. It is advisable to perform timely updates of the dummy 
data items so a malicious entity would not be able to comprehend the objective of 
such data items.  
ITINERARY RECORDING  
The agent platform signs the results of executing the agent with its private key and 
binds it to the identity of the succeeding platform in the agent itinerary. Thus, the 
agent owner can assemble the agent itinerary upon the agent’s return and compares it 
to the itinerary it deduces from the signed execution results. If they do not match, it 
detects tampering with the execution results by a truncation attack.  
 
The approach can detect tampering with execution results as the agent execution 
is terminated. However, the approach does not preserve the privacy of execution 
results. Also, it cannot detect truncation of execution results by colluding attack. 
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REFERENCE STATES 
Reference states are agent’s states that resulted from executing the agent at a trusted 
host. The approach uses reference states to detect any tampering with the agent’s 
states. The execution results are instantaneously and absolutely verified at the next 
platform in the agent itinerary.  
 
 The approach can detect tampering with the agent’s states spontaneously. 
However, it cannot detect truncation of execution results by colluding attack and 
does not preserve privacy of execution results. Moreover, it prolongs the agent 
execution time and doubles computation loads as compared to the normal loads of 
executing mobile agents. 
SECRET SPLITTING  
The agent task is split over multi-agents that cooperate to accomplish the intended 
task. Agents have shares of a secret key for remote digital signing. The results of 
agents are integrated without the need of reassembling the key. 
 The approach prevents a meaningful tampering with execution results. However, 
it does not preserve privacy of execution results and cannot protect the agent code. It 
also introduces additional communication and coordination loads. 
2.4 Existing e-Negotiation Frameworks 
In this section, we discuss the existing e-Negotiation frameworks with regards to 
system architecture, negotiation protocol, negotiation strategy, utility function, and 
security protocol with focus on one-to-many negotiation. We then identify the 
deficiencies in the existing frameworks and the needed enhancements. Next, we 
discuss the existing formal methods of verification of security protocols. 
2.4.1   Existing System Architectures 
Negotiation model is represented a sequence of multiple phases. The literature 
presents several negotiation models: (Robinson & Volkov, 1998; Kersten & 
Noronha, 1999; Li, 2001; Zhuang, Fong, & Shi, 2008, Guttman, Moukas, & Maes, 
1998; Gil Iranzo, 2005; Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2007a, 2007b, 2010). Robinson and 
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Volkov (1998) have defined a negotiation model of three phases: analysis, 
interaction design, and negotiation implementation. Kersten and Noronha (1999) 
have defined a negotiation model of three phases: pre-negotiation, conduct of 
negotiation, and post settlement. Li (2001) has defined a negotiation model of four 
phases: analysis, design, execution, and post-negotiation analysis. Zhuang et al. 
(2008) have extended Li's negotiation model to include an evaluation and ranking 
phase before the execution phase. The additional phase makes use of experience and 
history of negotiations, client's preferences, and vendors' profiles to estimate utilities 
of vendors' offers. Guttman et al. (1998) have defined a negotiation model of six 
phases: need identification, product brokering, merchant brokering, negotiation, 
purchase and delivery, service and evaluation. Gil Iranzo (2005) has defined a 
negotiation model of five phases: user interaction, search, negotiation, outcomes, and 
control. The model employs a stationary agent that communicates with a directory of 
services to locate a meta-search agent that advises on a set of service providers 
registered for the service of interest. It calls for offers and exchanges offers and 
counter-offers with service providers. Negotiation continues till an agreement is 
reached or negotiation aborts. The first three models do not make use of experience, 
knowledge, or negotiation history in the current negotiation. Furthermore, they only 
consider a single thread in multi-lateral negotiation. Zhuang model does not include 
purchase and delivery phase. Gutman et al. (1998) model does not include evaluation 
and ranking phase. Gil Iranzo model does not include both evaluation and ranking 
phase and purchase and delivery phase. A comprehensive negotiation model should 
include the following phases: request initiation, bidding, search, evaluation and 
negotiation, winner-determination and settlement, purchase, and delivery of 
goods/services. 
 
 The existing system architectures of e-Negotiation are generally abstract 
architectures such as the architecture in (Chen, & Huang, 2009). The architecture 
models one-to-many bilateral negotiation where a buyer wishes to negotiate multiple 
attributes with multiple suppliers and attributes can be of quantitative or qualitative 
type. It describes the negotiation system as a number of interacting entities: client, 
client agent, suppliers, supplier agent, negotiation servers, web servers, e-
Marketplace, and supplier inventory databases. The database has information about 
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goods/services suppliers provide. Buyer and seller agents communicate via web 
servers in e-Marketplaces. It considers the negotiation model comprising of three 
phases: pre-negotiation, negotiation, post-negotiation. In the pre-negotiation phase, 
the buyer defines the negotiation process to the buyer agent. It defines attributes and 
their respective weights, constraints, preferences score, tactics and strategies of 
negotiation.  In the negotiation phase, each seller agent proposes an offer for the 
request of the buyer agent. The buyer agent applies similarity matching to identify a 
seller offer that is most similar to buyer's request and then sends a counter-offer to 
each seller agent (Faratin et al., 2002). The buyer and sellers implement different 
strategies and tactics for generating offers and counter-offers. Next, the seller agent 
that received a counter-offer verifies if it satisfies its time and resource limitations. If 
the verification passes, then the seller starts a trade-off with the buyer agent on each 
negotiated attribute based on different strategies that the buyer agent selects. In the 
post-negotiation phase, the buyer agent compares the outcomes of trade-off 
strategies. 
 
 Generic agent architecture is presented in (Brazier et al., 2000; Jonker et al., 
2007) for bilateral negotiation where a buyer wishes to negotiate multiple attributes 
with a seller and attributes can be of quantitative and qualitative type.  It enhances 
the Generic Agent Model (GAM) in (Jonker et al., 2007). It describes the negotiation 
system as a number of interacting entities: buyer, buyer representative agents, seller 
representative agents, external world, seller-dependent seller database, and broker 
agent. The external world is such as consumer organizations or land registry office 
from which the buyer representative agent can retrieve information about third party. 
The seller database has a record of past deals in which it contributed. 
 
 It considers the negotiation model comprising of four stages: need identification, 
product brokering, merchant brokering, and negotiation. The buyer initially 
communicates its request to the broker agent. It then provides it with three deals of 
products from sellers that match its request. The buyer selects the deal that best 
meets its request. The buyer representative agent then negotiates with the seller 
representative agent, tries to resolve conflicts, and reaches a mutual agreement. The 
negotiation is considered as a cooperative but goals are not mutual.  
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 It presents a high-level architecture of the agent in multi-attribute negotiation. 
The architecture has seven components: own process control, agent interaction 
management, world interaction management, agent information maintenance, world 
information maintenance, cooperation management, and agent specific task. The own 
process control component stores characteristics and interests of the agent. The agent 
interaction management component takes care of managing agent communication 
with other agents, whereas, the world interaction management components takes 
care of managing agent communication with the external world. The agent 
information maintenance component maintains knowledge of preferences of other 
agents with which the agent co-operates. The world information maintenance 
component maintains information about the external world. The cooperation 
management component manages a set of processes: attribute evaluation, deal utility 
determination, utility planning, attribute planning, and negotiation coordination. The 
agent specific task component has a model of the planned negotiation task.  
 
 The architecture of cooperation management involves of five processes. In the 
first process, evaluation functions are used to evaluate attributes of past deals taking 
into account preferences of buyer. The evaluation functions are either as tables for 
discrete attributes, e.g. quality of service or specific functions for continuous 
attributes, e.g. price. Specific functions include: linear function, normal distribution 
function, uphill function, and downhill function (Jonker & Treur, 2001; Jonker et al., 
2007). In the second process, the relative importance is determined for different 
attributes and is referred to as weight of attribute. Then, overall utility of past deals 
are determined as the weighted sum of attribute evaluation values. In the third 
process, the target utility is determined as the sum of concession and utility of current 
deal utility. In the fourth process, the configuration of the next deal is determined 
based on target evaluation of different attributes. In the fifth process, the state of a 
negotiation process is analyzed and controlled. It can determine if negotiation repeats 
without making any progress or there is a significant difference between utilities of 
negotiators. It can make a decision if to abort negotiation, settle agreement, move 
into another round of negotiation, or change concession factor (a measure of how 
much concession can be made) or configuration tolerance (a measure of buyer 
satisfaction). 
CHAPTER 2: Background and Related Works 
 
55 
 
 A system architecture called CONSENSUS is proposed for multi-issue multi-
lateral negotiation that deploys stationary agents (Benyoucef et al., 2001). It supports 
competitive negotiation in e-Commerce applications. It is based on the simultaneous 
procedure for negotiation that concurrently carries out independent negotiations on 
interdependent issues. The architecture cares for the coordination and reconciliation 
of Combined Negotiations CN. It implements a Combined Negotiation Support 
System (CNSS) that enables the client to manage combined negotiations via a 
Workflow Monitoring and Control Tool of a Workflow Management System (WfMS) 
and manages individual agents via an Agent Monitoring and Control Tool.  It also 
ensures the interdependencies are maintained during negotiation, employs strategy 
rules the client defines, and assists in decision making. It allows the client to 
intervene into combined negotiations such as changing the implemented negotiation 
strategy during negotiation runtime. It instantiates self-interested agents and assigns 
them to different negotiations. The client initially consults NR Respiratory that 
serves as commodity/vendor broker. The broker matches commodities and vendors 
that satisfy client's requirements and then generates a list of candidates for the client 
to sort out the ones in which it is interested. The list is then passed to an Agent 
Factory that accordingly downloads Strategy Rules (SR) for negotiation from the 
respective negotiation servers and stores them in SR Repository. The Agent Factory 
instantiates software agents based on Strategy Rules. Agents are then connected to 
the respective negotiation servers. The client uses a CN Specification Tool that serves 
as a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to model the Combined Negotiation CN. It 
specifies negotiation constraints that are then manipulated and stored in a CN 
Repository. Upon completion of CN specification task, a workflow that models 
Combined Negotiations CN is generated and stored in a Workflow Repository. The 
client can monitor and debug the defined workflow via a Workflow Definition. An 
instance of the workflow is then started and can be monitored via Workflow 
Monitoring and Control Tool. Next, a Workflow Engine is generated that executes 
the workflow by instantiating software agents and assigning them activities as per the 
workflow. The client initially selects a particular strategy for negotiation and can 
change it to another strategy during negotiation as deemed appropriate. The strategy 
is defined rule by rule. It may initially select an auction negotiation type and then 
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change it to a bargaining negotiation type. Agents can be monitored via Agent 
Monitoring and Control Tool. Each agent generates an SR Engine that makes 
decisions based on Strategy Rules SR stored in SR Repository.  
 
 The architecture in (Hindriks et al., 2008) presents system level architecture for 
bilateral negotiation, architecture for negotiating agents, and user bidding interface 
that connects agents to the overall system architecture. 
 The architecture allows agents to interact and integrate the outcomes of 
negotiation. The interface connects arbitrary agents to the system through adapters 
that facilitates conduct of agent negotiations and evaluation of agent internal 
performance. The system architecture consists of four layers: interaction layer, 
ontology layer, graphical user interface layer, and analytical toolbox layer. 
 
- Graphical user interface layer allows users to create negotiation ontology, 
contribute in negotiation, and review performance and target of negotiating 
agents. It also allows users to define the negotiation process by setting the 
followings. 
 
 Negotiation domain 
 Preference profile 
 Shared domain knowledge  
 
Negotiation domain allows users to define negotiation objectives and attributes, and 
constraints. Attributes can be of different types: discrete enumerated, integer, or real. 
Constraints place restrictions on acceptable negotiation outcomes.  
 
Preference profile allows users to specify preferences of negotiation outcomes that 
indicate relative importance of different negotiation attributes. 
 
Shared domain knowledge stores public information that is shared between 
negotiating agents and can assist them in deciding on the next action that is 
acceptable to the negotiation partner. It is accessible by all negotiating agents. In 
competitive negotiation, agents maintain the privacy of their preferences and try to 
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model preferences of their opponents through the implementation of machine 
learning techniques and analysis of opponent acts. 
 
- Interaction layer allows agents to define the negotiation protocol and enables 
interactions of negotiating agents. It enforces negotiating agents to conform to 
the negotiation protocol, client’s negotiation deadline, and environment timeouts.    
 
- Analytical toolbox layer stores statistical analysis methods that are needed for 
analyzing outcomes of negotiation sessions and also stores methods that are 
needed for analyzing negotiation dynamic properties (Hindriks, Jonker, & 
Tykhonov, 2007). It uses Pareto efficient frontier, Nash product and Kalai-
Smorodinsky methods (Raiffa, 1982) for defining negotiation targets that are 
needed to analyze the efficiency of negotiation strategies, performance of 
negotiating agents, and quality of opponent modeling techniques.  
 
- Ontology layer allows negotiating agents to define their preferences and the 
negotiation domain. 
  
 The architecture of a negotiating agent consists of four components: negotiation 
history, negotiation strategy, preference model, and opponent model.  
 
- Negotiation history has a record of exchanged offers and also has a record of past 
deals including: negotiation outcomes, opponent identities, and opponent models.  
 
- Negotiation strategy decides on the best action in response to opponent offer 
based on information stored in negotiation history. It may decide to abort 
negotiation, accept an opponent offer, or generate a counter-offer. It implements 
specific negotiation tactics in generating counter-offers. The preference model 
has preferences of a negotiating agent.  
 
- Opponent model can have a significant influence on negotiation outcomes as it 
provides information about opponent preferences that are assumed to be private 
(Zeng & Sycara, 1998). It is composed of three subcomponents:  
 
 Negotiation strategy 
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 Preference model 
 Update mechanism 
Negotiation strategy predicts actions of a negotiating opponent based on the 
negotiation history. It provides the negotiating agent with a basis for generating 
counter-offers that are acceptable by a negotiating agent (Zeng & Sycara, 1998). 
 
Preference model has information about preferences of current and past negotiating 
opponents. The information is inferred from exchanged offers and settled 
agreements. It has uncertainty level as it is assumed to be private. 
 
Update mechanism analyzes opponent offers and tries to infer preferences of a 
negotiating opponent. 
 
 System architecture is proposed for negotiations in supply chain management 
(Wong et al., 2004). It handles three types of negotiations: 
- Negotiation between manufactures and suppliers 
- Negotiations between wholesalers and manufactures 
- Negotiations between retailers and logistics channels 
It deploys both stationary and mobile agents and consists of the following. 
 Buyer Manager Agent (BMA): is a stationary agent that resides at the buyer host. 
Its main role is to create and manage (BMNA) agents, and to make decisions on 
purchases. At initialization, it queries relevant information from ERP database as 
regards preferences, priorities, and constraints of the item to purchase, and a list 
of potential sellers to visit. It then creates (BMNA) agents and selects negotiation 
tactics. Next, it dispatches every (BMNA) agent to the designated seller host. 
Upon the return of (BMNA) agents to the buyer host, it collects proposals from 
(BMNA) agents and makes a decision on the best proposal. Finally, it updates the 
ERP with the negotiation record for future reference. 
 Buyer Mobile Negotiation Agent (BMNA): is a mobile agent that migrates to the 
designated supplier host and interacts with the Seller Negotiation Agent (SNA) to 
collect a proposal. It implements a negotiation strategy for evaluating the 
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proposal and generating a counter-proposal. It submits a counter proposal to the 
Supplier Negotiation Agent (SNA). Multiple (BMNA) might be created and each 
would be sent to the designated seller host. 
 Seller Manager Agent (SMA): is a stationary agent that resides at the seller host 
and its role is similar to that of the (BMA) agent. It creates and manages (SNA), 
and makes decisions on purchases. 
 Seller Negotiation Agent (SNA): is a stationary agent created by the (SMA) 
agent. Its role is to interact with the incoming (BMNA) agents during negotiation 
and to provide proposals upon request.  
 Graphical User Interface (GUI): is an interface though which sellers and buyers 
interact with their respective systems using run-time. It also controls and 
monitors the negotiation process. 
 Enterprise resource planning (ERP): it has management information of an 
organization including negotiation related information. 
 
 The existing system architectures are mainly based on the deployment of 
stationary agents while research has shown that mobile agents are more effective 
than stationary agents (Chen, & Huang, 2009; Du et al., 2005). Mobile agents are 
recommended for large scale distributed applications (Bădică et al., 2007). Also, the 
implementation of e-Negotiation in real applications is still limited due to a lack in 
establishing system level architectures that integrate heterogeneous negotiating 
agents into the overall system (Hindriks et al., 2007). The system architecture should 
enable negotiating agents to interact, negotiate, and analyze outcomes of negotiation 
sessions. They should also enable an arbitrary negotiating agent to connect to the 
negotiation system. Moreover, there is a lack in establishing negotiating agent 
architecture that defines different components of the agent.  
 
 The discussion shows that there is a need for system architecture that deploys 
mobile agents in e-Negotiation and integrates negotiating agents into the overall 
system. Also, there is a need for establishing architecture for negotiating agents.  
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2.4.2 Existing Negotiation Protocols 
A variety of negotiation protocols have been presented in the literature. They are 
mainly one-to-one negotiation protocols or one-to-many unilateral negotiation 
protocols. Some of the existing negotiation protocols are discussed briefly below. 
 
 Winoto et al. (2002) presented a negotiation protocol for one-to-one bilateral 
negotiation that extends the alternating-offer bargaining protocol (Lai, Li, Sycara, & 
Giampapa, 2004). It eliminates the strict assumptions of game-theoretic approach 
and reinforces agent learning but limits rationality and computational power. 
 
 Reaidy et al. (2006) presented a negotiation protocol for production systems. The 
protocol incorporates both competitive and cooperative negotiations. 
 
 Cranor and Resnick (2000) presented automated negotiation protocols for one-to-
many unilateral negotiation such as auction or one-to-one bilateral negotiation such 
as bargaining. 
  
 Li et al. (2008) presented multi-issue one-to-one bilateral alternate bidding 
negotiation protocol and recommended the deployment of dynamic learning agents 
that are based on reinforcement learning. The agents outperform static learning 
agents and would improve the efficiency of the negotiation protocol.  
 
 Wanyama and Homayoun Far (2007) presented a negotiation protocol for many-
to-many negotiations in group-choice decision making processes. 
  
 The existing negotiation protocols mainly deploy stationary agents and address 
one-to-one negotiations such as bargaining or one-to-many negotiations such as 
auctions. The one-to-many negotiation protocols carry out negotiations 
simultaneously. The focus of this thesis is on one-to-many e-Trade negotiations that 
deploy mobile agents and carry out negotiations sequentially. Thus, there is a need 
for a negotiation protocol that addresses the negotiation model of concern. It would 
be sufficient to have the general rules of the protocol clearly defined without the 
need for formal protocol representation or verification of protocol properties: input 
consistency, transparency, explicability, tractability, and completeness (Kersten & 
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Lai, 2007); particularly the thesis mainly focuses on four problems that relate to: 
system architecture, negotiation strategy, utility function, and security protocol.  
2.4.3 Existing Negotiation Strategies 
 Negotiation strategies have been classified based on eagerness to trade into four 
types (Rahwan et al., 2002; Ge & Dong, 2010; Nguyen & Jennings, 2003): (1) 
desperate; (2) patient; (3) partially patient; (4) optimized patient. The desperate 
strategy has a client’s negotiation deadline but tries to close a deal the soonest 
possible. It terminates search/negotiation once it finds an offer that satisfies client's 
preferences and constraints. The patient strategy imposes a strict client’s negotiation 
deadline and continues negotiation till the client’s negotiation deadline. It then 
chooses the offer that has the highest utility. The partially patient strategy has a 
client’s negotiation deadline but would interrupt negotiation, whenever, the expiry 
time of an offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The optimized patient 
addresses one-to-many negotiation that is modeled as simultaneous one-to-one 
negotiation threads (Ĺi et al., 2005). It evaluates the outcomes of a negotiation round 
and accordingly amends constraints on client’s acceptable utility so as to improve the 
outcomes of the subsequent negotiation round.  It communicates the deals that have 
already been reached to other negotiation threads and provides updates on new 
negotiation constraints. It continues on negotiation till it reaches the most possible 
utility prior the client’s negotiation deadline. It enhances the patient strategy and 
delays finalizing a deal it has already reached for a period of time trying to find 
better deals that optimize client’s utility. It finalizes the first deal if no better deal is 
reached. The optimization stage takes place whenever there is a vigorous competition 
between vendors at the marketplace.  
 
 The desperate strategy may not yield client’s maximum utility as more valuable 
offers might exist. The patient strategy gives a better chance for improving client’s 
utility; thought it may not maximize client’s utility, whenever, the expiry time of a 
top utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The strategy is 
usually implemented in one-to-many unilateral negotiation such as sealed-bid 
auctions and in one-to-many bilateral negotiation such as e-Commerce. The partially 
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patient strategy may not yield client’s maximum utility as a deceiving vendor might 
provide an overpriced offer with short validity forcing the buyer to accept it or risk 
losing it while more valuable offers might be forthcoming. Also, the strategy may not 
yield client’s maximum utility as the interruption might take place at an early time 
without ensuring adequate market search.  The optimized patient strategy addresses 
one-to-many negotiation that is modeled as simultaneous one-to-one negotiation 
threads as in auctions (Ĺi et al., 2005). The strategy outperforms other strategies but 
has a deficiency problem as regards the appropriateness of settings of the 
optimization period. The optimization period may not be set to ensure adequate 
market search. 
 
 The negotiation strategies have also been classified based on the implemented 
tactic into five types: 
 
- Non-adaptive strategy: it implements a single tactic during negotiation, which the 
negotiating entity defines prior to negotiation. The strategy is implemented in 
Kasbah Model (Chavez, Dreilinger, Guttman, & Maes, 1997) 
- Market-driven strategy: it can smoothly switch from one tactic to another during 
negotiation according to changes in market status and trading eagerness (Sim & 
Wong, 2001). The market status is assessed taking into account three key factors: 
(1) remaining market time; (2) attractiveness of an offer; (3) competition between 
trading agents. 
- Case-based strategy: it is based on the implementation of Experience Based 
Negotiation Agent (EBN) that has access to past successful negotiation scenarios 
and can dynamically generate adaptive negotiation strategies (Wong & Zhang, & 
Kara-Ali, 2000). The scenarios are stored at Knowledge & Experience repository. 
During negotiation, the agent retrieves the relevant past negotiation scenarios and 
assesses the similarity of the retrieved negotiation scenarios to the current 
negotiation scenario (Faratin et al., 2002). It then tries to capture the negotiation 
strategies with similar goals and within client's budget. Next, it concludes the 
most similar negotiation scenario and uses it to recommend a concession rate for 
generating a counter-offer for the next negotiation round. If a matching scenario 
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is not found, then a particular strategy is selected from a set of predefined 
strategies.  
- Adaptive strategy: it implements a tactic that takes into account three key factors: 
(1) knowledge of opponent's negotiation strategies and preferences; (2) cost of 
delay of agreement; (3) value of initial offers (Krovi et al. 1999). The strategy 
can be automatically implemented. 
- Tete-a-Tete strategy: it addresses multi-issue bilateral cooperative negotiation 
and employs Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) (Schäfer, 2001) as a 
decision-making tool for the evaluation and ranking of offers (Guttman et al., 
1998). It implements a tactic that is based on an argumentation negotiation 
approach between buyer and vendor agents.  
 
 The non-adaptive strategy has two drawbacks: (1) it is not adaptive to changes in 
market status; (2) a negotiating entity does not have enough knowledge and 
experience to select the appropriate negotiation strategy. The adaptive and market-
driven strategies are more efficient than the other strategies as being adaptive to 
changes in market status, trading eagerness, beliefs of the negotiating entity, and 
attitudes (e.g. Negotiation goals and obligations). 
   
 The one-to-many negotiation strategies have been based on two negotiation 
approaches:  (1) simultaneous approach; (2) sequential approach. The approaches 
were discussed in section 2.1. In the second simultaneous approach, the manager 
agent updates all negotiation threads with the negotiation outcomes of each 
negotiation thread and advises sub-agents to generate counter-offers after a fixed 
waiting time or after a fixed number of received offers since the arrival of first offer 
(An et al., 2006).  Apt and Markakis (2009) found that the sequential approach 
improves bidder utility as compared to the simultaneous approach. On the other 
hand, An et al. (2006) noted that the sequential approach increases the negotiation 
time as compared to simultaneous approach. 
 
 The negotiation strategies presented in the literature (An et al., 2006; Chen, & 
Huang, 2009; Faratin et al., 1998, 2002; Fatima et al., 2002, 2005, 2006; Ĺi et al., 
2005; Louta et al., 2008; Nguyen & Jennings, 2003; Ren, Sim, & Zhang, 2007; 
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Robu, Somefun, & La Poutré, 2005; Sim, & Wong, 2001; Sim, 2002; Wong et al., 
2000) have not discussed the effect of opponents’ negotiation deadlines on one-to-
many negotiations, and have assumed that those deadlines are private. They have 
only considered the effect of particular temporal constraints such as bidder 
negotiation time and delivery time. Existing negotiation strategies delay offer 
evaluation until all offers are collected. Limited work has been done on the effect of 
opponents’ negotiation deadlines on negotiations. We here discuss the extent of the 
work as below.  
 
 Si et al. (2007) addressed one-to-many bilateral negotiation in auctions and 
modeled it as concurrent one-to-one negotiations. The negotiation is purely price-
based. A negotiation framework is proposed that coordinates concurrent one-to-one 
negotiations of composite trading activities and maximizes bidder utility. Particular 
temporal constraints are considered such as opening and closing time of bidding, 
turnaround time for bidding, and start and end of offers validity. Opening and closing 
times of bidding are assumed to be known to vendors participating in trading 
activities. However, the risk of losing top utility offers that expire before the closing 
time of bidding is not discussed. 
 
 Collins et al. (2002) addressed single issue one-to-many bilateral negotiation. 
They discussed the interdependencies between various temporal constraints and how 
they affect the strategic behaviour of agents participating in e-Negotiation. They also 
discussed two types of interaction: (1) delayed response; (2) immediate response. 
The delayed response interaction is implemented in Vickery auctions and Sealed bids 
where the evaluation time of bids is always later than the bidding deadline and offers 
are sealed. The immediate response interaction is implemented where the bidding is 
on critical tasks that should be completed in a short time relative to the bidding 
deadline. The evaluation time of bids can be earlier than the bidding deadline and 
offers are not sealed to allow for bid evaluation at a time earlier than the bidding 
deadline. The authors identified the risk of awarding overpriced offers. The risk takes 
place if a vendor was able to deduce that the bidding task is critical and thus 
provided an offer of short validity. The bidder would be obliged to reason early and 
award the bid before waiting for more valuable offers that might be forthcoming. The 
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immediate response interaction would result in an inadequate market search space 
and hence, may not maximize the bidder utility. The authors did not propose any 
approach to manage the risk. 
 
 Lee et al. (2002) proposed a time-bound negotiation framework that allows 
agents to attach commitment duration to the exchanged offers/counter-offers. It also 
allows the client agent, which receives an offer with a soon expiry and needs more 
time to make a decision, to send a message to the respective vendor requesting an 
extension of the commitment duration. The framework results in an increased 
number of communicated messages and vendors would possibly reject the request 
and hence, client’s utility may not be maximized. Moreover, the request is not 
applicable to time-limited special offers in e-Commerce. 
 
 Nguyen and Jennings (2003) addressed one-to-many bilateral negotiation. They 
consider a single agent that carries out negotiation threads simultaneously and would 
not generate counter-offers unless all offers are received from vendors. 
 
 An et al. (2006) addressed one-to-many bilateral negotiation and assume 
incomplete information about opponent negotiation deadlines. They assign subagents 
to carry out negotiation threads simultaneously and a manager agent to coordinate 
the interaction between different negotiation threads. They propose flexible 
negotiation strategies that allow agents to generate counter-offers during negotiation 
without the need to wait for all offers to be received from vendors. The strategies 
consider the synchronization situation of multiple threads and allow agents to 
generate counter-offers based on fixed waiting time or fixed waiting ratio. The fixed 
waiting time is a time the agent has to wait after it received the first offer to be able 
to generate a counter-offer, whereas the fixed waiting ratio is a fixed number of 
offers the agent has to receive after it received the first offer to be able to generate a 
counter-offer. Counter-offers generation is based on concessions that are dependent 
on four factors: remaining negotiation time, trading competition, vendor’s 
negotiation strategies, and outcomes of other negotiation threads.  
 
 Sim & Wong (2001) addressed many-to-many negotiation in electronic auction 
and proposed a market-driven strategy that carries out negotiation threads 
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simultaneously. The strategy generates counter-offers taking into consideration the 
market status and trading eagerness. The market status is accessed based on three 
factors: market competition, offer attractiveness, and remaining market time. They 
also propose a deal optimization stage that would extend negotiation for a specific 
time after a deal is reached trying to search for alternative deals of better utilities. 
The stage finalizes the first deals if no better alternative is found.  
 
 Sim (2002) addressed one-to-many negotiation and proposed a market-driven 
strategy that carries out negotiation threads simultaneously. The strategy implements 
adjustable rates of concession that are dependent on: eagerness, trading time, trading 
opportunity, and trading competition. The strategy model different classes of 
concession: conservative, conciliatory, constant. The conservative class makes 
minimal concessions initially and then larger concessions near deadlines while the 
conciliatory class makes larger concessions initially and then minimal concessions 
near deadlines. The constant class makes fixed rate of concession. 
 
 Ren et al. (2007) addressed one-to-many bilateral negotiation and extended the 
market-driven strategy, which Sim (2002) has proposed, to consider uncertain 
dynamics of market status and agent conditions. The strategy guides agents 
dynamically on concessions. Concessions are dependent on four factors: trading 
competition, trading eagerness, trading opportunities, and trading time and strategy. 
The concession factors are amended for any unexpected and future changes in the 
market status (Sim, 2002). For example, the number of trading agents might change 
during negotiation as new agents might be incoming or old ones are outgoing. The 
strategy does not consider bidder desires including profit, trade-off, and preferences.  
 Chen and Huang (2009) addressed one-to-many multi-issue bilateral negotiation 
and implement risk seeking/averse strategies in exploring negotiation space. They 
use similarity matching approach to locate an offer among sellers’ offers that is most 
similar to buyer’s proposal, and to generate counter-offer that is most similar to 
seller’s offer. The strategies assist buyers in outsourcing potential sellers in 
marketplaces, and advise buyers on feasible and acceptable counter-offer.   
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 Louta et al. (2008) addressed one-to-many negotiation and assume incomplete 
information about opponents’ negotiation deadlines. They propose a negotiation 
strategy that deploys mobile agents and carries out negotiation threads sequentially. 
The strategy is based on ranking functions rather than counter-offer generation. The 
strategy is adaptive to changes in negotiation environments. It considers the decision 
issues that include: number of competitor companies, number of substitute or 
complementary products/services, quantity of product in stock, number of current 
potential buyers, reputation/reliability of each seller/buyer, client’s remaining 
negotiation time, and resources availability and restrictions.  
 
 It is obvious that there is a need to develop a flexible and efficient negotiation 
strategy that avoids delayed evaluation of collected offers and considers the 
following key factors: (a) trading competition between vendors at the market; (b) 
market search space; (c) client’s negotiation deadline; (d) vendor’s negotiation 
deadline; (e) network time delay with an attempt to maximize client’s utility. The 
need is a crucial, particularly if the top utility offer vigorously competes with other 
offers and its expiry time is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The 
strategy should not interrupt negotiation and award the bid to the top utility offer 
without assessing the market status accurately (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2010; Collins et 
al., 2002). Failure to fulfil the need properly would lead to loss of the top utility offer 
and award the bid to a more costly offer.  
2.4.4 Existing Utility Function 
Negotiating strategies need to evaluate opponent’s offer to decide on the most 
appropriate concession rate for the generation of a counter-offer or to seek a better 
offer. The value of a collected offer can be estimated by calculating its utility. 
Different utility functions have been devised in the literature. Utility functions model 
bidder preferences and aggregates all related attributes (Louta et al., 2008). They 
assign values to collected offers that form a criterion for ranking offers and choosing 
the best offer. In this section, we will discuss the existing utility functions. 
 
 Sandholm (1996) defined the utility function as gain minus cost. The utility 
function is basically defined as given in Equations (1) and (2).  
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 ܷ௔ ൌ ሺܴ ௜ܲ௔ െ݌௜ሻ (1) 
 
 ܷ௕ ൌ ሺ݌௜ െ ܴ ௜ܲ௕ሻ (2) 
 
where the utilities of client and vendor agents a and b are denoted as Ua and Ub 
respectively. The reserve prices of vendor and client agents are denoted as RPa and 
RPb, respectively. The price of a negotiated issue (i) is denoted as pi. 
 
In multi-constraint negotiation, utility functions should take into account weights 
of constraints and preferences. They should also take into account other significant 
factors such as constant time discount factor and constant cost of delay factor. The 
constant time discount factor indicates that the desire of a client in goods declines 
with time due to inflation or goods are consumable. The constant cost of delay factor 
indicates that the negotiator bears a fixed cost of delay.  
 
 Fatima et al. (2002, 2005, & 2006) presented a utility function for one-to-one 
negotiation. The function addresses single-issue and multi-issue negotiations and 
considers the two factors: time discount factor; client’s negotiation deadline. The 
utility function assumes two agents negotiate over the price of a single issue (i). 
Agent a acts on behalf on a particular client, while agent b acts on behalf of a 
particular vendor. They have distinct deadlines: Ta and Tb, and reserve price RPa and 
RPb respectively. The utilities of agents a and b are denoted as Ua and Ub 
respectively. The negotiation should end by the earlier deadline or the negotiation 
aborts. The time discount factor (G) has an effect on client’s utility and vendor’s 
utility. The time discount factor is greater than 1.0, e.g. (G > 1) for those who gain 
utility with time and prefer late agreement, whereas the time discount factor is less 
than 1.0, e.g. (G < 1) for those who lose with time and prefer early agreement. Thus, 
the utility increases with time in case of patient agents, whereas it decreases with 
time in case of impatient agents. A particular tuple (RP, T, G) is private to its agent. 
The price of the issue (i) is denoted as pi at time ti.  The time ti is computed relative 
to the start time of negotiation. The utility function U for the two agents is expressed 
in Equations (3) and (4). 
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 ܷ௔ ൌ ሺܴ ௜ܲ௔ െ݌௜ሻሺߜ௜௔ሻ௧೔ (3) 
 
 ܷ௕ ൌ ሺ݌௜ െ ܴ ௜ܲ௕ሻሺߜ௜௕ሻ௧೔ (4) 
 
 Assuming the two agents negotiate over the price of multiple issues (1 < i < n), 
the utility function (U) has been defined as in Equations (5) and (6). 
 
 ܷ௔ ൌ σ ሺܴ ௜ܲ௔ െ݌௜௡௜ୀଵ ሻሺߜ௜௔ሻ௧೔  (5) 
 
 ܷ௕ ൌ σ ሺ݌௜ െܴ ௜ܲ௕௡௜ୀଵ ሻሺߜ௜௕ሻ௧೔ (6) 
 
 Assuming the time discount factor is the same for all negotiated issues, the utility 
function has been defined as in Equations (7) and (8). 
 
 ܷ௔ ൌ ሺߜ௜௔ሻ௧೔ σ ሺܴ ௜ܲ௔ െ݌௜௡௜ୀଵ ሻ  (7) 
 
 ܷ௕ ൌ ሺߜ௜௕ሻ௧೔ σ ሺ݌௜ െܴ ௜ܲ௕௡௜ୀଵ ሻ (8) 
 
Faratin et al. (1998) proposed a utility function for one-to-many multi-attribute 
bilateral negotiation as given n Equation (9).  
 
ܸ௜ሺݔሻ ൌ ෍ ݓ௝௜ ௝ܸ௜ሺݔ௝ሻ
ଵஸ௝ஸ௡
 (9) 
 Negotiating agents that negotiate multiple attributes ሺݔ௝ሻ  for (1൑ ݆ ൑ ݊ሻ such 
as price and warranty would evaluate each offer ሺݔሻ they receive from opponents by 
summing the weighted values of negotiated attributes. The value of a negotiated 
attribute is denoted as ௝ܸ௜ሺݔ௝ሻ and is calculated as given in Equations (10) and (11). 
The weight of a negotiated attribute is denoted as ݓ௝௜.   
 
୮ܸ୰୧ୡୣ௜ ൫ݔ୮୰୧ୡୣ൯ ൌ
୮୰୧ୡୣ െ୮୰୧ୡୣ
୮୰୧ୡୣ െ୮୰୧ୡୣ 
(10) 
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୴ܸ୭୪୳୫ୣ௜ ሺݔ୴୭୪୳୫ୣሻ ൌ ͳ െ
୴୭୪୳୫ୣ െ୴୭୪୳୫ୣ
୴୭୪୳୫ୣ െ୴୭୪୳୫ୣ 
 
 
(11) 
 They highlighted that the function is inappropriate and would not maximize the 
client’s utility. In fact, the function does not take into account significant factors such 
as remaining negotiation time, availability of resources, and others. They proposed 
three types of negotiation tactics: time-dependent tactics, resource dependent tactics, 
and behavior dependent tactics. Resource dependent tactics are influenced by 
availability of resources such as remaining bandwidth, money, number of clients, and 
number of servers. 
 
 Zhuang et al. (2008) addressed one-to-many service-oriented negotiation and 
introduced a vendor’s profile factor into the utility function. It assesses the vendor's 
profile based on vendor’s reputation and accumulated commercial credit. The 
reputation factor indicates the vendor's publicity level and ranges from zero to 1. 
Well-known vendors have higher reputation than unknown vendors. The 
accumulated commercial credit factor relates to past trade records. It sums the 
normalized number of past successful contracts the client had with the vendor and 
the average utility of all past contracts. The more contracts the vendor has the better 
is the accumulated commercial credit. If the client has never traded with the 
negotiated vendor, the vendor's profile would only include reputation factor. The 
value of vendor's profile is defined as given in Equations (12) and (13). 
 
Up = wr Ur + wac Uac (12) 
 The parameters Up, Ur, and Uac denote the vendor's profile value, reputation 
factor, and accumulated commercial factor, respectively; whereas the parameters wr 
and wac  denote weights of the two factors, respectively. 
 
Ua c = wcn Ucn+ wa u Uau  (13) 
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 The parameters Uac, Ucn, and Uau denote the accumulated commercial factor, total 
number of past successful contracts, and average utility of contracts, respectively; 
whereas the parameters wcn and wau  denote weights of the two factors, respectively. 
 
 Wang, Tan, & Ren (2005) introduced new factors to the evaluation of vendor's 
profile. The factors are listed below. 
 
- Reliability 
- Security rank 
- Delivery service 
 
 Ren et al. (2007) addressed one-to-many negotiation and devised market-driven 
concession rates that are dependent on trading eagerness, trading opportunity, trading 
competition, trading time and negotiation strategy. The trading eagerness refers to 
the desire level of a negotiating entity to make concession so an agreement can be 
achieved. The trading opportunity refers to the number of trading partners entering or 
leaving during negotiation. The trading competition refers to the probability that an 
offer be ranked as the most competing offer. The trading time and strategy refers to 
the remaining trading time and concession strategies. They concluded that the more 
the trading opportunity is the less the concession rate is. Also, they concluded that 
whenever the maximum profit is more than the target profit, the more a negotiating 
entity is eager to complete a trading.  
 
 Wong et al. (2004) introduced a supplier creditability factor into the utility 
function. They defined the utility function as given in equation (14). 
 
ܰሺݕᇱሻ ൌ  ܿ௦ ෍ݓ௝௡ ௝ܰ൫ݕ௝௜൯
௝
 (14) 
 
෍ݓ௝௡ ൌ ͳ݆ א  ሼݏǡ ݌ǡ ݀ሽ
௝
 
A vendor offer is represented as ሺݕᇱሻ. The creditability of a vendor is denoted as ሺܿ௦ሻ. 
The weight of attribute ሺ݆ሻ is denoted as ൫ݓ௝௡൯. Negotiated attributes include price (ݏ), 
delivery (݌), and value-added service (݀). The scoring function of a negotiated 
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attribute ሺ݆ሻin negotiation round (i) is denoted as ௝ܰ൫ݕ௝௜൯. The vendor offer that is 
collected in negotiation round ሺ݅ሻ is represented as ൫ݕ௦௜ǡ ݕ௣௜ ǡ ݕௗ௜ ൯ specifying the values 
of price, delivery, value-added service, respectively. The time at which an offer is 
collected ሺݐ௜ሻ should be less than or equal to the maximum negotiation time of a 
negotiation round ሺ ௠ܶ௔௫ሻ i.e. ሺݐ ൌ  ݐ௜ ൑  ௠ܶ௔௫ሻ for ݅ ൌ Ͳǡ ͳǡڮ ǡ ݊Ǥ   
 
 Sim and Wong (2001) proposed a market-driven negotiation strategy for 
electronic auction where a number of buyer and seller agents negotiate. They also 
devised a concession function for the generation of counter-offers. The generation of 
counter-offers is dependent on current market status and trading eagerness. The 
market status is assessed as discussed in the previous section on three factors: market 
competition, offer attractiveness, and remaining market time. The market status 
ܯሺݐሻat time (t) is estimated as given in Equation (15).  
 
ܯሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െቀ
೅ష೟
೅ ା஼ሺ௧ሻା஺ሺ௧ሻቁ
ଷ  
 ܥሺݐሻ ൌ  ቐ
 ஻೟஻೟ାௌ೟ 
 ௌ೟ௌ೟ା஻೟ 
 
 
 ܣሺݐሻ  =ቐ
 ூ೟஻೟ 
ூ೟ௌ೟ 
 
where, T: Remaining time of the marketplace 
ܤ௧: Number of buyer agents 
ܵ௧: Number of seller agents 
ܫ௧: Number of agents interested in the agent’s current offer 
 
The concession rate in round (t +1) is calculated based on Equation (16). Trading 
eagerness and maximum concession amount are denoted as (E) and ܦ௠௔௫, respectively. 
ܦሺݐ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ܯሺݐሻ ൅ ܧʹ ൈ ܦ௠௔௫  (16) 
(15) 
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 Jonker et al. (2007) addressed cooperative multi-constraint one-to-one 
negotiation and proposed utility function that estimates the target utility taking into 
account three factors: weights of bidder attributes, bidder preferences, and utility 
gap. The utility gap is the difference between the utilities of the offer of the opponent 
and the bid of the bidder in the immediate preceding bid. 
 
 Louta et al (2008) addressed one-to-many complex negotiation and proposed a 
negotiation strategy that is based on ranking the collected offers rather than 
generating counter-offers. The ranking is by offer utilities, which are calculated 
taking into account particular decision issues (DIs) in addition to the negotiated 
attributes. The decision issues are changeable and depend on the states of the e-
Marketplace, clients, and vendors. The (DIs) include the following:    
 
- Number of competitor vendors 
- Number of remaining product in stock 
- Number of potential clients 
- Service availability and restraints 
- Reputation and reliability of vendors and clients 
- Remaining negotiation time 
- Number of alternate product/service 
 
The discussion shows that the utility functions presented in the literature have 
mainly considered the values of negotiated attributes and dynamics of the 
environment. They have not considered opponents’ negotiation deadlines and their 
effect on offer ranking. When two offers have same values of all negotiated attributes 
they should be ranked based on their validities; the offer of a later validity should 
have a higher rank as it allows the bidder to collect more offers and accurately 
investigate the trading opportunities at the marketplace. It is obvious that there is a 
need for a utility function that considers key factors including: client’s negotiation 
deadline, opponent’s negotiation deadlines, and market search space so offer 
evaluation and ranking would be more accurate.  
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2.4.5 Existing Security Protocols for e-Negotiation  
There has been limited work on the security of mobile-agent based e-Negotiation. 
The work has mainly focused on the security of data gathering mobile agents. The 
security requirements of negotiating mobile agents are more complex than those of 
data gathering mobile agents. Firstly, negotiating mobile agents should decrypt, 
evaluate, and rank the collected offers while traversing the Internet and executing in 
untrustworthy environment, whereas data gathering mobile agents only decrypt and 
evaluate the collected offers when they return to the client host, which is assumed to 
be a trusted host. Secondly, negotiating mobile agents make critical decisions while 
executing in untrustworthy environment, whereas data gathering mobile agents only 
make decisions when they are back to the client host, which is assumed to be trusted. 
Thirdly, negotiating agents may run multiple negotiation rounds till a decision is 
made, whereas data gathering agents do not carry out any negotiation. We discussed 
the various security protocols presented in the literature that address the security of 
data gathering mobile agents in (2012b). The protocols include the following: 
 
• Append only Container Protocol (Karnik & Tripathi, 1999) 
• Targeted state protocol (Karnik & Tripathi, 1999) 
• Publicly Verifiable Chained Digital Signature Protocol (Karjoth, Asokan, & 
Gülcü, 1998) 
• Chained Digital Signature Protocol with Forward Privacy (Karjoth et al., 1998) 
• Chained MAC Protocol (Karjoth et al., 1998) 
• Publicly Verifiable Chained Signature Protocol (Karjoth et al., 1998) 
• Configurable Mobile Agent Data Protection Protocol (Maggi & Sisto, 2003) 
• Mobile Agent Integrity Protocol (Hannotin, Maggi, & Sisto, 2001; Maggi & 
Sisto, 2002a)  
• Improved Forward Integrity Protocol (Yao, Foo, Peng, & Dawson, 2003) 
• Secure protocol based on sedentary agent for mobile agent environments (Rhazi, 
Pierre, & Boucheneb, 2007) 
• Data gathering security protocol (Jaljouli, 2006b) 
• Enhanced configurable mobile agent data protection protocol (Jaljouli, 2006a) 
• Enhanced multi-hops protocol (Jaljouli, 2005) 
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The work has also focused on the security of agent-based on-line auctions, 
security of e-Health, privacy of collaborative supply chain planning, privacy of e-
Commerce transaction, and privacy of decision-making functions in competitive 
negotiation (Stubblebine & Syverson, 1999; Wimalasiri et al., 2004; Chakraborty et 
al., 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Vogler et al., 1999).  
 
In this thesis, we mainly focus on the security of mobile agent-based e-Trade 
negotiation. We here discuss the security approaches presented in the literature that 
address the security of agent-based e-Negotiation.  
 
 Vogler et al. (1999) proposed an approach that aims for securing the privacy of 
decision-making functions in mobile agent-based e-Commerce negotiation. The 
approach assumes that vendor hosts might be malicious, but vendors cannot 
cooperate in attacking the negotiating agents. It also assumes that each agent domain 
has a Trust Service that controls and manages the negotiating agents and also has a 
bank service that facilitates bank transactions in e-Commerce applications. The Trust 
Service has a Tamper Proof Environment (TPE) that provides a secure environment 
for the execution of negotiating agents. The approach is based on secret splitting and 
function hiding. The secret splitting splits negotiation functions and data between 
two cooperative agents: Controller Agent (CA) and Worker Agent (WA). The CA 
agent stores critical negotiation functions and data including: utility function, tactic 
function (Part I), decision function, strategy matrix, and offer vector. The WA agent 
stores non-critical negotiation functions and data including: negotiation thread and 
tactic function (Part II).  The CA agent executes at a Tamper Proof Environment 
(TPE); whereas the WA agent executes at vendor hosts in an agent domain. The 
function hiding encrypts the tactic function and stores in at the WA agent. The CA 
agent has the decryption function that can decode the values computed using 
encryption functions. The approach only addresses the privacy of decision-making 
function and does not address the other security properties of e-Negotiation. 
 
 He & Leung (2002) highlighted the trust problem in agent-based e-Commerce 
negotiation and transaction. They discussed three approaches that address trust in e-
Commerce negotiation. The first approach is based on enforcement of third parties 
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such as banks, post offices, and credit card companies. The second approach is based 
on chunking e-Commerce transactions into smaller chunks so a malicious agent 
would not have interest in defeating a transaction (Sandholm & Ferrandon, 2000). 
The third approach is enforcement of social laws that restraint agent behavior 
(Shoham & Tennenholz, 1992, 1995). The approaches do not address the security 
properties of data exchanged during e-Negotiation. 
 
 Yang (2005) presented a set of security protocols that aim for protecting the 
agent itinerary and partial results the mobile agent collects. The protocols address 
one-to-one e-Commerce negotiation where a buyer agent searches vendor agents at 
the marketplace for an offer that best meets the buyer’s requirement profile and also 
negotiates with the vendor agent of the best offer. The protocols are based on onion 
routing scheme that has been implemented in protecting the agent’s data and 
itinerary (Syverson, Goldschlag, & Reed, 1997; Westhoff, Schneider, Unger, & 
Kaderali, 1999). The scheme allows anonymous agent connection where the 
identities of hosts in the agent itinerary are hidden excluding the identities of the 
immediate preceding and succeeding hosts to enable agent migration. The host 
encrypts the data it intends to send with the public keys of the receiving hosts. It 
starts with the key of the last receiving host and ends with the key of the first 
receiving host. The data can be viewed as an onion with the innermost layer 
encrypted with the public key of the last receiver in the agent itinerary and the 
outermost layer encrypted with the public key of the first receiver in the agent 
itinerary. In onion routing scheme, the mobile agent traverses through multiple onion 
routers. Each router decrypts the data onion with its public key to learn the identity 
of the next host in the agent itinerary. It then dispatches the mobile agent to that host.  
Next, it encrypts the data onion with the public key of the next host in the agent 
itinerary and cleans up the connection table after it passes the data onion. The 
receiver would not be able to learn the identities of the preceding host in the agent 
itinerary or the host that initially sent the data onion. Generally, the onion routing 
scheme ensures anonymity of non-neighbors hosts. Yang has extended the onion 
routing scheme, which Westhoff et al. (1999) have proposed, by including a unique 
session key in each layer of the data onion. Each host in the agent itinerary would 
encrypt its offer with the session key associated with the layer it decrypts. The 
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presented protocols are: (1) Reversible-onion Protocol; (2) Improved Labeled-onion 
Protocol; (3) Itinerary Extension Protocol; (4) Multi-Layered Inverted Pyramid 
Protocol. The protocols protect both the agent’s data and itinerary. They preserve the 
forward integrity, privacy, and non-repudiability properties of the agent’s data. They 
also preserve the anonymity of non-neighbor hosts in the agent itinerary. The 
Improved Labeled-onion Protocol extends the Reversible-onion Protocol to handle 
colluding attacks. The Itinerary Extension Protocol extends the Reversible-onion 
Protocol to allow for the extension of the agent itinerary during agent migration. The 
extension is limited to hosts that are trusted by the agent owner and is based on key 
distribution scheme. The Multi-layered Inverted Pyramid recovers the weakness of 
Reversible-onion Protocol in dealing with faulty remote hosts. The protocols do not 
address one-to-many negotiation. They also require complex calculations that affect 
the functionality of the protocols. Moreover, the protocols do not address the 
authenticity of agent’s data. 
 
 Mobach (2007) presented architecture for agent-based service negotiation where 
customer agents make requests for resource access at remote platforms. Customer 
agents (CA) interact with service provider agents (SPA) through a mediator agent 
(MA) that provides the CA agents with directory services on markets and available 
suppliers.  The CA and SPA agents might migrate to the platform of the MA agent. 
Each agent is assigned a global unique identifier (GUID) that is private to the 
middleware architecture. The MA agents can only get a hash of the GUID identifier 
concatenated with a counter. The architecture has three layers: application layer, 
middleware layer, and kernel layer. The kernel layer serves three functionalities 
including: secure communication between negotiating agents, secure migration of 
agents between hosts, and secure agent execution (agent’s code and data). The 
architecture only discusses particular properties: (1) availability of platform; (2) 
non-repudiation and authenticity of the agent code; (3) privacy and integrity of 
agent’s data. The availability property is achieved by implementing replicas that 
replace the location manager in case of its failure. The non-repudiation property is 
achieved by having a hash of the agent’s code signed by the agent owner. The 
authenticity property is achieved by binding the agent’s code to the global unique 
identifier (GUID). The identifier would be verified with the corresponding identifier 
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in the negotiation agreement, which the SPA platform stores, whenever the CA agent 
requests access to a resource at the platform. The privacy and integrity of agent’s 
data are generally based on encryption mechanisms; though the mechanisms are not 
described in details. The architecture also assumes that agents execute at trusted 
hosts. The security framework is not complete and does not focus on the security 
properties of data exchanged during negotiation including privacy, integrity and 
authenticity of request for offer, offers, payment order, and purchase order. 
 
The existing security approaches cannot truly preserve the various security 
properties of data exchanged during e-Negotiation. The approaches are either 
abstract approaches or incomplete approaches. They do not present formal proofs on 
the soundness of the approaches. There is a need for a sound security negotiation 
protocol that addresses the various security threats of intruders and non-trusted hosts 
during the different phases of e-Trade Negotiation and truly preserves the various 
security properties of data exchanged during negotiation. Also, formal proofs on the 
soundness of the protocol should be presented to gain trust in the protocol. 
2.4.6 Formal Methods of Verification 
The existing security protocols assert the capability of preserving particular security 
properties of mobile agent-based systems, though that does not ensure the soundness 
of the protocols. Several formal methods have been presented in the literature for the 
verification of security protocols. The methods of verification have been used in 
developing protocols free of security flaws and revealing unforeseen security flaws 
in the existing protocols (Hannotin et al., 2001; Ma & Tsai, 2000; Aziz et al., 2001; 
Meadows, 1996; Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b; Jaljouli, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Burrows, 
Abadi & Needham, 1990; Lowe, 1997; Formal Systems, 2000). The methods 
perform rigorous analysis of the security properties of protocols and present proofs 
on the soundness of protocols. The formal methods allow accurate specification of a 
negotiation system and its interaction with the environment. The methods also allow 
modeling and verification of the various security properties of a security protocol 
(Ma & Tsai, 2000). On the other hand, the methods of testing protocols cannot 
provide proofs on the soundness of protocols. The methods are not reliable as the 
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malicious acts of intruders and non-trusted hosts are unbounded and unpredictable. 
Also, the testing methods are not practical as the execution traces that should be 
analyzed might be infinite and particularly in large-scale systems.  
 
 There are five classes of formal methods and are discussed in (Ma & Tsai, 2000) 
and (Jaljouli, 2006b). The classes are as follows: 
 
 Methods based on modal logic 
 Methods based on finite-state exploration 
 Methods based on theorem proving 
 Methods based on process algebra 
 Methods based on infinite-state exploration 
 
-  Methods based on modal logic: a protocol is represented as a set of logic 
statements based on the initial beliefs and knowledge of messages exchanged in the 
negotiation system. The protocol is verified using deductive reasoning. The protocol 
is considered sound if the deduced knowledge is equivalent to the required 
knowledge. There are two problems with logic methods. The protocol verification is 
not systematic and manually done. Hence, the verification is not error-free. The BAN 
logic (Burrows et al., 1990) is the best known logic.  
 
- Methods based on finite-state exploration: a protocol is modeled as a system of 
communicating processes that represent the interaction between participating honest 
hosts and an intruder. The security properties are expressed in logic, and commonly 
temporal logic. The methods consider the Dolev-Yao intruder model (Yao & Dolev, 
1983), where the intruder can store, hide, replace, or replay messages that are 
communicated over the Internet. And the intruder can also produce new messages by 
decrypting, encrypting, or forging any intercepted messages. The methods analyze a 
protocol by considering an insecure state and then trying to search for any path to the 
insecure state from an initial state. There are some problems with the methods 
(Boreale & Buscemi, 2002a; Fiore & Abadi, 2001; Ma & Tsai, 2000): (1) search 
might be infinite due to the unlimited and unpredictable capacities of intruders; (2) 
analysis is only possible for a model with a finite number of states; (3) restrictions 
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should be imposed on the number of participants and messages they can send or 
receive; (4) result of finding a finite state model free of security flaws does not 
guarantee that the actual model is free of security flaws. On the other hand, the 
methods have two advantages: (1) generation of traces of insecure states; (2) 
verification can be automatic. The Methods include: Interrogator (Millen, Clark, & 
Freedman, 1987), NRL protocol Analyzer (Meadows, 1996), CSP model checker 
FDR (Lowe, 1996, 1997), SPIN model checker (Maggi & Sisto, 2002b), MurM 
(Mitchell, Mitchell & Stern, 1997).  
 
- Methods based on theorem proving: a protocol is modeled as a set of all possible 
execution traces using logic and verified using logic theories. The methods have the 
capability of verifying real protocols with a large number of states. There are three 
problems with the methods. They require human guidance. They also require a lot of 
time and expertise to develop lemmas and theorems as needed. The Induction 
method (Paulson, 1997) is based on the Isabelle Theorem Prover.  
 
- Methods based on process algebra: a protocol is modeled as a set of concurrent 
communicating processes using algebra. The protocol is verified through the testing of 
equivalence between every two parallel processes. There are two problems with the 
methods. The methods suffer from infinite universal quantifications, i.e. checking the 
equivalence in behavior between all possible combinations of process pairs is 
difficult as this may result in an almost infinite number of combinations (Durante, 
Sisto & Valenzano, 2000). Also, the methods are not automated. Process algebra 
methods include: S-Calculus (Abadi, Blanchet & Fournet, 2007), Applied S-Calculus 
(Abadi & Fournet, 2001), Spi-Calculus (Abadi & Gordon, 1999), Distributed S-
calculus (Sewell, 1998), Seal Calculus (Vitek & Gastagna, 1999), and Crypto-loc 
Calculus (Blanchet & Aziz, 2003).  
 
- Methods based on infinite-state exploration: a protocol is modeled as a system of 
concurrent processes and execution traces. Each process is represented as a sequence 
of input and output actions that take place due to its interaction with the environment. 
Intruders are not explicitly modeled, and the messages they may generate are not 
predicted. It is assumed that the environment can generate messages using initial 
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knowledge and implementing deductive rules (Boreale, 2001). The security 
properties of the protocol are expressed as execution traces that are generated by the 
protocol. The protocol is verified by implementing symbolic transition relations and 
through the search of insecure states. The verification can be automatic. The methods 
are efficient as introducing the following advantages: (1) performing a complete 
exploration of the whole infinite-state model generated by a finite set of participants 
using symbolic techniques; (2) being free from the state explosion problem as the 
symbolic models assume that every input action only leads to a single symbolic 
transition, and hence are finite (Boreale, 2001).; (3) providing sound analysis of 
protocols as the detection of a security flaw on the symbolic model implies that a 
flaw exists in the infinite model and vice versa (Fiore & Abadi, 2001; Boreale & 
Buscemi, 2002a; Boreale, 2001); (4) reducing the run time; (5) improving the 
accuracy of protocol verification. Infinite-state exploration methods include: STA 
(Boreale, 2001; Boreale & Buscemi, 2002a, 2002b; STA Documentation, 2001; 
Boreale & Gorla, 2002); PVS & SAL (Rushby, 2006); Symbolic methods (Fiore & 
Abadi, 2001).  
2.4.7 STA Automatic Verifier 
Based on the discussions given in the previous section, we find that the STA 
(Symbolic Trace Analyzer) tool is suitable for verifying the security negotiation 
protocol that will be discussed in Chapter 6. The STA tool has been used in detecting 
several flaws in the following protocols: Needham-Schroeder Protocol, Yahalom 
Protocol, Otway-Rees Protocol, Kerberos Protocol, Multi-hops Protocol, and 
Configurable Mobile Agent Data Protection Protocol. The flaws are given in 
(Boreale & Gorla, 2002; STA, 2001; Corradi et al., 1999; Jaljouli, 2005, 2006a, 
2006b, 2009, 2012b).  
 
 The STA tool is based on infinite-state exploration methods that implement 
symbolic transition relations (Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b; STA Documentation, 
2001; STA, 2001). The STA tool has been developed using ML functional 
polymorphic programming language (Milner, Tofte, Harper, & MacQueen, 1997). 
The ML language has been used in developing verification tools (Mobility 
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Workbench, 2004; Process Algebra Compiler, 2000; Symbolic Model Prover, 2000). 
STA tool requires the Moscow ML compiler (Moscow ML, 2004).  
2.5 Summary  
In this chapter, we presented background to e-Negotiation with focus on the 
different application domains, taxonomy of negotiation models, negotiation 
parameters, and mobile agent-based negotiation system. We also presented 
background to negotiation strategies and different negotiation tactics. We also 
presented background to the security of mobile agent-based system. We focused on 
the security of agent’s data and discussed the related security threats, requirements, 
properties, and mechanisms. 
 
 We discussed the existing works on e-Negotiation frameworks relating to 
system architecture, negotiation protocols, negotiation strategies, and security 
negotiation protocols.  We also discussed the different formal methods of 
verification of security protocols and highlighted the respective advantages and 
drawbacks.  
 
 We highlighted the deficiencies in the existing system architectures. They are 
not complete and do not consider the various negotiation phases, and particularly 
the purchase and delivery phases. They do not benefit from past negotiation 
experiences. They model one-to-many negotiation models as multi-threaded 
negotiation carried out simultaneously. They mostly deploy a single or multiple 
stationary agents in carrying out e-Negotiation; whereas mobile agents have proven 
to be more efficient. Certain architectures deploy multiple mobile agents that carry 
out negotiation threads independently but do not update negotiation threads of the 
outcomes of other threads. They do not present complete architecture of negotiating 
agents. Some components are missing such as the opponent model, trust, security, 
tactic, or utility function. We concluded that there is a need for a complete system 
architecture that integrates mobile agents into the system.  
 We identified the deficiencies in the existing negotiation protocols. They 
mainly address on one-to-one bilateral negotiation or one-to-many unilateral 
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negotiations. We concluded that there is a need for a negotiation protocol that 
addresses one-to-many bilateral negotiation, and particularly, for e-Trade 
negotiation where negotiating agents are competitive.   
 
 We discussed the different types of negotiation strategies and the implemented 
negotiation approaches including the simultaneous and sequential approaches. We 
then highlighted the problem with the existing negotiation strategies which do not 
consider the risk of losing top utility offers that expire before the negotiation 
deadline and its effect on the client’s utility. The strategies do not consider 
opponents’ negotiation deadlines and assume that they are private. They only 
consider the client’s negotiation deadline. Very few strategies discuss the risk and 
its effect on negotiation. One strategy considers the risk and proposes an approach 
that is based on seeking an extension of the commitment duration which may 
possibly be rejected. Another strategy aborts the negotiation and awards the bid to 
the offer that expires before the negotiation deadline without ensuring that the 
client’s maximum utility is achieved. We concluded that there is a need for a 
strategy that considers the risk and manages it effectively so the client’s maximum 
utility can be achieved. 
 
 We discussed the existing utility functions and the factors that are considered in 
evaluating and ranking offers. We explained how the functions would evaluate and 
rank offers inaccurately. We identified the need to introduce key factors into the 
utility function so the decision-making of negotiation strategies would be based on 
an accurate offer evaluation and ranking and hence can achieve the client’s 
maximum utility. The factors include the client’s negotiation deadline, vendor’s 
negotiation deadline, and market search space. 
 
 We discussed the different approaches that address the security of mobile 
agent-based systems and the related deficiencies. The approaches only preserve 
particular security properties and do not address the security of e-Trade 
negotiation. We concluded that there is a need for a security protocol that can truly 
preserve the various security properties of the data exchanged during e-Trade 
negotiation. 
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 We discussed the different formal methods of verification of security protocols 
and the relevant advantages and drawbacks. Based on the discussions, we found 
that the STA tool is suitable for verifying the security protocol to be proposed in 
the thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Negotiation Architecture 
 
 
 
The existing system architectures of e-Negotiations have mostly been based on the 
deployment of stationary agents that act on behalf of clients and vendors and interact 
through direct message passing or through a mediator. The architectures have proven 
ineffective as they result in excessive communication loads and delays, and queuing 
delays. In this chapter, we establish system architecture (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2007b, 
2007c, 2010) for multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade negotiations that 
deploys mobile agents, which have shown effectiveness in automating negotiation 
and generating more efficient systems as compared to the existing systems that 
deploy stationary agents. We also devise architecture for arbitrary negotiating agents. 
The chapter addresses two key problems in the system architecture of e-Negotiations. 
The first problem relates to lack in establishing system level architectures that 
integrate heterogeneous negotiating agents into the overall system (Hindriks et al., 
2007). The system architecture should enable negotiating agents to interact, 
negotiate, and analyze outcomes of negotiation sessions. They should also enable an 
arbitrary negotiating agent to connect to the negotiation system. The second problem 
relates to lack in establishing negotiating agent architecture that defines different 
components of the negotiating agent. 
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3.1 Proposed Architecture for Negotiating Agents 
The proposed architecture of a negotiating agent in mobile-agent based e-Negotiation 
is depicted in Figure 3.1. The agent is composed of two models: its own model and 
opponent model. The agent model has several components as outlined below. 
 
 Agent code and static data 
 Requirement profile including negotiation attributes, constraints, and preferences. 
 Negotiation protocol 
 Negotiation strategy, tactic, and utility function 
 Negotiation history 
 Ontology 
 Security protocol 
 Trust 
 
 The opponent model has information about the opponents, which are not certain. 
It includes the agent speculations of opponent preferences, and negotiation strategy. 
It also has update mechanisms.   
 
Agent model
Negotiation 
strategy
Requirement 
profile
Negotiation 
protocol
Agent code 
&
Static data
Attributes
Constraints
Preferences
TacticNegotiation 
history Utility function
Opponent model
Negotiation strategy Update mechanismsPreferences
Agent
Security 
protocol
TrustOntology  
Figure 3.1 Architecture of negotiating agent  
3.2 Proposed System Architecture 
The proposed system architecture of mobile-agent based e-Trade negotiation is 
depicted in Figure 3.2. The system includes ten intelligent agents and five types 
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of hosts: client host, vendor hosts, Trusted Server (TS), e-Marketplace server, and 
client’s bank host.  
Trusted servers are servers that have two functionalities (a) providing a third-party 
service in agent-based applications including directory services, mediation, 
communication services, or brokering; (b) increasing or decreasing trust level 
between entities participating in agent-based applications (McDonald et al., 2005). 
The servers gained trust due to the following: (1) establishment of a history of honest 
interactions; (2) implementation of tamper-proof hardware, execution traces, or 
multi-agent secure computation (Algesheimer, Cachin, Camenisch, & Karjoth, 
2001); (3) enforcement of security policy. Trusted servers have the capability to 
detect some or all malicious acts of intruders and adversaries. If an entity is found to 
be violating the integrity of an agent, the servers would then advise other entities in 
the system to change their trust levels in this specific entity. Trusted servers can alter 
the agent’s state, itinerary, or security policy. They may append new hosts to agent 
itinerary that would assist in maximizing agent’s utility. 
 
The e-Marketplace is a virtual trading hub that facilitates e-Trade. It supports the 
entire e-Trade process including search, match, comparison, negotiation, agreements, 
and payments phases (Pucihar, 2003). It allows different types of trading agents 
including: vendor agents, client agents, financing agents, and mediator agents to 
meet and negotiate deals (Archer & Gebauer, 2000). Seller agents provide their 
product catalogs to e-Marketplaces and buyer agents create their procurement 
catalogs. Seller and buyer agents can then search catalogs, interact and negotiate with 
each other, and process trading transactions (Kowalczyk et al., 2002). Trading agents 
can execute at the e-Marketplace host, client hosts that instantiated them, or vendor 
hosts. The e-Marketplace provides directory services on potential clients and vendors 
at the marketplace. It provides information on products and their prices and 
availabilities. It also keeps records of past trading activities, reputation, and trust 
level in trading agents. Moreover, the e-Marketplace manages trading agents at its 
host and the flow of data between agents including business transactions. The e-
Marketplace is supervised by trusted organizations named Market Authorities that 
publish policies on the allowable interactions and communications between client 
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agents and vendor agents (Archer & Gebauer, 2000). E-Marketplaces are expected to 
support security, efficiency, financing, and anonymity (Feldman, 2000). 
 
The agents are of two types: stationary and mobile. Some of the agents are 
competitive and others are cooperative as will be discussed below. The agents are 
as follows: 
 Interface Agent (IA) 
 Heuristic Agent (HA) 
 Collaboration Agent (CA) 
 Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) 
 Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA) 
 Replica Agent (RA) 
 Supervisor Agent (SPA) 
 Purchasing Agent (PA) 
 Client’s Bank Agent (BA) 
 Vendor Agent (VA) 
 
Interface Agent (IA) is a stationary agent at the client host that handles the 
interaction between the client and the negotiation system. It prompts the client to 
provide descriptive information about goods/services of interest. The information 
might be quantitative e.g. price limit or qualitative e.g. high service level. The agent 
analyzes the information the client provides and maps it into attributes of the 
requested goods/services. The attributes are stored in a Request for Offer (RFO). 
 
Heuristic Agent (HA) is a stationary agent at the e-Marketplace that provides advice 
on quantifying any qualitative information the client provides based on heuristic 
approaches. It defines an appropriate value of qualitative preference by selecting from 
a set of preference standards (Saaty, 2008) predefined in the system. It then computes 
a score of a preference using Fuzzy functions (Bellman & Zadeh, 1970; Kowalczyk & 
Bui, 2000; Carvalho, Ekel, Martins, & Pereira, 2006) that returns a value with [0, 1].   
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Collaboration Agent (CA) is a stationary agent at the e-Marketplace that assists in 
planning a bid for the client's Request for Offer (RFO). It searches pre-fetched 
servers for need patterns that are most similar to the client's need pattern and 
computes similarities between the two patterns (Zeng, Xing, & Zhou, 2004). It 
implements Q-learning approach (Zen, 2009; Li & Cao, 2004; Von-Wun & Chun-
An, 2002) and recommends a matrix of weights of constraints in multi-issue 
negotiation model. It can also recommend an agent itinerary, which is comprised of 
the hosts of the most competitive vendors, and a client’s negotiation deadline taking 
into account the expected delivery time of goods/services that the client has initially 
set. 
 
Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) is a mobile agent that migrates to vendor hosts in 
search of offers and negotiation with the competitive vendors. It might make a 
preliminary evaluation of the collected offers, whenever a limited-time advantageous 
offer exists. In Section 3 of Chapter 2, we discussed the different approaches that have 
been proposed for evaluating a collected offer and computing its utility. Barbuceanu 
and Lo (2000) have proposed a multi-attribute decision making method. The agent 
comprises four modules (Skylogiannis, Antoniou, Bassiliades, Governatori, & Bikakis, 
2007) that enhance the flexibility of the negotiation system in handling negotiation 
processes: 
 Knowledge module 
 Reasoning module 
 Communication module 
 Control module 
Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA) is a mobile agent that accompanies the SNA agent 
and executes simultaneously with it at a vendor host. It stores all partial itinerary 
registries of its execution at vendor hosts. The partial itinerary registries constitute 
the actual agent itinerary. 
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Figure 3.2 System architecture of mobile-agent based e-Trade negotiation 
The SNA and IRA agents initially migrate to hosts of potential vendors. The 
knowledge module keeps a track of decisions and interactions made during 
negotiation. The Reasoning module encodes the logic of negotiation strategies that 
aim for inference of preferences and utility of opponents from the history of 
decisions and interactions. The Communication module communicates any new 
event that takes place in the negotiation environment to the Control module (steps 1 
& 2). It then activates the Reasoning module that subsequently reads the information 
in the Knowledge module and analyzes it (steps 3 & 4). It then deduces new facts, 
invalidates old facts, and accordingly updates the Knowledge module (step 5). The 
Control module communicates with the Communication module and instructs to 
generate a new offer or counter-offer, wait for the next event, or abort negotiation 
(steps 6 & 7). It then updates the Knowledge module of the made decision or 
interaction (step 8). The architecture of the SNA agent is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
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Replica Agent (RA) is a duplicate of the SNA agent that might be generated to 
handle a sub-task as assigned by the SNA agent. It might search a particular route of 
agent itinerary and then communicates search outcomes to the SNA agent. The full 
details of the implementation of the RA agent will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.3 Architecture of Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) 
Supervisor Agent (SPA) is a mobile agent that is dispatched to the Trusted Server 
(TS) (Pagnia et al., 2000). It securely stores utility functions, and negotiation tactics 
and strategies. It evaluates collected offers, makes a decision on the winning offer, 
and issues a purchase order to the respective winning vendor. Also, it is responsible 
of verifying the security properties of search/negotiation outcomes. It can detect if 
any tampering acts have taken place. It detects the different types of attacks 
including deletion, truncation or replacement of already collected offer/s, or insertion 
of fake offers. The SPA agent is dispatched to the Trusted Server (TS) to limit the 
ability of opponents from learning negotiation tactics and strategies, or revealing the 
client’s contract space. 
Purchasing Agent (PA) is a mobile agent that is dispatched to the client’s bank host. 
It securely stores bank account details of the client and makes payment orders to the 
client's bank agent for processing payment to the winning vendor. It also makes a 
follow-up on delivery of goods/services to the client and on time. 
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Client’s Bank Agent (BA) is a stationary agent that resides at the client’s bank host. It 
is responsible of processing the payment orders of its clients. 
Vendor Agent (VA) is a stationary agent that resides at a vendor host and acts on 
behalf of the vendor. During negotiation, the SNA agent interacts with a set of VA 
agents and collects offers. The SNA and VA agents are competitive agents. The IRA 
interacts with the same set of VA agents and requests partial itinerary registries of its 
execution at the respective vendor hosts.   
3.3   E-Trade Negotiation Model 
We define a multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral negotiation model that deploys 
mobile agents in e-Trade negotiation. The negotiation model passes through eight 
successive and non-concurrent phases during its lifetime as Figure 3.3 and outlined 
below. 
 
 Request initiation phase 
 Bidding phase 
 Search phase 
 Replication phase 
 Evaluation and negotiation phase 
 Settlement phase 
 Purchase phase 
 Delivery phase 
 
Request initiation phase: the client in step (1) interacts with the IA agent and places a 
request for goods/services. He/she describes goods/services of interest, expected 
delivery time ሺ ாܶ஽ሻ, preferences, constraints, and priorities. 
 
Bidding phase: the IA agent analyzes client's request and formulates a requirement 
profile. In this thesis, we will refer to it as Request for Offer (RFO). It includes: 
attributes such as description of goods/services of interest, and number of items; 
constraints such as price limit, expected delivery time ( ாܶ஽), or warranty period; 
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preferences such as a particular delivery method; priorities. It then carries out the 
following actions: 
 
 Communicates in step (2) with the HA agent, whenever the client does not set an 
exact value of a preference, e.g. high as a preference of the quality of service 
level. The HA agent provides a set of predefined preference standards (Saaty, 
2008) and advises on the value of a preference. The IA agent then computes a 
score of the preference using Fuzzy functions that returns a value with [0, 1].   
 
 Communicates in step (3) with the CA agent that recommends weights of 
constraints in multi-issue negotiation model. It also advises on an agent itinerary 
that is comprised of the hosts of potential vendors based on experience, 
knowledge, and past negotiation records. Moreover, it recommends a target 
utility ሺ୘ሻ and a client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) taking into account the 
expected delivery time ( ாܶ஽). 
 
 Generates the SNA agent in step (4) and then stores the requirement profile in the 
agent. It then dispatches the SNA agent to hosts of potential vendors in step (5). 
 
 Generates the SPA agent that is responsible for verifying the integrity and 
authenticity of the collected offers. The IA agent in step (6) sends the SPA agent 
to the Trusted Server (TS) that provides a secure and any time availability 
execution environment for verification and evaluation of the collected offers. 
 
 Generates the PA agent that is responsible of issuing payment orders to client's 
bank agent and securely stores client's account details. The IA agent in step (7) 
sends the PA agent to the client’s bank host. . 
 
Search phase: the SNA agent executes at hosts of potential vendors in step (8) and 
collects offers from these vendors. The offers are encrypted to ensure the security of 
offers. The Offer collection is under particular temporal constraints such as client’s 
negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) and negotiation deadlines of vendors of top utility offers 
that expire before the client’s negotiation deadline. Usually, the agent continues the 
search for offers till the client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே). It may interrupt offer 
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collection earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline to avoid loss of the top utility 
offer that expires earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The interruption 
would not take place unless conditions on trading competition and market search 
space are satisfied. The conditions will be discussed in Chapter 4. The agent enforces 
cryptography on the collected offers to preserve the security of offers and to promote 
competition between visited vendors.  
 
Replication phase: during the search for offers, the SNA agent might generate a 
duplicate of it-self and assigns the RA agent a particular task in step (9). For 
example, it might need to complete the search in the soonest possible time before an 
advantageous offer expires so it assigns the replica to search a sub-set of vendor 
hosts it plans to visit. The RA agent communicates the outcomes of search to the 
SNA agent upon completion of its task. 
 
Evaluation and negotiation phase: upon completion of search of potential vendors, 
the SNA agent integrates the search outcomes of the RA agent into its search 
outcomes. It then migrates to the Trusted Server in step (10) and provides the SPA 
agent with the integrated search outcomes. The SPA agent then securely decrypts the 
collected offers, verifies, and short-lists all acceptable offers. It then verifies the 
integrity and authenticity of the offers and evaluates the utility of each offer. It then 
ranks offers by their utilities and short-lists vendors of top utility offers. If the 
client’s RFO is not satisfied and target utility is not yet achieved, then the SPA agent 
initiates a negotiation round or aborts negotiation without reaching an agreement 
(Shiraz & Barfouroush, 2008; Si et al., 2007). The SPA agent advises the SNA agent 
on particular attributes to negotiate with the short-listed vendors in the next 
negotiation round trying to boost the client's utility. It also advises the SNA agent on 
the appropriate negotiation strategy and concession rates to implement (Zhuang et 
al., 2008). The SNA agent then migrates to the hosts of short-listed vendors. The 
SNA agent might run multiple negotiation rounds with the short-listed vendors and 
collects amendments to their original offers if any exists till client’s requirements are 
satisfied, adequate market search is completed, and client's utility is maximized. 
Negotiation can continue till the client’s negotiation deadline.  
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Winner determination and settlement phase: upon completion of negotiation, the 
SPA agent concludes the offer that best meets the client’s RFO and maximizes its 
utility. It then identifies the winning vendor (௪). It sends a purchase order to the 
winning vendor and waits for an acceptance message in step (11). It also sends reject 
messages to other vendors.  
 
Purchase phase: the SPA agent in step (12) requests the PA agent to issue a payment 
order for the benefit of the winning vendor and then the PA agent issues a payment 
order and presents it to the BA agent to process the payment. The SPA agent then 
notifies the IA agent of the details of purchase order in step (13). The BA agent in 
step (14) processes the payment order for the benefit of the winning vendor. 
 
Delivery phase: the winning vendor in step (15) delivers goods/services to the client 
upon the receipt of payment. The goods/services should be delivered to the client not 
later than the expected delivery time ( ாܶ஽), which the client has initially set. The 
client then sends an acknowledgement on the receipt of goods/services to the IA 
agent in step (16). Next, the IA agent passes the acknowledgement to the winning 
vendor and concludes the successful completion of client’s request. It finally 
proceeds on terminating the following mobile agents: SNA, RA, SPA, and PA 
agents.  
3.4   Negotiating Agents Interaction 
Each agent in the system architecture is assigned a specific process and collaborates 
with other agents in the system to accomplish the negotiation task. The interaction 
between different agents is depicted in Figure 3.4 and is described as follows. 
 
 The IA agent manages negotiation and coordinates other agents in the system as 
follows. 
- Communicates with the HA agent on quantifying any qualitative attribute. 
- Communicates with the CA agent on weights of negotiation constraints, 
potential vendors in marketplaces for goods/services of interest, target utility 
(UT), and client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே). 
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- Controls generation and termination of the following mobile agent: SPA, 
SNA, RA, PA and IRA agents. 
 The SNA agent interacts with the SPA agent on attributes to negotiate and 
interacts with the VA agent on offers and counter-offers. It also, generates and 
interacts with the RA agent on integration of negotiation outcomes. Moreover, it 
interacts with the winning vendor agent (VAW) on the purchase order and bid 
award. 
 The SPA agent interacts with the SNA agent on the purchase order and bid 
award. It also interacts with the PA agent on payment orders for goods/services 
to purchase. Moreover, it interacts with the SNA and IRA agents on the outcomes 
of search/negotiation. 
 The PA agent interacts with the BA agent on processing the payment for 
goods/services to purchase. 
 The winning vendor agent (VAW) interacts with the client on delivery of 
goods/services and the client then interacts with the IA agent on 
acknowledgement of receipt of goods/services.  
 
PA
SPA
HA
VAW
IA
CA
RA
    IRA 
Client
SNA
VAVAVAVA
BA
 
 
Figure 3.4 Interaction between different agents in the negotiation system 
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3.5   System Enhancements  
The negotiation task is split over multiple mobile agents to produce a more efficient 
and secure negotiation model. The following explains the enhancements it introduces 
to the negotiation system. 
 The SPA agent ensures that the security of collected offers is maintained during 
negotiation as it decrypts, verifies, and evaluates collected offers at the Trusted 
Server. It does not decrypt offers at vendors' hosts that might be malicious or 
running malicious agents.  
 The SPA ensures the privacy of negotiation strategies, tactics, and decision 
functions during negotiation as they are stored in it rather in the SNA agent, 
which may execute at non-trusted hosts. 
 The IRA agent provides a proof on the actual agent itinerary so any deletion or 
truncation of offers can be detected. 
 The SNA agent reduces communication loads as it migrates to hosts of potential 
vendors and directly collects offers from these vendors rather than residing at a 
client host and implementing Message Passing Paradigm in its interaction with 
vendor agents 
 The PA agent ensures that the account details of the client are maintained secured 
during negotiation. It stores the account details encrypted with the public key of 
client's bank and migrates to the client's bank host, which is considered a trusted 
host. 
 The RA agent assists the SNA agent in searching and negotiating a partial set of 
potential vendors and, thus shortens search and negotiation time. It has a 
significant effect, particularly; when client’s negotiation deadline or vendors’ 
negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer expiry times) are tight. 
 The CA and HA agents assists in formulating client’s requirement profile 
accurately including weights of negotiation attributes, quantifying qualitative 
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attributes, etc. They play a significant role in estimating the utilities of collected 
offered accurately.  
3.6   Summary 
In this chapter, we highlighted the problems in the existing e-Negotiation systems 
that mainly deploy stationary agent and incompleteness of the presented system 
architectures. We also indicated the motivations for establishing system architecture 
that deploys and integrates mobile agents in e-Trade negotiations. We thus proposed 
system architecture that deploys mobile agents in e-Trade negotiation and devised 
agent architecture detailing its different components. The system deploys multiple 
agents for the conduct of negotiation and each one has a distinctive job. It deploys 
stationary and mobile agents. The stationary agents are of five types: Vendor Agent 
(VA), Interface Agent (IA), Heuristic Agent (HA), Collaboration Agent (CA), and 
client’s Bank Agent (BA). The mobile agents are of five types: Search and 
Negotiation Agent (SNA), Replica Agent (RA), Supervisor Agent (SPA), Purchasing 
Agent (PA), and Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA). The various phases of e-Trade 
negotiation model are identified. Two new phases are presented: replication phase 
and purchase phase. The system describes how the different agents interact with each 
other during negotiation. The proposed system presents enhancements to e-Trade 
negotiation. It ensures the security of data exchanged during negotiation, shortens 
search/negotiation time, and assists in accurate evaluation of offers collected during 
negotiation. 
 There are different mobile agent frameworks (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2012a). The 
mobile agent can be implemented in Aglets or Voyager as they are the only 
frameworks that support two key features: (1) cloning; (2) remote creation of mobile 
agents. There are two significant features that should be considered in selecting the 
appropriate framework. They are agent collaboration and agent itinerary features. 
The Aglets framework facilitates agent collaboration but agent itinerary should be 
pre-defined; whereas the Voyager framework does not facilitate agent collaboration 
but agent itinerary can be dynamically defined.  We recommend Aglets for the 
implementation of the e-Trade negotiation system. The negotiation system would be 
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implemented in Java (JDK 1.7.x). The web browser would serve as a user interface 
and agents would operate at the information processing layer. 
 
 To our knowledge, we are the first to present a system architecture that deploys 
and integrates mobile agents in multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade 
negotiations. The architecture describes the various negotiation phases and the 
interactions between the different negotiating agents. The presented system 
architecture presents a more efficient system as deploying mobile agents rather than 
stationary agents that result in excessive communication loads and delays. Hence, it 
would motivate the implementation of e-negotiation in real applications. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
One-to-Many Bilateral e-Trade 
Negotiation Strategy 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the problem that has not been considered in the existing 
negotiation strategies and relates to the risk of losing top utility offers that might 
expire before the client’s negotiation deadline in one-to-many bilateral negotiations. 
We then describe the negotiation model in details and outline the general rules of the 
negotiation protocol for one-to-many bilateral mobile agent-based negotiation. Next, 
we present a flexible and rational strategy for multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral 
negotiations that effectively avoids such risk and truly maximizes client’s utility.  
4.1 Overview of the Problem 
Negotiation strategies aim at maximizing the outcomes of negotiation in terms of 
client’s utility. They schedule multiple negotiation rounds with potential vendors and 
try to reach an agreement that is acceptable to the client before the client’s 
negotiation deadline. They also advise on the generation of counter-offers based on 
least possible concession rates that would maximize client’s utility. The existing 
negotiation strategies delay the generation of counter-offers till all offers are 
collected from potential vendors and compared. This delayed response interaction is 
aimed at maximizing client’s utility though it is only possible given that the validities 
of collected offers extend till the client’s negotiation deadline. In fact, it is probable 
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that the validity of a time-limited offer of top utility ends before the client’s 
negotiation deadline and negotiation strategies would miss out on such significant 
offers. Thus, the client’s utility would not be maximized. Establishing a negotiation 
strategy that can avoid loss of such significant offers and can effectively interrupt 
negotiation before the client’s negotiation deadline is a fundamental requirement to 
the success of e-Trade negotiations and to gain trust in its applications as it ensures 
the client’s maximum utility is achieved.  
The problem of interest is defined as a negotiation strategy that avoids loss of top 
utility offers while negotiating with other potential vendors. Particularly, given the 
offer validity is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline; we want to maximum 
the client’s utility. The strategy should act differently and more effectively than the 
existing negotiation strategy as follows. 
 Evaluate a collected offer as soon as the vendor provides the offer and does not 
delay the generation of counter-offers till all offers are collected from potential 
vendors and compared. 
 Interrupt negotiation before the client’s negotiation deadline for a time-limited 
offer only if it satisfies the following: (1) has the top utility; (2) expires earlier 
than the client’s negotiation deadline; (3) provides a significant increase in the 
client’s utility as compared to the utilities of the already collected offers. 
 Evaluate offers taking into consideration market search space, offer validities and 
values, and network time delay, which relates to processing, queuing, 
transmission, and propagation delays. 
 Rank offers based on trading competition that relates to offer validities and 
utilities. The two offers that have the same price but different validities should be 
ranked such that the offer of later validity has a higher rank as it allows for a 
longer negotiation time and hence a broader market search space. 
 Ensure completion of an adequate market search space. 
The problem is complex as the delayed counter-offer generation might result in a 
drop in the client’s utility due to the loss of the time-limited offer of top utility. Also, 
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the early interruption of negotiation might result in a drop in the client’s utility due to 
an inadequate market search space. To our knowledge, the problem has not been 
addressed and managed efficiently in any of the existing negotiation strategies. 
To illustrate the effect of negotiation strategies on the outcomes of e-Trade 
negotiation, we consider a client that sends a mobile agent to a set of hosts of potential 
vendors {V1, …, Vj, …, Vn} and assigns it to collect offers from vendors  and negotiate 
with vendors until a negotiation deadline (TEN) is reached. The deadline will thereafter 
be referred to as a client’s negotiation deadline. Each vendor agent provides an offer to 
the mobile agent on behalf of its vendor (Vj) for (1 d j  d n).  The offer is of price (Sj ) 
and with an end time of validity (TEV
j ). The mobile agent verifies the collected offers to 
determine all acceptable offers, and then compares all acceptable offers to identify the 
winning vendor (Vw).  To illustrate this we present two scenarios: scenario (A) and 
scenario (B) which are depicted in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 respectively. We assume 
that there are three acceptable offers: {	୫, 	୩, 	୸}. In scenario (A), the last offer has 
the lowest price (ܵ௭), whereas in scenario (B) it does not.  
The desperate strategy does not yield the client’s maximum utility in both 
scenarios as it awards the bid to the first acceptable offer, which would most probably 
be an overpriced offer of price (Sm). The patient strategy yields the client’s maximum 
utility in scenario (A), whereas it does not in scenario (B). The strategy continues with 
offer collection expecting to obtain better offers, meanwhile, it loses the offer with the 
lowest price (Sk) in scenario (B) as it expires before the client’s negotiation deadline.  
The partially patient strategy yields the client’s maximum utility in scenario (B), 
whereas it does not in scenario (A). It interrupts offer collection before offer (Fk) 
expires to avoid loss of such a top utility offer, which expires earlier than the client’s 
negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ. In scenario (A), it loses the offer (Fz) of lowest price (Sz) 
that is forthcoming.  
The optimized patient strategy yields different outcomes based on the setting of 
the optimizing period. In scenario (A) and (B), the strategy may not yield maximum 
utility if the optimization time is longer than the expiry time of the best collected 
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offer. Also, the strategy may not yield maximum utility if the optimization period in 
not enough to search the market adequately.  
 
Table 4.1 Negotiation outcomes of scenario (A) 
Offer Offer 
validity 
Offer price Outcomes 
Desperate Partially patient Patient 
	୫ TEN<TEV  Sm  
Smz min Skz min Sz  = min 	୩ TEV <TEN Sz  < Sk  < Sm  
	୸ TEN<TEV  Sz  = min 
 
Table 4.2 Negotiation outcomes of scenario (B) 
Offer Offer 
validity 
Offer price Outcomes 
Desperate Partially patient Patient 
	୫ TEN<TEV  Sm  
Smz min Sk  = min Szz min 	୩ TEV <TEN Sk  = min 
	୸ TEN<TEV  Sk  < Sz  < Sm  
A real application that highlights the problem is the booking of airline tickets. 
Negotiation can take the form of search for alternatives (Calisti, 2002). There exists a 
possibility that a mobile agent collects a top utility offer just prior its expiry time or 
the offer expiry time is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. For example, a 
mobile agent searches various airlines for a flight on 7th Sep, 2010 from Charlotte 
(CLT) to Montreal (YUL). It searches for a non-stop cheap flight with a price limit 
of $600 and starts the search on 5th Sep, 2010 23:54 EDT (Canada) being unaware 
of any time-limited offer. It sets 6th Sep, 2010, 9:00 EDT as the client’s negotiation 
deadline. It searched through Expedia.com, Aircanada.com, Yahootravel.com, 
Cheapoair.com, Orbitz.com, and Grab2Travel.com. Different offers are provided 
from Delta Airlines, US Airways, Continental, Air Canada, and United Airways. 
Table 4.3 shows all offers collected from the different search engines with offer of 
$579 on US Airways being the first collected offer. The price of a non-stop flight 
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varies from $217 (Canada Air) to $579 (US Airways) having  US Airways offer as 
the first collected offer and Air Canada offer to expires on 5th Sep, 2010 11.59 EDT. 
The query time of a mobile agent is expected to range from 125-450 seconds using 
Genetic algorithms (Selamat & Selamat, 2004) and hence, Air Canada offer will 
expire before the agent completes the query.  
Table 4.3 List of collected offers 
 Offers 
Search Engine Airline Route Time-limited 
offer 
Price 
($) 
Expedia.com US Airways Non-stop No 579 
Continental One stop No 489 
United airlines One stop No 441 
 
Delta One stop Yes, valid till 
6 Sep, 2010 
371 
Air Canada.com Air Canada Non-stop Yes, valid till 
5 Sep, 2010 
217 
Cheapoair.com Delta One stop No 342 
Yahootravel.com Air Canada One stop No 364 
Orbitz.com US Airways Non-stop No 579 
 Delta One stop No 371 
 United airlines One stop No 590 
 
American 
Airlines 
One stop No 1140 
Grab2Travel.com Air Canada Non-stop No 364 
 Air Canada One stop No 829 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the least price is $217 and is on Air Canada Airlines. The 
desperate strategy awards the bid to the first acceptable offer of $579 (US Airways). 
It does not maximize client’s utility as it does not give enough time for evaluating the 
CHAPTER 4: One-to-Many Bilateral e-Trade Negotiation Strategy 
 
 
105 
 
market accurately and awards the bid to the first acceptable offer which is 
overpriced. The patient strategy extends the search and negotiation till the client’s 
negotiation deadline and then awards the bid to the offer of $364 (Air Canada). It 
misses out the offer of $217 (Air Canada) that has a short validity and would expire 
before the client’s negotiation deadline and hence, would not maximize client’s 
utility. The two strategies would miss out on the time-limited offer of least price. The 
optimized patient negotiation strategy may not yield maximum utility if the 
optimization time is longer than the expiry time of Canada Air offer. The partially 
patient negotiation strategy awards the bid to the first time-limited offer of $371 
(Delta Airways) since it expires earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே). 
The strategy would not maximize client’s utility as it did not get a chance to learn 
about the offer $217 (Air Canada). 
Our negotiation strategy would not wait until the client’s negotiation deadline to 
make a decision based on the availability of a top utility offer priced at $217 (Air 
Canada) that expires before the client’s negotiation deadline. The strategy acts as 
follows:  
1. Computes the utility of each collected offer as soon it is collected and compares 
the offer with the so far collected offers based on their utilities and expiry 
times. 
2. Sets alerts to signal before the expiry times of offers of Air Canada and Delta 
Airways. 
3. Completes search for offers and then changes the price limit to $271. 
4. Runs negotiation rounds trying to find competitive alternatives and may search 
for different route and times. 
5. Re-evaluates the so far collected offers whenever an alert signals expiry of an 
offer and then verifies that the offer has highest utility and satisfies conditions 
on trading competition and market search space. 
6. Chooses the offer only if it passes the verifications.  
 
 The market search space condition refers to the satisfaction of an adequate 
market search space. It compares the actual number of searched vendors to the 
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minimum number of vendors the client agent has to search. The agent might consider 
a search of five vendor agents as an adequate market search space. The trading 
competition condition refers to two indexes that indicate how far an offer competes 
with other top utility offers. The two indexes are as follows. 
 Offer utility index: it compares utilities of the current offer and top ranked offer 
with respect to the target utility. It indicates if there is a marginal/significant 
difference between the two offers in terms of utility.  
 Offer validity index: it compares the expiry times of the current offer and top 
ranked offer with respect to the current time. It indicates if the expiry time of the 
current offer is marginally/significantly longer than that of the top ranked offer. 
 
Figure 4.1 Variations in price of a flight from MLT to YUL 
The strategy can make a decision on an early bid award before the top utility 
offer expires, given that: (a) the offer has highest utility; (b) market search space 
condition is satisfied, e.g. a search of five vendors; (c) the offer satisfies trading 
competition condition. The offer of Air Canada satisfies the three conditions and 
hence, the strategy stops the search and negotiation near the offer expiry time and 
accepts the offer. In this example, the proposed strategy provided additional savings 
of 60.3%, 60.3%, and 24.5% as compared to desperate, patient, and partially 
strategies, respectively.  
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4.2 Negotiation Model 
The negotiation system includes both mobile and stationary agents, and five 
types of hosts: client host, vendor hosts, e-Marketplace server, client’s bank host, and 
Trusted Server (TS) (Pagnia et al., 2000). 
 
 The client is a user who has a request for goods/services. The e-Marketplace is a 
virtual marketplace that connects the different types of trading agents including: 
client agents and vendor agents. The Trusted Server (TS) provides a secure execution 
environment for interacting agents. Further details on e-marketplaces and Trusted 
Servers were given in Section 2 of Chapter 3. 
There are nine types of interacting agents as follows. 
 Interface Agent (IA) 
 Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) 
 Supervisor Agent (SPA) 
 Purchasing Agent (PA) 
 Replica Agent (RA) 
 Collaboration Agent (CA) 
 Heuristic Agent (HA) 
 Vendor Agent (VA) 
 Client’s Bank Agent (BA) 
The IA agent is a stationary agent at the client host that receives a Request for 
Offer ሺ	ሻ from a client and tries to satisfy it through search and negotiation with 
potential vendors in marketplace. The SNA agent is a mobile agent that migrates to 
vendor hosts to collect and negotiate offers with vendor agents. The SPA agent is a 
mobile agent that is dispatched to the Trusted Server (TS). It securely stores utility 
functions and negotiation strategies for evaluating offers, responding to vendors, 
and making decisions on the winning vendor. The PA agent is a mobile agent that 
is dispatched to the client’s bank host. It securely stores bank account details of the 
client and makes payment orders to the client's bank agent for processing payment 
to vendors. The RA agent is a (replica) copy of the SNA agent. It is a mobile agent 
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that is assigned to search a subset of the potential vendors to assist it in completing 
an adequate market search space, whenever the expiry time of the collected offer is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The CA agent is a stationary agent at 
the e-Marketplace. It has knowledge about past negotiation scenarios and can 
provide advice to the IA agent, which do not have any past experience in 
negotiation, to minimize the need for predictions and learning (Lashkari, Metral, & 
Maes, 1997; Zen, 2009). The CA agents are trusted agents that are registered in “e-
Bulletin Board Agency” (Lashkari et al., 1997). They are artificial agents that act 
as knowledge and expert agents with a repository for tracking negotiation scenarios 
and reasoning module that filters the similar of negotiation scenarios and 
provide advice to the IA agent. They are not mobile agents and serve as 
knowledge-based consultants. They can make decision based on past experiences 
and in response to changes in environment. They check similarities between current 
and past negotiation scenarios (Zeng et al., 2004). They have a hierarchical 
structure for categorizing different negotiation types to facilitate similarity filtering 
of negotiation scenarios. They are effective in providing their expertise in the field 
of negotiation based on knowledge and reasoning. The HA agent is a stationary 
agent at the e-Marketplace and provides advice on quantifying the qualitative 
information in the (RFO). The vendor agent is a stationary agent that acts on behalf 
of a vendor and provides offers to the client agent upon request. The BA agent is an 
agent that acts on behalf of client’s bank. The flow of interaction between the 
different types of agents is illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
The negotiation strategy is based on the following assumptions: 
 Drift time exists between different agents. 
 Agent replication is facilitated. 
 The SNA agent may run multiple negotiation rounds. 
 Client’s negotiation deadline is only conveyed to vendor agents. 
 Vendor agents provide offers with a validity period. 
 Each agent possesses public and private encryption keys. A vendor agent uses 
its private key to sign its offer, and the public key of a Trusted Server (TS), 
which the client agent has defined, to encrypt its signed offer.  
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 Mobile agents suffer from network time delay, which relates to processing, 
queuing, transmission, and propagation delays.  
 Negotiating entities exchange offers and counter-offers in the form of 
messages. 
 
The negotiation model comprises of eight successive and non-concurrent phases 
in which the negotiating agents exchange messages as depicted in Figure 4.2. Table 
4.4 summaries the notation of particular parameters of exchanged messages. Refer to 
Glossary for the full list of notations. The different negotiation phases were discussed 
in Section 4 of Chapter 3. Further details of the negotiation phases are given below.  
Request initiation phase (phase 1): the client provides the IA agent with its 
requirement profile that includes attributes of goods/services of interest, expected 
delivery time (TED), preferences, constraints (max, min), and priorities.  
Bidding phase (phase 2): the IA agent stores the provided requirement profile in a 
Request for Offer (RFO) and then communicates with the HA agent to get advice on 
quantifying the qualitative preferences of the client. It then communicates with the 
CA agent that has a store of past negotiation scenarios and can advise on an agent 
itinerary comprised of the hosts of potential vendors, an adequate market search 
space, and trading competition limits. The CA agent can also advise on a client’s 
negotiation deadline and a target utility (UT). The client’s negotiation deadline would 
be based on the expected delivery time (TE). The target utility will be used as a 
reference point for verifying the collected offers. The utility of a collected offer (୨) 
will be estimated using a utility function that will be discussed in details in Chapter 
5. Next, the IA agent generates SNA, SPA, and PA agents and sends them to the 
hosts of potential vendors, Trusted Server (TS), and client’s bank host, respectively. 
Search phase (phase 3), the SNA agent migrates successively to hosts of potential 
vendors {V1 , … , Vj , … , Vn} and collects offers from these vendors. A vendor agent 
provides an offer (	୨) on behalf of its vendor (Vj) to the SNA agent including the start 
and end times of offer validity ( ௌܶ௏
௝ , ாܶ௏
௝ ), and (RFO) as a tuple ൫	୨ǡ ௌܶ௏௝ ǡ ாܶ௏௝ ǡ 	൯. It 
encrypts its offer to preserve the security of the offer as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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  Figure 4.2 High-level system architecture of mobile agent-based one-to-many negotiation 
If the end time of offer validity ( ாܶ௏
௝ ) (i.e. offer expiry time) is earlier than the 
client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே), then the SNA agent sets an alert at a time (ܶݎ௝) 
that is just before the end time of offer validity to allow for a sufficient time for 
agreement settlement.  
Replication phase (phase 4): the SNA agent generates the RA agent to search a sub-
set of vendor hosts it plans to visit if the end time of the validity ൫ ாܶ௏௝ ൯ of the top 
utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே). The RA agent 
accumulates the results of its search/negotiation and then communicates them to the 
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SNA agent. The two agents are cooperative and each agent searches a subset of 
potential vendors. 
Evaluation and negotiation phase (phase 5): the SNA agent migrates to the Trusted 
Server (TS) once it completes a search/negotiation round where it provides the SPA 
agent with search/negotiation outcomes. The SPA agent can securely decrypt, verify, 
and evaluate the collected offers at the Trusted Server. The SPA agent then short-
lists all offers that satisfy the client’s RFO. It ranks offers by their utilities and 
identifies the top ranked offer. If the utility of the top ranked offer is greater than that 
of the target utility, the SPA agent accordingly updates its target utility and tries in 
the next negotiation round to reach a deal on an offer with a greater utility than that 
of the utility of the current top ranked offer. Next, it implements two time-dependent 
tactics: (1) Boulware tactic; (2) Concerder tactic in generating counter-offers 
whenever an agreement is not reached (Faratin et al., 1998). The tactics are 
dependent on the client’s remaining negotiation deadline. The tactics use polynomial 
or exponential functions that determine values of attributes of a counter-offer in next 
negotiation round. The Boulware tactic initially makes the least possible concessions 
and then, as it approaches the client’s negotiation deadline, it moves towards making 
the most possible concessions, whereas, the Conceder tactic initially makes the most 
possible concessions and then, as it approaches the client’s negotiation deadline, it 
moves towards making the least possible concessions. The SNA agent then migrates   
to the hosts of short-listed vendors and negotiates particular attributes as advised by 
the SPA agent and collects new offers. The SNA agent continues on negotiation and 
evaluation phases till the client’s negotiation deadline is reached. It may reach an 
agreement or not. If then ranks offers by their utilities and identifies the winning 
vendor (Vw). During negotiation and evaluation phases, the SNA agent should 
temporarily interrupt negotiation if an alert signals a soon expiry of an offer and then 
migrates to the Trusted Server for evaluating and verifying the collected offers. The 
SPA agent accepts the offer if it satisfies the following three conditions: 
 Offer has highest utility. 
 Market search space condition is satisfied, e.g. search of five vendors. 
 Offer satisfies trading competition condition. 
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The market search space refers to the number of vendor hosts the SNA agent has 
searched. The SPA agent might consider a search of five vendor agents as an 
adequate market search space.  
The trading competition condition refers to two indexes that indicate how far an 
offer competes with the already collected offers. The indexes are described below. 
 Offer utility index compares the utilities of the current offer and top ranked offer 
with respect to the target utility. It indicates if there is a marginal/significant 
difference between the two offers in terms of utility. 
 Offer validity index compares the expiry times of the current offer and top ranked 
offer with respect to the current time. It indicates if the expiry time of the current 
offer is marginally/significantly longer than that of the top ranked offer. 
If the offer does not satisfy the three conditions, the SNA agent resumes on 
negotiation. It migrates to the remaining vendor hosts in the agent itinerary and 
collects offers from these vendors.  
Settlement phase (Phase 6): upon the completion of negotiation, the SNA agent 
settles an agreement with the winning vendor (Vw). It sends a purchase order to the 
host of winning vendor (Vw) and waits for acceptance. It also sends reject messages 
to other vendor hosts in the agent itinerary.  
Purchase phase (phase 7): the SPA agent requests the PA agent to issue a payment 
order for the benefit of the winning vendor and then the PA agent issues a payment 
order on the behalf of the client and presents it to the BA agent. The BA agent then 
processes the payment order to the winning vendor (Vw). The SPA agent also notifies 
the IA agent of the details of purchase order.  
Delivery phase (phase 8): the winning vendor (Vw) delivers goods/services to the 
client upon the receipt of payment. Next, the IA agent receives an acknowledgement 
from the client confirming the receipt of goods/services. It would then pass the 
acknowledgement to the winning vendor (Vw) and concludes the successful 
completion of the client’s (FRO). Finally, the IA agent terminates the SNA, RA, PA, 
and SPA agents. 
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Table 4.4  Notations of exchanged negotiation parameters 
Symbol Exchanged parameter 
 {V1, … , Vj, … , Vn } A set of potential vendors 
 F:{	୩, …, 	୫, …, 	୸} Offers vector, which only includes acceptable offers sorted 
by offer rank 
U:{ଵ, …, ୨, …, ୬} Utilities vector, which only includes utilities of acceptable 
offers sorted in ascending order 
 UT  Target utility of the client  
 NT 
 NT_MIN 
Actual number  of searched vendors 
An estimate of the adequate market search space 
	 
 ௌܶே  
 ாܶே 
Client’s Request for Offer 
Client’s negotiation start time 
Client’s negotiation deadline 
D g Number of sent replica agents (RA) 
 Vw Winning vendor 
 ௌܶ௏௝  Start time of the offer validity of vendor (Vj) 
 ாܶ௏
௝
 
ܶݎ௝ 
 ௘ܶ 
(γ௟, ߜ௟ሻ 
End time of the offer validity of vendor (Vj) 
Time at which an alert signals a soon expiry of a time-
limited offer (	୨) of top utility 
Time elapsed since the dispatch of the SNA agent to the first 
vendor host in the agent itinerary 
Limits of offer utility and offer validity indexes 
4.3 Negotiation Protocol  
The design of a negotiation strategy is dependent on the implemented protocol.  
Therefore, it is essential to first define the rules of the negotiation protocol and then 
describe the negotiation strategy. 
A negotiation protocol defines the sequence of possible actions the negotiating 
agent can make during the course of negotiation and may lead to an agreement or 
abortion of negotiation. It includes input and output requirements for any action. The 
negotiating agent can make any of the following possible actions upon receipt of an 
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offer from other agents in the negotiation system: (1) Accept the offer, (2) Reject the 
offer and make a counter-offer, or (3) Reject the offer and do not make an offer. If all 
agents in the negotiation system agree on an offer, then negotiation finishes and an 
agreement is concluded. Conversely, if all agents reject an offer and have no 
intention to proceed on negotiation, then negotiation aborts. There are three types of 
responses the negotiating agents can communicate during the course of negotiation 
(Boella & Torre, 2004). The responses are: (1) Valid offer with a counter-offer; (2) 
Finished acknowledging acceptance of the current offer; (3) Broken with an intention 
to abort negotiation.  
The protocol presented in this thesis focuses on multi-constraint one-to-many 
bilateral mobile agent-based negotiation where negotiation threads are sequential.  It is 
different from existing protocols that focus on one-to-one negotiation (McBurney & 
Parsons, 2003; Parsons, Sierra, & Jennings, 1998) or one-to-many auction-based 
negotiation where negotiation threads are concurrent (Sim & Wong, 2001; An et al., 
2006; Chen & Huang, 2009; Wong et al., 2004; Rahwan et al., 2002).  The system 
architecture of negotiation is discussed in Chapter 3. It includes a client and a set of 
potential vendors. The SNA agent acts on behalf of the client and each VA agent acts 
on behalf of a potential vendor. Negotiating agents implement particular negotiation 
strategies but do not have information about negotiation strategies implemented by 
other agents in the negotiation system. The SNA agent is a mobile agent that migrates 
sequentially to hosts of potential vendors to interact with vendor agents and collect 
offers from these vendors. The SNA and VA negotiating agents are competitive agents. 
They are self-interested agents that try to maximize their own utilities. The protocol 
consists of succession of Request of Offer (RFO) on behalf of the client and succession 
of offers on behalf of potential vendors. The SNA agent conveys the client’s negotiation 
deadline ( ாܶே) to vendor agents and also vendors convey the expiry time ( ாܶ௏
௝ ) of their 
offers to the SNA agent. The client’s negotiation deadline should be earlier than the 
expected delivery time of goods/services (TED), which the client has initially set. The 
environment is static which considers the number of VA agents is fixed and not 
changeable during negotiation. 
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 The presented protocol extends the general rules of the alternating-offer bargaining 
protocol (Lai et al., 2004). The rules can generally be expressed as follows:  
 Initially, the SNA agent visits the hosts of potential vendors and submits the 
Request for Offer (RFO) to each vendor. The request specifies attributes of 
goods/services of interest, preferences and constraints of the client, and client’s 
negotiation deadline. 
 A visited vendor agent (VA) takes an action either to provide an offer or declines 
the Request for Offer (RFO). The offer should be kept private during negotiation 
and it can only be read by the client’s agents. The offer includes the validity time 
of the offer. The VA agent should provide its offer before the client’s negotiation 
deadline ( ாܶே). It should also commit to its offer till the client’s negotiation 
deadline unless the offer validity is earlier than the negotiation deadline. If the 
current time exceeds the client’s negotiation deadline then the negotiation aborts. 
 At the end of search phase, the SNA agent migrates to the Trusted Server and 
provides the SPA agent with search outcomes. The SPA agent then starts an 
evaluation and negotiation phase. It evaluates offers using a private utility 
function and ranks offers by their utilities. It then short-lists vendors of top utility 
offers and selects attributes to be negotiated in the next negotiation round. The 
SPA agent advises the SNA agent on the attributes to be negotiated with the 
short-listed vendors. The SNA agent then starts a negotiation phase with the 
short-listed vendor agents. It will re-visit the hosts of short-listed vendors to 
collect better offers. The SNA agent would respond differently to the offers of 
VA agents. Its response to the short-listed vendors would be Reject with a new 
Request for Offer (RFO); whereas its response to non-shortlisted vendors would 
be Reject. The new (RFO) is generated based on time-dependent tactics (Faratin 
et al., 1998) that will be discussed Section 4.4. 
 A short-listed vendor agent (VA) takes an action either to provide a better offer 
than its previous offer or declines the new Request for Offer (RFO). Duplicate 
offers are not allowed during negotiation. The offer includes the validity time of 
the offer. The VA agent should provide its offer before the client’s negotiation 
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deadline ( ாܶே). It should also commit to its offer till the client’s negotiation 
deadline. If the current time exceeds the client’s negotiation deadline then the 
negotiation aborts. 
 At the end of evaluation and negotiation phase, the SNA agent evaluates the new 
offers using the utility function and ranks offers by their utilities. It then short-
lists vendors of top utility offers and starts a new negotiation phase with the new 
short-listed vendor agents. The SNA agent may respond differently with each   
short-listed vendor agent (VA). Its response to the short-listed vendors would be 
Reject with a new Request for Offer (RFO); whereas its response to non-
shortlisted vendors would be Reject. 
 The SNA agent continues negotiation till the client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) 
aiming at optimizing the client’s utility. It evaluates all collected offers and 
awards the bid to the vendor of the offer of top utility given that it satisfies 
client’s preferences and constraints. It sends Accept to the VAw agent and sends 
Reject to the remaining VA agents.  
 The SNA agent sends a purchase order to the VAw agent. The VAw agent replies 
with Accept and hence an agreement is concluded. The agreement should be 
done before the delivery time of goods/services, which the client has initially set. 
The agreement should include the attributes of goods/services initially defined in 
RFO at the price of the winning offer. 
 The formal protocol representation or verification of protocol properties such as 
consistency, transparency, or explicability (Kersten & Lai, 2007) are not presented as 
the thesis mainly focuses on four problems in one-to-many bilateral negotiation 
system that relate to: system architecture, negotiation strategy, utility function, and 
security protocol. 
4.4 Negotiation Strategy  
The proposed strategy focuses on multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral negotiation 
where the negotiation threads are sequential. It assumes that offers are non-
retractable. The withdrawal of an offer results in imposing a penalty on the 
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respective trading partner. The strategy implements the immediate response 
interaction and evaluates an incoming offer as soon as it is received. It does not 
implement the delayed response interaction (Collins et al., 2002) that leads to the 
loss of top utility offers that expire before the client’s negotiation deadline.  
 The algorithm in Figure 4.3 shows the pseudo-code of the proposed negotiation 
strategy.  
Algorithm Negotiation strategy 
INPUT: (	ሻ 
OUTPUT: Vw 
BEGIN 
 (V, NT_MIN, UT, W, TEN, γ௟, ߜ௟ሻm IA agent communicates with the CA agent 
m IA agent communicates with the HA agent 
Initialization ( ௘ܶ , g , NT) 
 Read current time at the client’s host ( ௖ܶ) and set ௘ܶ = 0 
The IA agent initializes the SNA, PA, and SPA agents 
Dispatch the SNA agent to hosts of potential vendors 
Dispatch the PA agent to client’s bank host 
Dispatch the SPA agent to a Trusted Server 
WHILE ( ௖ܶ + ௘ܶ <TEN) 
{ 
FOR (Vj  V) DO 
Vj m Dispatch the SNA agent 
Read  ( ௘ܶ)  
Store time at which the SNA agent got executed at the host of (Vj) as ( ௝ܶ) 
Calculate Drift time Tdj = ௖ܶ + ௘ܶ – ௝ܶ 
IF ൫TEN ≤ ( ௝ܶ +Tdj)൯ THEN 
  Abort_SNA_agent_execution 
ELSE 
 Execute the SNA agent and collect an offer ሺ	୨, ௌܶ௏௝ , ாܶ௏௝ , RFO) from (Vj) 
 Compute offer utilityሺ୨) 
Figure 4.3 Negotiation strategy algorithm 
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Algorithm Negotiation strategy 
 Abort_SNA_agent_execution 
ELSE 
 Execute the SNA agent and collect an offer ሺ	୨, ௌܶ௏௝ , ாܶ௏௝ , RFO) from (Vj) 
 Compute offer utilityሺ୨)  
 NT = NT +1 
 IF offer ൫	୨൯ does not meet selection criteria THEN 
 Discard offer (	୨)  
ELSE 
 U ← Append (୨) 
              Sort (U) 
    IF ( ாܶ௏
௝ < TEN) THEN 
            Compute (γ௝ , ߜ௝) 
 IF (୨== U>ͳ@) ॥൬ቀ0 < γ௝ ≤ γ௟ቁ&൫ߜ௝ ≥ ߜ௟൯൰ 
  THEN 
 Offer expiry alert (	୨) 
 IF (NT < NT_MIN) AND (g = = 0) THEN 
 Dispatch the RA agent to ࣰ  V 
 g = g +1 
 ENDIF  
                ENDIF 
 ENDIF 
    F ← Append ൫	୨ǡ ௌܶ௏௝ ǡ ாܶ௏௝ ǡ 	൯ 
 ENDIF 
 ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
Evaluation_and_ negotiation  
} 
END Negotiation_strategy 
Figure 4.3 Negotiation strategy algorithm (Contd.) 
 At the initialization, the algorithm gets a Request for Offer (	) from the client 
as an input. The IA agent then consults the CA agent (Wong et al., 2000; Zhang, 
Lesser, & Podorozhny, 2001) on the following: agent itinerary of hosts of potential 
vendors {V1 , … , Vj , … , Vn}, adequate market search space (NT_MIN), target utility 
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(UT), weights of negotiated attributes (W), client’s negotiation deadline (TEN), and 
upper limit of offer utility index and lower limit of offer validity index (γ௟, ߜ௟ሻ. The 
parameter (W) indicates the importance of each attribute relative to other negotiated 
attributes. The parameter will be discussed in more details in Section 2 of Chapter 5. 
The pair (γ௟, ߜ௟ሻ represents the trading competition limits. The parameter (NT_MIN) is 
an estimate of the adequate market search space in terms of a minimum number of 
vendors the client agent has to search. 
 In the algorithm, the IA agent communicates with the HA agent to get values of 
qualitative preferences the client defined in (RFO). The algorithm then initializes three 
parameters: time ( ௘ܶ), number of sent replica agents (g), and actual number of searched 
vendors (NT), and sets them all to zero. It also initializes two empty vectors: offers vector 
(F), and utilities vector (U). The two vectors will only include acceptable offers and the 
corresponding utilities, respectively. The parameter ( ௘ܶ) represents the time elapsed 
since the dispatch of the SNA agent to the first vendor host in the agent itinerary and is 
traced by a timer the agent has. Next, the algorithm reads the current time at the client 
host ሺ ௖ܶ), and setsሺ ௘ܶሻ to zero. Next, the IA agent initializes the SNA agent and then 
dispatches it to the host of the first vendor agent in the agent itinerary to collect an offer 
from it. 
 When the SNA and IRA agents start interacting with a vendor agent, the algorithm 
reads the time at which the SNA agent got executed at the host of vendor (Vj) and 
stores it as ( ௝ܶ), reads ( ௘ܶ), and calculates drift time (T ௝݀) as given in Equation (1). It 
then verifies that the client’s negotiation deadline has not been reached (i.e. ௖ܶ  +  ௘ܶ < 
TEN). If the verification fails, it aborts the execution of the SNA agent; otherwise it 
executes the SNA agent, collects an offer (	୨) from the current vendor agent. The 
algorithm then computes the offer utility (୨) and increments the actual number of 
searched vendors (NT) by 1.  
 T ௝݀ = ௖ܶ + ௘ܶ < TEN  (1) 
 The algorithm carries out a preliminary evaluation of each offer as soon as it is 
collected. It carries out the following verifications: 
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1. The offer (	୨) meets following selection criteria:  
 Offer utility (୨) is equal to or greater than the target utility (UT) 
 Offer (	୨) satisfies client constraints (maxs, mins) for (1 d s d m).  
If the offer meets the selection criteria, the algorithm appends the offer utility 
(୨) to vector (U) and then sorts the vector (U) in an ascending order to rank the so 
far collected offers by their utilities; otherwise it discards the offer (	୨), and then 
dispatches the SNA agent to the next vendor host in the agent itinerary.  
- The expiry time of the offer (	୨) is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline i.e. 
( ாܶ௏
௝  < TEN). If the offer passes the verification, the algorithm computes two indexes: 
offer utility index (γ௝ሻ and offer validity index (ߜ௝ሻ that are needed to assess trading 
competition between vendors at the marketplace and to check if the offer is 
significant and should be monitored during search and negotiation. The indexes 
compare the current offer with the top ranked offer in terms of their utilities and 
expiry times, respectively. The two indexes are defined in Equations (2) and (3).   
γ௝ ൌ  U>1@UjUT   (2) 
 
ߜ௝ൌ ಶ்ೇ
ೕ  ಶ்ೇభ
ಶ்ೇభ ்ೕ   (3) 
The offer utility index (γ௝ሻ indicates whether the difference in utility between the 
top ranked offer and the collected offer ሺ୨ሻ is marginal or significant. The first 
element >ͳ@ in vector (U) represents the utility of the top ranked offer as the vector 
is sorted by utilities of offers.  
The offer validity index (ߜ௝) indicates if the difference between the expiry time of 
the top ranked offer ( ாܶ௏ଵ ) and expiry time of the collected offer ( ாܶ௏
௝ ) is marginal or 
significant.  
The expiry time of offer (	୨) would be monitored during search and negotiation, 
only if it is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (e.g. ாܶ௏
௝ < TEN), and given that 
CHAPTER 4: One-to-Many Bilateral e-Trade Negotiation Strategy 
 
 
121 
 
the offer also satisfies at least one of the two following conditions: 
1. Offer has the top utility (i.e. Uj ൌ >ͳ@ሻamong the so far collected offers 
2. Offer meets trading competition condition: (0 <γ௝  ≤ γ௟ሻ and ሺߜ௝ ≥ ߜ௟ሻ. The 
condition (0 <γ௝  ≤ γ௟ሻindicates that the utility of offer (	୨) is marginally less than 
the utility of top ranked offer, whereas, the condition ሺߜ௝ ≥ ߜ௟ሻ indicates that the 
expiry time of offer (	୨) is significantly longer than that of the top ranked offer.  
If offer (	୨) passes the verification it indicates that the offer is either the top ranked 
offer, or its utility is marginally less than that of the top ranked offer, but its expiry 
time is significantly later than that of the top ranked offer. Hence, offer (	୨) is 
considered competitive and Offer expiry alert algorithm shown in Figure 4.4 is run, 
otherwise the offer will be discarded and its utility will be deleted from vector (U). 
 The Offer expiry alert function in the algorithm is to set a timer to signal 
sometime before the expiry time of a top utility offer so it can be utilized and would 
not be missed out. It first estimates the time ( ௪ܶ) the SNA agent needs to settle an 
agreement with the VAw agent taking into consideration the network time delay 
incurred due to processing, queuing, transmission, and propagation delays. It 
estimates the following: verification time, award time, and jump time. 
The verification time ( ௅ܶ) represents the time needed to verify and sort out the 
collected offers.  
The award time ( ஺ܶ) represents the time needed to award the bid, which includes 
the following tasks: make a decision, send notification of acceptance and issue a 
purchase order to vendor (௪), receive an acknowledgement from vendor (Vw), and 
process a payment to (Vw) through the client’s bank.  
The jump time ( ௃ܶ௎ெ௉) represents the time the SNA agent needs to jump to the 
Trusted Server, which is defined as the network time delay.   
The algorithm then sums the estimated times and assigns the sum to the bid 
settlement time (Tw).  
Any agreement is expected to take place at a time later than the negotiation 
deadline (TEN) by (Tw). The algorithm then verifies if the offer would expire before 
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the expected agreement time. It tests the condition: ( ாܶ௏
௝ +T ௝݀) d (TEN + Tw). If the 
verification passes, it sets an alert to signal at a time (ܶݎ௝) that is earlier than the 
expiry time ሺ ாܶ௏௝ ) of offer ൫	୨൯ by the settlement time (Tw) to allow for settling an 
agreement with vendor (Vj). It calculates the time (ܶݎ௝) based on Equation (4) that 
considers the drift time (Tdj). 
ܶݎ௝ൌ ாܶ௏௝ ൅TdjǦTw  (4) 
Algorithm Offer expiry alert 
INPUT: 	୨, ாܶ௏௝ , TEN , Tdj 
BEGIN 
Estimate (verification time, award time, jump time) 
௪ܶ  ← Sum ( ௅ܶ , ஺ܶ, ௃ܶ௎ெ௉) //Settlement time 
IF (( ாܶ௏
௝ +Tdj) d ( ாܶே + ௪ܶ)) THEN  
ܶݎ௝ ← Compute ( ாܶ௏௝ +Tdj - ௪ܶ)  
Set_Alert (ܶݎ௝, 	୨ሻ 
ENDIF 
END Offer_expiry_alert 
Figure 4.4 Offer expiry alert algorithm 
 
After the Negotiation strategy algorithm runs the Offer expiry alert algorithm, it 
verifies the following two conditions:  
1. Actual number of searched vendors (NT) at ൫ ௝ܶ൯ is less than the minimum number 
of vendors the client agent has to search (NT_MIN). 
2. No replica agent is yet sent, i.e.  (g = 0). 
If the verifications pass, the algorithm initializes the RA agent as a replicate of 
the SNA agent and assigns it to search a sub-route of the agent itineraryሺࣰሻ. The 
algorithm then dispatches the RA agent to a sub-route ሺࣰሻ of the agent itinerary. The 
SNA and RA agents cooperate in searching all vendors in the agent itinerary trying 
to satisfy the constraint on the minimum number of vendors the client agent has to 
search (NT_MIN) in a shorter time and before offer (	୨) expires. Next, the algorithm 
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increments the number of sent replica agent (g) by 1, and appends the offer (	୨) 
including its start and end times of validity and the (RFO) as a tuple 
൫	୨ǡ ௌܶ௏௝ ǡ ாܶ௏௝ ǡ 	൯ to vector (	).  
If a collected offer (	୨) for (1 d j d n) expires before the client’s negotiation 
deadline, an alert would signal at time (ܶݎ௝) during search or negotiation, indicating 
that the offer (	୨) is a competitive offer and is about to expire. Accordingly, the Early 
candidate selection algorithm is run and is shown in Figure 4.5. The algorithm 
integrates the search results of the RA agent into the search results of the SNA agent.  
The algorithm does not immediately award the bid to the vendor of offer (	୨) as more 
competitive offers may have been received or an adequate market search space has 
not yet been completed.  
Algorithm Early candidate selection 
INPUT: ୨ , NT, NT_MIN , U , 	୨, ௝ , 	,ߛ௟,ߜ௟ 
BEGIN 
IF (Alert ==  ON) THEN 
 Integrate search results of the RA and SNA agents 
 Sortሺሻ 
 IF ( (୨ ൌൌ >ͳ@) & (NT൒ NT_MIN) ) THEN 
 Compute (γ௞, ߜ௞ǡ ߪሻ for 2nd ranked offer  ୩ ൌ >ʹ@ሻ 
 IFቀ൫γ௞ ൑ ߛ௟൯Ƭሺߜ௞ ൒ ߜ௟ሻƬሺσ ൐ ͶሻቁTHEN 
 ሺ	୨ሻ, and delete (୨) from ሺሻ 
 ELSE   
 Candidate-selection ௪ = ௝  
 Agreement (	୨,௝) 
 ENDIF 
 ELSE 
 Exclude offer ሺ	୨ሻ and delete ൫୨൯ 
 ENDIF 
ENDIF 
END Early_candidate_selection  
Figure 4.5 Early candidate selection algorithm 
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The algorithm then sorts the so far collected offers and stores them in vector (U). 
It then carries the following verifications to ensure maximum utility is achieved: 
 The offer (	୨) for which the alert is on has the top utility (i.e. ୨ ൌ U>1@) and the 
constraint on minimum number of searched vendors is met (i.e. NT ≥ NT_MIN). If 
the verification fails, it excludes offer (	୨)ǡ deletes its utility (୨) from utility 
vector ሺሻ, and continues on the agent itinerary; otherwise the algorithm 
computes three variables: offer utility index (γ௞ሻ, offer validity index (ߜ௞), and 
standard deviation (ɐሻ. The two indexes are computed for the second ranked 
offer (	୩). The second element in vector ሺሻ represents the utilitiy of the second 
ranked offer (i.e. ୩ ൌ >ʹ@) as the vector is sorted by utilities of offers. The 
algorithm then moves to the next verification.  
 The offer (	୨) does not satisfy the three collective conditions outlined below. 
- ൫γ௞ ൑ ߛ௟൯ 
- ሺߜ௞ ൒ ߜ௟ሻ 
- ሺɐ ൐ Ͷሻ 
The conditions imply that the offer (	୨) falls into one of the following categories: 
 The utility of the top ranked offer (୨ሻ is significantly greater than that of the 
second ranked offer i.e. ൫γ௞ ൐ ߛ௟൯ and hence, the offer has much better standing 
than the second ranked offer.  
 The utility of the top ranked offer is marginally greater than that of the second 
ranked offer ൫γ୩ ൑ ɀ୪൯ and its validity is marginally shorter than that of the 
second ranked offer ሺɁ୩ ൏ Ɂ୪ሻ. The utilities of the two offers lie within 4 standard 
deviationsሺɐሻ from the mean and hence, the offer (	୨) has best standing among 
the collected offers.  
Having satisfied the above-mentioned verifications, offers collection/negotiation 
would be interrupted and the respective vendor (௝) would be awarded the bid. Next, 
an agreement is settled and payment is processed for (௪). If the verification fails, the 
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offer (	୨ሻ is excluded and its utility൫୨൯ is deleted from vector (). Next, the agent 
continues on its itinerary. 
Upon completion of search of all vendors in the agent itinerary or reaching the 
client’s negotiation deadline, the Evaluation and Negotiation algorithm is run. The 
pseudo-code of the algorithm is shown in Figure 4.6. The algorithm selects a Trusted 
Server and initializes a set of short-listed vendors (୬ୣ୵) to be negotiated in the next 
negotiation round. The algorithm then integrates the search results of the RA agent 
into the search results of the SNA agent. It then dispatches the SNA agent to the 
Trusted Server (TS) to carry out the evaluation and negotiation phase. It then 
decrypts each offer in the offers vector (	) using the decryption key of the Trusted 
Server, and extracts vendor’s signature from its offer. The algorithm then deduces 
the identity of the vendor from its signature and appends it to the set (୬ୣ୵). It then 
clears the utilities vector (). It then computes the offer utility and appends it to the 
() vector. The algorithm sorts the () vector and identifies the top ranked offer, e.g. 
(୵ = >ͳ@). It then verifies if the client’s negotiation deadline is not yet reached and 
then updates the agent with the utility of the top ranked offer (୵) to search for 
offers of better utility; otherwise it settles an agreement with the VAw agent on its 
offer (	୵ ). Next, the algorithm sets a shortlist of vendors to be negotiated in the next 
negotiation round (୬ୣ୵). It then chooses which of the two time-dependent tactics: 
Boulware and Conceder to implement based on concession factor (β), which 
indicates if the client’s remaining negotiation deadline is short or not (Faratin et al., 
1998). If (β < 1) it implements Boulware tactic; otherwise it implements Conceder 
tactic.  
 The tactic advises on the concession rates and generation of counter-offers in the 
next negotiation round. Full details of time-dependent tactics are given in (Faratin et 
al., 1998). 
The negotiation strategy will be analyzed in Chapter 5 to show its efficiency and 
how it maximizes client’s utility, shortens negotiation time, and fulfills an adequate 
market search space as compared to patient and partially patient negotiation 
strategies.
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Algorithm Evaluation and Negotiation 
INPUT:, 	, ்ௌ  , ୬ୣ୵ 
BEGIN 
Integrate search results of the RA and SNA agents 
்ௌ  m Dispatch the SNA agent 
Clear (Uሻ 
FOR (	୨ 	) DO 
Decrypt offer (	୨) using the decryption key of the Trusted Server 
Extract the vendor’s signature from the decrypted offer 
Deduce the identity of vendor (௝) from its signature  
୬ୣ୵  ← Append (௝) 
Compute offer utilityሺ୨) 
U← Append (୨) 
 END FOR  
Sortሺሻ 
      ௪ = >ͳ@ 
Read  ( ௘ܶ) and store current time at ሺ்ௌሻ as ்ܶௌ 
Calculate Drift time ்ܶ݀ௌ = ௖ܶ + ௘ܶ – ்ܶௌ 
IF ሺTEN≤ ( ்ܶௌ+்ܶ݀ௌ)ሻ THEN 
              Candidate-selection ሺ௪ሻ 
              Agreement (Fw,௪) 
              Abort_agent_execution 
ELSE 
IF  (௪  > UT) THEN  
(UT = ௪) 
 = ୬ୣ୵ 
ENDIF 
IF (β < 1) THEN implement Bouwlare tactic 
ELSE implement Conceder tactic 
 ENDIF 
          Compute concession 
          Generate counter-offer                
ENDIF 
END Evaluation_and_Negotiation  
Figure 4.6 Evaluation and Negotiation algorithm 
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4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we presented background to the effect of temporal constraints on 
negotiation and outlined the existing negotiation strategies. We also highlighted the 
drawbacks of existing strategies as regards negotiation outcomes and presented a real 
example. We then described the general rules of the negotiation protocol and 
proposed a flexible and rational negotiation strategy for multi-constraint one-to-many 
bilateral negotiations, with emphasis on scenarios where the expiry time of the top 
utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. We described the 
different algorithms of the strategy including: negotiation strategy algorithm, offer 
expiry alert algorithm, early candidate selection algorithm, and evaluation and 
negotiation algorithm. The algorithms impose strict conditions for aborting 
negotiation before the client’s negotiation deadline in the presence of top utility offer 
that expires before the client’s negotiation deadline. The conditions verify that an 
adequate market search space is completed and trading competition limits are met.  
 
  The negotiation strategy avoids delayed evaluation of collected offers and allows 
early bid award having satisfied the following conditions: (a) top utility offer expires 
before the client’s negotiation deadline; (b) an adequate market search space is 
completed; (c) top utility offer considerably competes with the so far collected offers 
or the top utility offer marginally competes with the second ranked offer but its 
validity is slightly shorter than the secondly ranked offer.  
 
 The strategy sets alerts that signal soon expiry of top utility offers taking into 
account the network time delay. It updates the target utility in each negotiation round 
based on the achieved utility in the preceding negotiation round whenever the 
achieved utility is greater than the target utility. It also implements time-dependent 
tactics in generating counter-offers whenever an agreement is not reached (Faratin et 
al., 1998).  
 
 The strategy deploys mobile agents differently from the existing negotiation 
strategies that deploy stationary agents. In fact, mobile agents have been found to be 
more efficient in conducting e-negotiation when compared to stationary agents, 
which result in large communication complexity (An et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008; 
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Chen & Huang, 2009; Du et al., 2005). The proposed negotiation strategy is well 
suited for e-Trade negotiations where top utility offers might expire before the 
client’s negotiation deadline.  
  
 In this chapter, we only outlined the general rules of the negotiation protocol 
without presenting the formal representation or properties verification of the protocol 
as the thesis primarily concentrates on four problems that relate to: system 
architecture, negotiation strategy, utility function, and security protocol. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Negotiation Strategy Analysis 
and Utility Function  
 
 
 
 In this chapter, we address multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Negotiation 
and focus on scenarios where top utility offers might expire before the client’s 
negotiation deadline. We present enhancements to the existing utility function so 
offers would be evaluated more accurately. It takes into account three significant 
factors: client’s negotiation deadline, vendor’s  negotiation deadline (i.e. offer 
expiry time), and market search space in addition to values of offer attributes and 
client’s constraints, e.g. offer price and bid price limits. The function presents a 
reliable ranking system of offers so negotiation strategies can take the most 
appropriate actions during negotiation and thus achieve their main goal of 
maximizing entity’s utility. The function is then used to analyze the performance of 
the negotiation strategy presented in Chapter 4. The utility function is then used to 
compute the client’s utility in the proposed negotiation strategy with that in patient 
and partially patient strategies and compare the three strategies.  
5.1 Calculating Offer Utility  
Assuming two agents negotiate multiple constraints (1 d s d m) of a single issue. 
For example, the agent might negotiate two constraints: price of service and 
warranty period, and sets upper and lower limits of each constraint ሺ௦ǡ௦ሻ 
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on negotiated attributes (s) for (1 d s d m). The utility function is based on scoring 
functions (Vogler et al., 1999).  
 
  The utility function first computes the utility Us൫Fj൯of each negotiated 
attribute (ݏ) for ሺͳ ൑ ݏ ൑ ݉ሻ of a collected offer (Fj) using Equations (1) or (2), 
as applicable and then computes the offer utility U൫Fj൯ using Equation (4). 
Equation (1) is used whenever the client sets upper and lower constraints on a 
negotiated attribute (s), whereas equation (2) is used whenever the client defines one 
constraint only such as upper or lower constraint on a negotiated attribute. Upper and 
lower constraints are denoted as ሺmaxs) and (min௦), respectively. The client may set 
upper and lower constraints for a warranty period attribute as 12 months and 18 
months, respectively. The left function is used whenever the client agent tries to 
increase its utility by having higher values of an attribute such as warranty period, 
and the right function is used whenever the client agent tries to increase its utility 
by having lower values of an attribute such as price. The value of a negotiated 
attribute (s) is denoted as (ܵ). The parameter (E) defines the gradient of the utility 
function (Faratin et al., 1998).  
 
௦൫	൯ൌ ቤ൬
ܵǦ௦
௦Ǧ൰
ͳ
Ⱦቤ ௦൫	൯ൌ ቤ൬
௦Ǧܵ
Ǧ൰
ͳ
Ⱦቤ (1) 
௦൫	൯ ൌ  ቤ൬
ܵǦ௦
௦ ൰
భ
ഁቤ ௦൫	൯ൌ ቤ൬
Ǧܵ
 ൰
ͳ
Ⱦቤ (2) 
 The parameter (ܵ) represents the value of a negotiated attribute such as offer 
price. Attributes can be of discrete enumerated type (e.g. Boolean type) or numeral 
type. Enumerated attribute has a set of possible values and each value is associated 
with a rank that indicates the relative importance of a preference value to other 
values with respect to a particular criterion. The lower the rank is the higher is the 
attribute importance. In service-oriented negotiation, certain attributes can be of 
enumerated type and are imprecisely defined such as high quality, Ad hoc service, or 
short delivery. The negotiating agent can define values of enumerated attributes 
using Fuzzy set theories that model conceptualization and process imprecise 
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information (Bellman & Zadeh, 1970; Kowalczyk & Bui, 2000; Carvalho et al., 
2006). The negotiating entity defines an appropriate preference value by selecting 
from a set of preference standards (Saaty, 2008) predefined in the system as shown in 
Table 5.1.  
 
 For example, a preference of high quality can be defined by selecting from a 
predefined standard given in Table 5.2. The rank lies within the interval of [1, 7]. 
The matching score of a preference (ܵ) is Fuzzy function that returns a number a 
value within [0, 1]. Assume the maximum rank number is Max_rank, the matching 
score of a given value of rank (r) is defined in (Zhuang et al., 2008) and as given in 
Equation (3). 
 
ܵ ൌ ெ௔௫̴௥௔௡௞ିሺ௥ିଵሻெ௔௫̴௥௔௡௞  (3) 
 
Table 5.1 Fundamental scale for discrete enumerated attributes 
Importance level  Definition 
1 Equal importance 
2 Weak or slight importance 
3 Moderate importance 
4 Moderate plus importance 
5 Strong importance 
6 Strong plus importance 
7 Very strong or demonstrated importance 
8 Very, very strong 
9 Extreme importance 
Reciprocals of above If activity n has one of the above numbers when 
compared to activity m, then m has the reciprocal 
value of n when compared with n 
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Table 5.2 Quality predefined standard 
Quality level Rank (r) Matching score (ܵሻ 
High 1 1 
Very good 2 0.86 
Good 3 0.71 
Acceptable 4 0.57 
Poor 5 0.43 
Very poor 6 0.29 
Unacceptable 7 0.14 
 
 The offer utility is computed as the weighted sums of utilities of negotiated 
attributes and is given in Equation (4). The parameter (w௦) for (1 d s d m) is the 
normalized weight of a negotiated attribute (s) and indicates the importance of an 
attribute relative to other negotiated attributes (Zhuang et al., 2008). In a negotiation 
strategy, the greater the weight of an attribute is, the more important it is, and vice 
versa (Zhuang et al., 2008).  
൫	൯ൌσ ௦ͳ൑൑ Ǥ௦൫	൯ (4) 
 The weight of an attribute is computed using Equation (5), whereሺ௦ሻ defines 
how much an attribute (s) weighs out of the overall weights of attributes. Usually, 
weights of attributes remain fixed during a negotiation round (Yan, Fong, Pengfan, & 
Meilin, 2007). 
ൌ ೞσ ೞൌͳǥ  (5) 
 
where  σ ௦ൌͳǥ ൌͳ   and ሺͲ ൏ ݓ௦ ൏ ͳሻ 
 The SNA agent uses Analytic Hierarchy Process approach (AHP) to make a 
decision on weights of attributes that maximize the client’s utility (Saaty, 2008). The 
agent establishes a decision matrix (ܹ) with (h) alternatives and (m) attributes as 
given in Equation (6). It carries out a comparison between (h) alternatives and 
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chooses the alternative that maximizes the client’s utility, which is a vector of (m) 
elements corresponding to [w1  w2 .... wm].  
 
ܹ ൌ ൦
ݓଵଵݓଵଶ ǥ ݓଵ௠
ݓଶଵݓଶଶ ǥ ݓଶ୫
ڭ
ݓ௛ଵݓ௛ଶ ǥ ݓ௛௠
൪ (6) 
 For example, the client agent that negotiates two attributes e.g. price and 
warranty period may set the matrix as in Equation (7). The agent might select (0.6) 
and (0.4) as weights of price and warranty period attributes, respectively. 
ܹ =  
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍͲǤͷͷ ͲǤͶͷͲǤ͸ ͲǤͶ
ͲǤ͹ ͲǤ͵
ͲǤͺ ͲǤʹ
ͲǤͻ ͲǤͳ ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
        (7) 
 The client agent computes utilities of all collected offers and ranks offers by their 
utilities. It then chooses the top ranked offer and awards the bid to the respective 
vendor. 
5.2 Enhanced Utility Function 
In this section, we amend the utility function presented in the literature (Chen & 
Huang, 2009; Faratin et al., 1998; Louta et al., 2008; Sim & Wong, 2001; Wong et 
al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2001). We introduce new factors to the utility function 
discussed in Section 5.2. The function considers the effect of vendor’s negotiation 
deadline and market search space on top of the client’s negotiation deadline. The 
amendments would lead to an accurate ranking of offers collected during negotiation 
and thus boost the outcomes of negotiation strategies, and in particular client utilities.   
 
The proposed utility function takes into consideration three key factors: 
 Market search space 
 Client’s negotiation time (start and end times of negotiation the client sets) 
 Opponent’s negotiation time (start and end time of the offer validity the vendor sets)  
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 Let the start time and end time of an offer validity be denoted as ൫ ௌܶ௏௝ ൯ǡ and 
൫ ாܶ௏௝ ൯, respectively. The number of vendors, which the SNA agent has searched until 
the end time of the validity of offer ൫Fj൯ is denoted as ൫்ܰ௝൯. The proposed function 
calculates the offer utility ሺ୨ሻ in two steps. The first step calculates the offer utility 
U൫Fj൯ based on the general utility function given in Equation (4) and the second step 
factorizes the offer utility U൫Fj൯ by two factors: Temporal factor (Mሻ, and Negotiation 
space factor ሺP) as given in Equation (8).  
୨ ൌ P ቀ൫	୨൯ቁ
M
 (8) 
 
where, P ൌ ቆ ଵ
ୣ൬భ ಿ೅
ೕΤ ൰
ቇ  
 M ൌ ቆ ሺ ಶ்ಿି்ೄಿሻሺ ಶ்ಿି ೄ்ೇೕ ቁାሺ ಶ்ೇೕ ି்ೄಿሻቇ 
 For simplicity, we discuss the proposed utility function for purely price-based 
negotiation. Let ሺmax௦ሻ represents the price upper limit of goods/services, and ൫ܵ௝൯ 
represents the price of offer ሺ	୨). Assume (E) is equal to 1. The offer utility ሺ୨ሻ would 
be as given in Equation (9) based on Equations: (2 - left function), (4) and (8). 
୨ ൌ P ቀೞȂௌೕೞ ቁ
M
 (11) 
The utility function is formulated based on the following concepts:  
 The earlier the start time of offer validity ൫ ௌܶ௏௝ ൯ is as compared to ሺ ௌܶேሻ, the 
better the utility is since agreements can be concluded in a shorter time, 
particularly, in the presence of time-limited offers of top utilities. 
 The later the end time of offer validity ൫ ாܶ௏௝ ൯ is as compared to negotiation 
deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ, the better the utility is since a broader market search space can be 
completed before the offer expires. 
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 The lower the offer price ሺܵ௝ሻ is as compared toሺmax௦ሻ, the better the utility is 
since more savings exist on client purchases 
 The longer the negotiation duration ሺ ாܶே െ ௌܶேሻ is, the better the offer utility is 
since more time is given for negotiation. 
 The more the actual number of searched vendor ൫்ܰ௝൯ is, the better the utility is 
since more trading opportunities are investigated. 
5.3 Verifying the Enhanced Utility Function 
The function accurately estimates offers utilities, which form the selection criterion 
for identifying the offer that truly maximizes the client’s utility. We present proofs of 
validity of the function. We compare utilities of the top two competitive offers. The 
prices of the top two offers  ܵ௠ and ܵ௡ are represented as DǤ ሺmax௦ሻ and OǤ ሺmax௦ሻ 
respectively. The temporal factors of the two offers are M௠and M௡, respectively. The 
negotiation space factors of the two offers are P௠ and P௡, respectively. 
 
Theorem 1: Assume that at a certain time instant (t) during the course of search or 
negotiation, the top two competitive offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same price and 
would expire before the client’s negotiation deadlineሺ ாܶே). Assume also that the end 
time of offers validities match i.e. ሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൌ  ாܶ௏௡ ሻ but the start time of offers validities 
differ i.e.ሺ ௌܶ௏௠ ൏ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ, then the offer of an earlier start time of validity has a better 
utility.  
Proof: The top two competitive offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same price that can be 
represented as follows. 
ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ ܯ݅݊{ܵଵǡ ܵଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܵ௧}๹D= O 
׵ ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ Dሺmax௦ሻ 
 Substituting into Equation (9), results in different utilities ܷ௠and ܷ௡ and can be 
simplified as follows.  
ܷ௠ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௠ 
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ܷ௡ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௡ 
จሺ ௌܶ௏௠ ൏ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ๹ሺM௠ ൏ M௡ሻ
๻ܷ௠ ൐ ܷ௡
 Offer ሺFሻ, which was provided earlier, has a better utility than offer ሺFሻǤ This 
is valid since the sooner an offer is provided, the more the chance for search and 
negotiation is and the earlier an agreement can be concluded, particularly, when the 
offer is a top utility offer. 
 
Theorem 2: Assume that at a certain time instant (t) during the course of search or 
negotiation, the top two competitive offers ሺFሻand ሺFሻhave the same price and 
would expire before the client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ. Also, assume that the 
start time of offers validities match i.e.ሺ ௌܶ௏௠ ൌ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ but the end time of offers 
validities differ i.e.ሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൐ ாܶ௏௡ ሻ, then the offer of a longer end time of validity has a 
better utility.  
Proof: The top two offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same price that can be represented 
as follows. 
ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ ܯ݅݊{ܵଵǡ ܵଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܵ௧}๹D= O 
׵ ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ Dሺmax௦ሻ 
 
 Substituting into Equation (9), results in different utilities ܷ௠and ܷ௡ and can be 
simplified as follows.  
ܷ௠ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௠ 
ܷ௡ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௡ 
จሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൐ ாܶ௏௡ ሻ๹ሺM௠ ൏ M௡ሻ 
๻ܷ௠ ൐ ܷ௡
 The offer ሺFሻ has a better utility than offer ሺFሻ, which has an earlier end time 
of validity. The result is valid since the longer the validity of an offer is, the better 
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the chance to maximize client’s utility is. The offer ሺFሻ increases the chances for 
the completion of a satisfactory market search space that might conclude more 
competitive offer/s before it expires. 
 
Theorem 3: Assume that at a certain time instant (t) during the course of search or 
negotiation, the top two competitive offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same price and 
would expire before the client’s negotiation deadlineሺ ாܶே). Also, assume that the 
two offers have the same validity but the start time of offers validities and the end 
time of offers validities differ such thatሺ ௌܶ௏௠ ൏ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ andሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൏ ாܶ௏௡ ሻ, respectively, 
then the offer of a longer end time of validity has a greater utility.  
Proof: The top two offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same price that can be represented 
as follows. 
ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ ܯ݅݊{ܵଵǡ ܵଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܵ௧}๹D= O 
׵ ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ Dሺmax௦ሻ 
 Substituting into Equation (9), results in different utilities ܷ௠and ܷ௡ and can be 
simplified as follows.  
ܷ௠ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௠ 
ܷ௡ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௡ 
จ൫ሺ ாܶ௏௠ െ ௌܶ௏௠ሻ ൌ  ሺ ாܶ௏௡ െ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ൯๹ሺM௠ ൌ M௡ሻ 
 The offer ሺFሻ has a shorter validity that only allows for a fewer number of 
vendors to search when compared to offer ሺFሻ.
จሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൏ ாܶ௏௡ ሻ ٥ ሺܰ௠் ൏ ܰ௡்ሻ๹ሺP௠ ൏ P௡ሻ
๻ܷ௠ ൏ ܷ௡
 The offer ሺFሻ has a better utility than offer ሺFሻǤ The result is valid since the 
longer the validity of an offer is, the better the chance to maximize client’s utility is. 
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The offer increases the chances for the completion of a satisfactory market search 
space that might conclude more competitive offer/s before it expires. 
 
Theorem 4: Assume that at a certain time instant (t) during the course of search or 
negotiation, the top two competitive offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same start time 
and end time of offers validities i.e. ሺ ௌܶ௏௠ ൌ  ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ and ሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൌ  ாܶ௏௡ ሻ. Also, assume 
that the offers have the different prices i.e. ሺܵ௠ ൏ ܵ௡ሻ and would expire before the 
client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶே), then the offer with a lower price has a better 
utility.  
Proof: The top two competitive offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have different prices that can 
be represented as follows. 
ܵ௠ ൌ Dሺ௦ሻ
ܵ௡ ൌ Oሺ௦ሻ
จܵ௠ ൏ ܵ௡๹D ൏ O 
 Substituting into Equation (9), results in different utilities ܷ௠and ܷ௡ and can be 
simplified as follows.  
ܷ௠ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௠ 
ܷ௡ ൌ Pሺͳ െ OሻM௡ 
จ൫ሺ ாܶ௏௠ െ ௌܶ௏௠ሻ ൌ  ሺ ாܶ௏௡ െ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ൯๹ሺM௠ ൌ M௡ሻ 
จሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൌ  ாܶ௏௡ ሻ ٥ ሺܰ௠் ൌ ܰ௡்ሻ๹ሺP௠ ൌ P௡ሻ
๻ܷ௠ ൐ ܷ௡
 The offer ሺFሻ has a better utility than offer ሺFሻ, which has a higher price. The 
result is valid since the lower the offer price is, the more the savings on client 
purchases are. 
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Theorem 5: Assume that two negotiation scenarios Rc and Ra have the same 
negotiation start time i.e. ሺ ௌܶே௖ ൌ  ௌܶே௔ ሻ but different client’s negotiation deadlines i.e. 
ሺ ாܶே௖ ൏ ாܶே௔ ሻ. Assume also that in both scenarios, the top two competitive offers 
ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ have the same price and would expire before the client’s negotiation 
deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ. In addition, assume that the start time of offers validities and the end 
time of offers validities match i.e. ሺ ாܶ௏௠ ൌ  ாܶ௏௡ ሻ and ሺ ௌܶ௏௠ ൌ  ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ. At a certain time 
instant (t) during the course of search or negotiation, the top utility offer in scenario 
Rc has a lower utility than that in scenario Ra, which has a later client’s negotiation 
deadline. 
Proof: The top offers ሺFሻ and ሺFሻ in Rc and Ra scenarios, respectively have the 
same price that can be represented as follows. 
ܵ௠ ൌ ܵ௡ ൌ ܯ݅݊{ܵଵǡ ܵଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܵ௧ሽ ൌ Dሺ௦ሻ 
 Substituting into Equation (9), results in different utilities ܷ௠ and ܷ௡ and can be 
simplified as follows.  
ܷ௠ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௠ 
ܷ௡ ൌ Pሺͳ െ DሻM௡ 
The start and end times of offer validity in both scenarios and are the same. 
൫ሺ ாܶ௏௠ െ ௌܶ௏௠ሻ ൌ ሺ ாܶ௏௡ െ ௌܶ௏௡ ሻ൯ 
Also, the number of searched vendors in both scenarios is the same. 
ሺܰ௠் ൌ ܰ௡்ሻ๹ሺP௠ ൌ P௡ሻ 
׶ ൫ሺ ாܶே௠ െ ௌܶே௠ሻ ൏ ሺ ாܶே௡ െ ௌܶே௡ ሻ൯๹ሺM௠ ൐ M௡ሻ 
๻ܷ௠ ൏ ܷ௡
 The offer ሺFሻ in scenario Rc  has a lower utility than offer ሺFሻin scenario Ra. 
The result is valid since the earlier the client’s negotiation deadline is, the fewer the 
chances for maximizing client’s utility are and the less the negotiation time is. 
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5.4 Analysis of the Negotiation Strategy 
In this section, we analyse the performance of the negotiation strategy presented in 
Chapter 4. The performance can be measured by testing the achieved utilities and 
negotiation time (An et al., 2006; Fatima et al., 2002). We show the results of a series 
of experiments that have been undertaken to analyse the performance of the proposed 
strategy. We also compare the performance of the proposed strategy with patient and 
partially patient strategies in the presence of time-limited top utility offers. We 
choose the patient and partially patient strategies as they are common baseline 
strategies in sequential one-to-many e-Negotiations. We assume that both the client 
and vendor agents implement time-dependent concession tactics (Faratin et al., 
1998). Strategy testing may not fetch critical scenarios that deal with top utility 
offers that expire before the client’s negotiation deadline. Thus, as in (An et al., 
2006), we simulate the negotiation system with all possible critical scenarios 
considering various settings of key factors that have impact on client’s utility and 
negotiation time. The factors include: trading competition, market search space, 
client’s negotiation deadline, and vendor’s negotiation deadline. For simplicity, we 
assumed that the network time delay is fixed. 
 
 In the experiments, the client agent collects offers from a set of vendors at 
discrete time instants ௌܶ௏= {1, 2, … , i , … , ாܶே െ ͳ} and the offers expire at 
discrete time instants, ாܶ௏ = {2, 3, … , i , … , ாܶே} with the earliest expiry of a 
collected offer at ாܶ௏ = 2.We assume a purely price-based negotiation and the client 
agent completes a number of negotiation rounds. We assume that the two least priced 
offers are collected at different time instants. The least priced offer is collected at 
time instants ( ௌܶ௏ = t), where ݐ = {2, } , ாܶே െ ͳ}. It is a time-limited offer that 
expires before the client’s negotiation deadlineሺ ாܶேሻ. Also, the end time of offer 
validity is varied from (t + 1) to ாܶே and its price is varied from (0.5max௦ሻ to 
(0.85max௦ሻ. The second least priced offer is collected at time instant ( ௌܶ௏ = 1). The 
offer validity extends till the client’s negotiation deadlineሺ ாܶேሻ and its price is 
(0.9max௦). The difference in price between the two least priced offers varies from 
(5%) to (40%). We consider three different client’s negotiation deadlines, e.g. ாܶே ൌ
ሼͳͲǡ ͳͷǡ ʹͲሽ. We test (40*91) states for varying settings and present numerical results 
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that show the impact of the key factors on the performance of the different strategies. 
We present simulation results of (4*36) states where the difference in price between 
the two least priced offers is as: 5%, 15%, 30%, and 40% of the price upper limit 
(max௦ሻ. We use the client’s utility as a metrics to compare the performance of 
strategies. This is because the negotiation strategy effectiveness can be measured by 
the client’s utility gained from a negotiation (Chen & Huang, 2009). We compare the 
client’s utility the three strategies achieve in negotiation rounds where the expiry 
time of the least priced offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. We 
highlight drops in the client’s utility and increases in the negotiation time a strategy 
may induce. 
5.4.1 Impact of Vendor’s negotiation deadline 
In the experiment, the client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) is set to 20 and the end 
time of the validity of the least priced offer varies from t = 3 to 20 (x-axis). Also, the 
price difference between the two least priced offers is set to 5%. The vendor’s 
negotiation deadline denotes the end time of offer validity.  Figure 5.1, shows the 
result of the experiment. It is noted that the proposed strategy maximizes client’s 
utility as compared to the patient and partially patient strategies. The patient strategy 
delays offer evaluation and bid award till the negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) and hence, 
misses out on the least priced offer. The client’s utility would be 0.296. The strategy 
results in a drop in the client’s utility when compared to that of the proposed 
strategy, which ranges from 0.31 to 0.35 if the end time of the validity of the least 
priced offer is greater than 15. The patient strategy results in a drop in the client’s 
utility that ranges from 4.52% to 15.43% and an increase in the negotiation time 
that ranges from 5% to 25%. The partially patient strategy interrupts negotiation 
whenever the end time of the validity of the least priced offer is earlier than the 
client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே). The client’s utility would range from 0.118 to 
0.284 if the end time of the validity of the least priced offer is less than 15. The 
strategy results in a drop in the client’s utility when compared to that of the 
proposed strategy, which is 0.296. The drop ranges from 60.14% to 4.05%. These 
drops are attributed to two deficiencies: (a) patient strategy discards any offer of an 
end time of validity earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline; (b) partially patient 
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strategy interrupts negotiation if the least priced offer expires before the client’s 
negotiation deadline without ensuring the completion of an adequate market search 
space. In contrast,  the proposed strategy makes a balance between satisfying an 
adequate market search space and avoiding loss of the least priced offer of an end 
time of validity earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The strategy does not 
interrupt negotiation for the least priced offer if its end time of validity is 
significantly shorter than that of the second least priced offer and the price 
difference is marginal such as 5% or 15% even though an adequate market search 
space is satisfied. The strategy does not interrupt negotiation for significant 
ofdity index (ߜ௝ሻ e.g. ( ாܶ௏ ≤ 15). It discards the least priced offer and favors 
the second least priced offer even though it is more expensive by 5% since it has a 
significantly longer end time of validity allowing for extended market search space. 
The strategy interrupts negotiation for the least priced offer if: (a) end time of offer 
validity is marginally shorter than that of the second least priced offer; (b) price 
difference is marginal such as 5% or 15%; (c) adequate market search space is 
satisfied. The strategy interrupts negotiation for minor offer validity index (ߜ௝) e.g. 
( ாܶ௏  > 15). Also, the strategy interrupts negotiation for the least priced offer if its 
end time of validity is significantly shorter than that of the second least priced offer 
provided the price difference is significant such as 30% or 40% and an adequate 
market search space is satisfied.  
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Figure 5.1 Relative performances of the strategies with the 
  impact of vendor’s negotiation deadline on the client’s utility 
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5.4.2 Impact of Trading Competition  
In the experiment, the negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) is set to 15 and the price difference 
between the two least priced offers is varied from 5% to 40%. Also, the end time of 
the validity of the least priced offer is set to 4. Figure 5.2 shows the results of the 
experiment. The results show that the partially patient strategy results in a drop in 
client’s utility of 48.64% and 19.39% for a price difference of 5% and 15%, 
respectively and the patient strategy results in a drop in client’s utility of 18.06% and 
32.70% for a price difference of 30% and 40%, respectively as compared to other 
strategies. In contrast, the proposed strategy results in the client’s maximum utility. 
This is because the proposed strategy does not interrupt negotiation for the least 
priced time-limited offer unless the conditions on trading competition and market 
search space are verified and satisfied. The trading competition condition is verified 
by comparing the utility and validity indexes of an offer (γ௝, ߜ௝ሻ to the utility and 
validity limits (γ௟, ߜ௟ሻ, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Relative performances of the strategies with 
the impact of trading competition on client’s utility 
 
 The strategy interrupts negotiation for significant price difference such as 30% 
or 40%, which indicates that the offer utility index (γ௝) is significant, provided 
adequate market search space is satisfied e.g. (number of searched vendors is 4). 
Nevertheless, the proposed strategy does not interrupt negotiation for minor price 
difference such as 5%  or 15%, which indicates that the offer utility index (γ௝) is 
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marginal, unless adequate market search space is satisfied and the end time of the 
validity of the least priced offer is marginally shorter than that of the second least 
priced offer, which indicates that the offer validity index (ߜ௝) is marginal. The 
strategy does not interrupt negotiation for minor price difference even though 
adequate market search space is satisfied if the end time of the validity of the least 
priced offer is significantly shorter than that of the second least priced offer. The 
strategy favors extended market search space over minor price difference 
expecting more competitive offers might be forthcoming that boost client’s utility. 
5.4.3 Impact of Client’s negotiation deadline 
In the experiment, the price difference between the two least priced offers is set to 
15% and the least priced offer is collected at time instant ( ௌܶ௏ = 2). We investigate 
the sensitivity of the three strategies to different client’s negotiation deadlines e.g. 
 ாܶே ൌ ሼͳͲǡ ͳͷǡ ʹͲሽ. Figure 5.3 shows the results of the experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Relative performances of the strategies with the 
impact of the client’s negotiation deadline on the client’s utility 
 
 It is noted that the patient and the partially patient strategies are not sensitive to 
varying client’s negotiation deadlines when dealing with time-limited offers. The 
patient strategy discards any time-limited offer and the partially patient strategy 
interrupts negotiation before the expiry of the time-limited least priced offer and 
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awards the offer regardless of the client’s negotiation deadline. It only considers the 
price difference factor and assesses the utility as 0.15. In contrast, the proposed 
strategy is sensitive to varying client’s negotiation deadlines. For example, the utility 
of the least priced offer of end time of validity ( ாܶ௏ = 7) is assessed as 0.344, 0.306, 
and 0.286 for client’s negotiation deadlines of 10, 15, and 20, respectively. This is 
because the end time of the validity of the least priced offer is marginally shorter 
than the client’s negotiation deadline of ( ாܶே = 10) allowing for extended market 
search space; whereas it is significantly shorter than the client’s negotiation deadline 
such as ாܶே = {15, 20} and hence restricting extended market search space. It is 
expected that extended market search space brings in more competitive offers that 
boost client’s utility. 
5.4.4 Impact of Market Search Space 
In the experiment, the start time of validity of the least priced offer is varied as ௌܶ௏௠ = 
{2, 5, 7, 10}. We set the client’s negotiation deadline at  ாܶே = 15 and the price 
difference between the two least priced offers is set at 15%. Figure 5.4 shows the 
results of the experiment. The results show that offers that have the same values of 
negotiated attributes are ranked based on their validities. For example, interrupting 
the negotiation for three similar offers that have the same end time of validity 
( ாܶ௏ ൌ ͳͲ) but  different start times of validity ( ௌܶ௏ሻ such as 2, 5, and 7, respectively 
results in varied client utilities as 28.9%, 12.5%, and 0.2%, respectively. This is 
because the sooner the least priced offer is provided the better the chance to conclude 
an agreement in a shorter time is. Also, interrupting the negotiation for three similar 
offers that have the same start time of validity ( ௌܶ௏ ൌ ͷ) but different end times of 
validity ( ாܶ௏ሻ as 6, 9, and 12, respectively results in varied client utilities as -18.8%, 
5.3%, and 25.7%, respectively. This is because the longer the end time of the validity 
of the least priced offer is the broader the market search space is. Comparing the 
three strategies of concern, the following can be noted:  
 
 The partially patient strategy results in a drop in the client’s utility of 18.8% since 
it interrupts negotiation for the offer of ሺ ாܶ௏ ൌ ͸) 
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 The patient strategy results in a drop in the client’s utility of 25.7% since it 
extends negotiation till the client’s negotiation deadline and losses out on the 
least priced  offer 
 The proposed strategy results in an increase in the client’s utility of 25.7%. It 
only interrupts the negotiation for the offer of ሺ ாܶ௏ ൌ ͳʹ) since the offer utility 
(γ௝) and offer validity (ߜ௝) indexes are both marginal. It does not interrupt 
negotiation for the other two offers since the offer validity (ߜ௝) index is 
significant. 
 
Figure 5.4: Relative performances of the strategies 
with the impact of market search space on client’s utility 
5.5 Reasoning the Negotiation Strategy  
We reason about the validity of the proposed negotiation strategy by inspecting the 
negotiation outcomes of various negotiation strategies for different settings of 
temporal constraints. We highlight the enhancements the proposed strategy offers to 
negotiation outcomes as compared to outcomes of the patient and desperate strategies 
(Faratin et al., 1998). The desperate strategy awards the bid to the first acceptable 
offer, whereas the patient strategy awards the bid at the client’s negotiation deadline 
to the offer that is still valid and has the best value among the collected offers. The 
proposed strategy might award the bid earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline 
and shortly before the expiry of a time-limited offer of top utility if the offer satisfies 
the following conditions: 
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 Actual number of searched vendors is equal to or greater than the minimum 
number of vendors the client agent has to search (NT_MIN). 
 Offer utility significantly differs from that of the second ranked offer or utility 
and validity of the offer marginally differ from that of the second ranked offer. 
 
The strategy considers the various temporal constraints in making a decision on 
winning vendor. The constraints are shown in Table 5.3. Moreover, the strategy takes 
into account other significant factors including the following: 
 Constraint on the minimum number of vendors the client agent has to search 
(NT_MIN) 
 Offer utility index (ߛ௝ሻ 
 Offer validity index (ߜ௝) 
 Standard deviation (V) 
 Offer utility ൫୨൯ 
  
Table 5.3 Temporal constraints for strategy reasoning 
Temporal constraint Notation 
Client’s negotiation deadline ாܶே 
Start time of the offer validity ௌܶ௏ 
End time of the offer validity ாܶ௏ 
Settlement time ௪ܶ 
Verification time ௅ܶ 
Award time ஺ܶ 
Jump time ௃ܶ௎ெ௉ 
Drift time between client host and the 
host of vendor (Vj) 
Tdj
 
Offer alert time ܶݎ௝ 
 
The comparative analysis is with respect to four key characteristics: outcomes of 
negotiation; maximum utility, adequate market search space, and shortened search 
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and negotiation time. The primary criterion compares the end time of offer validity 
to the client’s negotiation deadline. The secondary criterion tests the significance of 
the offer. The comparative analysis is outlined in Table 5.4. 
We analyze all possible negotiation scenarios classified into eight scenarios 
outlined as follows. 
 
1. The offer (	୨) is competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). An alert is set to signal earlier 
than the offer expiry time ( ாܶ௏) by settlement time ( ௪ܶ) taking into account the 
drift time (Tdj). At the alert time (Trj), it is the top ranked offer and its utility is 
significantly more than that of the second ranked offer. Also, the number of so far 
searched vendors is equal to or greater than the minimum number of vendors the 
client agent has to search (NT_MIN). The offer presents a significant increase in 
client’s utility and, thus, it should not be missed out. 
 
2. The offer (	୨ሻ is competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). An alert is set to signal earlier 
than the offer expiry time ( ாܶ௏) by settlement time ( ௪ܶ) taking into account the 
drift time (Tdj). At the alert time (ܶݎ௝), it is the top ranked offer and there is a 
marginal difference between the offer and the second ranked offer with respect to 
their utilities and validities. Also, the number of the so far searched vendors is 
equal to or greater than the minimum number of vendors the client agent has to 
search (NT_MIN). The longer validity of the second offer does not weigh the loss in 
utility. It does not present any significant advantage as compared to the top 
ranked offer and, thus, should not be missed out. 
 
3. The offer (	୨ሻ is competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). An alert is set to signal earlier 
than the offer expiry time ሺ ாܶ௏ሻ by settlement time ( ௪ܶ) taking into account the 
drift time (Tdj). At the alert time (ܶݎ௝), the offer does not have the best utility as 
compared to the so far collected offers. Thus, the offer should be rejected. 
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4. The offer (	୨ሻ is competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). An alert is set to signal earlier 
than the offer expiry time ( ாܶ௏) by settlement time ( ௪ܶ) taking into account the 
drift time (Tdj). At the alert time (ܶݎ௝), the number of the so far searched vendors 
is less than the minimum number of vendors the client agent has to search 
(NT_MIN). Thus, the offer should be rejected. 
 
5. The offer (	୨ሻ is competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). An alert is set to signal earlier 
than the offer expiry time ( ாܶ௏) by settlement time ( ௪ܶ) taking into account the 
drift time (Tdj). At the alert time (ܶݎ௝), it is the top ranked offer and the number of 
the so far searched vendors is equal to or greater than the minimum number of 
vendors the client agent has to search (NT_MIN). The utility of the second ranked 
offer is marginally less than that of the top ranked offer, but its validity is 
significantly longer. The longer validity of the second offer weighs the loss in 
utility. It presents a significant advantage as compared to the top ranked offer. It 
allows for extended search that may pick a more advantageous offer and. It has 
better standing than the top ranked offer and, thus the top ranked offer is rejected. 
 
6. The offer (	୨ሻ is not competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). Thus, the offer should be 
rejected. 
 
7. The offer (	୨ሻ is competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
equal to or later than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). At the client’s 
negotiation deadline, the offer should be accepted since it is the top ranked offer. 
 
8. The offer (	୨ሻ is not competitive at collection time ( ௌܶ௏) and its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is 
equal to or later than the client’s negotiation deadline (TEN). At the client’s 
negotiation deadline, the offer should be rejected as it is not the top ranked offer. 
 
 The analysis shows that the proposed strategy carries out prompt evaluation of a 
collected offer to identify significant offers that would expire before the client’s 
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negotiation deadline. It sets an alert to signal earlier than the expiry time ( ாܶ௏) of 
time-limited offers of top utilities by the time needed to settle an agreement ( ௪ܶ) 
taking into account the drift time (Tdj). The strategy avoids loss of a top utility offer 
that expires earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline confirming the search of 
minimum number of vendors the client agent has to search (NT_MIN). It extends 
search/negotiation near the expiry time of a top utility offer and would interrupt 
search/negotiation earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline only if an offer 
presents a significant advantage over the so far collected offers. It should have a 
utility that is significantly more than that of the second ranked offer or its validity is 
marginally shorter than that of the second ranked offer. We can notice that the 
following: 
 
- The proposed strategy avoids loss of the top utility offer in two critical scenarios, 
in which the patient strategy fails. It rejects any offer that expires earlier than the 
client’s negotiation deadline if it is not the top utility offer. Generally, the 
strategy presents several advantages over existing strategies. It maximizes utility, 
ensures adequate market search space, and shortens search and negotiation time.  
 
- The patient strategy does not start offer evaluation unless negotiation is closed. 
Thus, it missed out on the top utility offer in two critical scenarios as they expire 
earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. It only accepts the top utility offer 
in one scenario out of the eight scenarios since its expiry time ( ாܶ௏) is later than 
the negotiation deadline (TEN) by ( ௪ܶ). It does not maximize utility, nor shortens 
search and negotiation time. It only ensures adequate market search space. It 
loses any top utility offer that expires before the client’s negotiation deadline.  
 
- The desperate strategy in all scenarios accepts the first offer that meets client 
request regardless of its utility and adequacy of market search space. It does not 
investigate valuable offers that might be forthcoming. The strategy shortens 
search and negotiation time. However, it does not ensure adequate market search 
space, nor maximizes utility. 
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- The proposed strategy as compared to patient and desperate strategies results in: 
(1) better outcomes, (2) increase in client’s utility, (3) adequacy of market search 
space, (4) shorter search and negotiation time. It improves the client’s utility as it 
avoids loss of a top utility offer that expires before the client’s negotiation 
deadline and avoids early bid settlement that would result in overpriced bids. 
Moreover, the proposed strategy shortens search and negotiation time as it would 
interrupt negotiation earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline if the following are 
confirmed: 
 
 The condition on the minimum number of vendors the client agent has to 
search (NT_MIN) is met 
 The offer highly competes with other top utility offers in terms of utilities and 
vendors’ negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer expiry times)  
 
Table 5.5 shows the characteristics of the three strategies as regards of the client’s utility, 
market search space, search and negotiation time, communication loads, resources 
consumption and client satisfaction. 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 5
: A
na
ly
si
s o
f N
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
St
ra
te
gy
 a
nd
 U
til
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n 
 
15
2 
 
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
5.
4 
D
et
ai
le
d 
re
as
on
in
g 
of
 v
ar
io
us
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
 
 
 
Pr
im
ar
y 
C
rit
er
ia
 
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
cr
ite
ria
 
O
ut
co
m
e 
of
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
 
M
ax
im
um
 
ut
ili
ty
 
A
de
qu
at
e 
 
m
ar
ke
t 
se
ar
ch
 
sp
ac
e 
Sh
or
te
ne
d 
se
ar
ch
 
tim
e 
St
ra
te
gy
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
ாܶ௏
 <
 
ாܶே
 
C
om
pe
tit
iv
e1
 
Ac
ce
pt
 a
t a
le
rt 
tim
e 
(ܶݎ
௝ሻ 
if 
th
e 
of
fe
r s
at
is
fie
s t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
: 
1.
 
 ୨ 
= 
[
1]
  
2.
 
N
T  
≥ 
N
T_
M
IN
 
3.
 
ሺγ ݆
൐
ߛ ௟ሻ
 
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
Ac
ce
pt
 a
t a
le
rt 
tim
e 
(ܶݎ
௝ሻ 
if 
th
e 
of
fe
r s
at
is
fie
s t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
s:
 
1.
 
 ୨ 
= 
[
1]
  
2.
 
N
T  
≥ 
N
T_
M
IN
 
3.
 
ሺ ቀγ
݆൑
ߛ ௟ቁ

൫
ߜ ݆
൏
ߜ ௟൯


ሺ σ
൐
Ͷሻ
ሻ  
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
Re
je
ct
 a
t a
le
rt 
tim
e 
(ܶ
ݎ ௝ሻ
 if
 th
e 
of
fe
r s
at
is
fie
s t
he
 c
on
di
tio
n:
  
 ୨ 
≠ 
[
1]
 
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
Re
je
ct
 a
t a
le
rt 
tim
e 
(ܶ
ݎ ௝ሻ
 if
 th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
: N
T  
< 
N
T_
M
IN
 is
 sa
tis
fie
d 
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
Re
je
ct
 a
t a
le
rt 
tim
e 
(ܶ
ݎ ௝ሻ
  i
f t
he
 o
ff
er
 sa
tis
fie
s t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
s:
 
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 5
: A
na
ly
si
s o
f N
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
St
ra
te
gy
 a
nd
 U
til
ity
 F
un
ct
io
n 
 
15
3 
 
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
5.
4 
D
et
ai
le
d 
re
as
on
in
g 
of
 v
ar
io
us
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
 
 
 
Pr
im
ar
y 
C
rit
er
ia
 
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
cr
ite
ria
 
O
ut
co
m
e 
of
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
 
M
ax
im
um
 
ut
ili
ty
 
A
de
qu
at
e 
 
m
ar
ke
t 
se
ar
ch
 
sp
ac
e 
Sh
or
te
ne
d 
se
ar
ch
 
tim
e 
St
ra
te
gy
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
Proposed 
Patient 
Desperate 
1.
 
 ୨ 
= 
[
1]
)  
2.
 
ሺ ቀγ
݆൑
ߛ ௟ቁ

൫
ߜ ݆
൒
ߜ ௟൯


ሺ σ
൐
Ͷሻ
ሻ  
N
on
-
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
Re
je
ct
 
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
ாܶ௏
 ≥
 
ாܶே
 C
om
pe
tit
iv
e1
 
Ac
ce
pt
 a
t t
he
 c
lie
nt
’s
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
de
ad
lin
e 
(
ாܶே
ሻ if
 th
e 
of
fe
r s
at
is
fie
s t
he
 
co
nd
iti
on
:
୨ =
 [
1]
 
Ac
ce
pt
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
9 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
N
on
-
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
Re
je
ct
 a
t 
th
e 
cl
ie
nt
’s
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
de
ad
lin
e 
(
ாܶே
ሻ i
f 
th
e 
of
fe
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 
sa
tis
fy
 th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
: 
୨്
 [
1]
 
Re
je
ct
 A
cc
ep
t 9
 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
9 
8 
9 
1 
Sa
tis
fie
s 
on
e 
of
 tw
o 
co
nd
iti
on
s:
 (a
) h
as
 b
es
t u
til
ity
, e
.g
. 
୨ =
 ሾ
ͳሿ ;
 (b
) I
ts
 u
til
ity
 m
ar
gi
na
lly
 d
iff
er
s f
ro
m
 th
at
 o
f t
he
 b
es
t o
ff
er
 e
.g
. ሺ Ͳ
൏
γ ௝
൑
ߛ ௟ሻ
, 
an
d 
its
 v
al
id
ity
 is
 lo
ng
er
 th
an
 th
at
 o
f t
he
 b
es
t o
ff
er
, e
.g
. ሺ ߜ
௝൐
Ͳሻ
 
CHAPTER 5: Analysis of Negotiation Strategy and Utility Function 
 
 
154 
 
Table 5.5 Characteristics of negotiation strategies 
 Negotiation Strategy 
Criteria Desperate Proposed Patient 
Result in least client’s utility  { { 
Result in the client’s maximum utility {  { 
Ensure adequate market search space {   
Shorten search and negotiation time {  { 
Reduce communication loads effectively {  { 
Reduce resources consumption effectively {  { 
Meet client satisfaction {  { 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the different steps of evaluating offers including 
estimating weights of negotiated attributes and quantifying enumerated attributes. 
We then introduced new factors into the existing utility function so the ranking of 
collected offers would be more accurate, particularly in scenarios where top utility 
offers might expire earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The factors are not 
considered in the existing utility functions. The factors include: market search 
space, vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. offer expiry time or end time of offer 
validity), and client’s negotiation deadline. The function assigns different values 
for offers of same attributes but of varying validities. A higher value would be 
assigned to the offer of longest validity. Also, the function assigns values for offers 
taking into account the completed market search space. A lower value would be 
assigned to the offer that is collected before an adequate market search space is 
completed when compared to a similar offer collected having completed an 
adequate market search space. Proofs of validity of the utility function are 
presented. Next, we showed the results of simulating the negotiation system in 
critical scenarios with various settings of the discussed factors that have an impact 
on the achieved client’s utility and negotiation time.  
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 We compared the performance of the negotiation strategy presented in Chapter 
4 to the performance of patient and partially patient strategies. The client’s utility 
and negotiation time are used as metrics for the comparison of strategy 
performances. The results showed that the proposed negotiation strategy maximizes 
client’s utility, shortens the negotiation time, and ensures the completion of 
adequate market search space in multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade 
negotiation. We also reasoned about the correctness of the negotiation strategy by 
comparing its outcomes to those of patient and desperate strategies. The results 
showed that the proposed strategy outperforms the two other strategies. It achieves 
the client’s maximum utility, ensures adequate market search space, shortens 
search and negotiation time, and ensures client satisfaction. The proposed strategy 
also reduces communication loads and resources consumption as deploying mobile 
agents that carries out negotiation sequentially with vendors rather than stationary 
agents that carries out negotiation with vendors simultaneously. The results show 
that the proposed strategy is well-suited for multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral 
e-Trade negotiation. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Security Protocol for 
e-Trade Negotiation 
 
 
 
Negotiation strategies advise on the best course of action during negotiation and aim 
for maximizing client’s utility. In chapters 4 and 5 we presented a flexible strategy 
and temporal constraints dependent utility function that boosts client’s utility and 
effectively manages the risk of missing out on top utility offers that expire before the 
client’s negotiation deadline. There is also a crucial risk that the data exchanged 
during e-Negotiation is susceptible to various security threats (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c). The threats are such as deleting or tampering with collected 
offers; breaching privacy of collected offers; repudiating a provided offer; 
masquerading the genuine provider of an offer; transmitting fake offers; tampering 
with client’s Request for Offer (RFO), purchase orders, or payment orders. These 
threats restrain strategies from maximizing client’s utility. In this chapter, we devise 
a sound security protocol (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) for mobile 
agent-based one-to-many e-Trade negotiations that can truly prevent or at least detect 
any security threat. We also reason about the correctness of the security protocol. A 
formal proof of the correctness of the security protocol will be presented in the next 
chapter using formal methods of verification.  
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6.1 E-Trade Negotiations 
Mobile agents have been deployed in e-Trade electronic negotiation to act on behalf 
of trading partners, i.e. clients and vendors (Stubblebine & Syverson, 1999). They try 
to find a mutually acceptable agreement among trading partners that maximizes their 
utilities and meets client’s constraints and preferences. Agent-based negotiation 
presents the following advantages over human negotiation (Babanov et al., 2003; 
Jaiswal et al., 2004; Zeng & Syeara, 1998; Wimalasiri et al., 2004; Stubblebine & 
Syverson, 1999): 
 
- Faster, cheaper and reliable negotiation 
- Free from human errors 
- Much broader market search space  
- Enhanced utilities of trading partners 
- Timely delivery of goods/services 
- Better outcomes 
- Reduced resource allocation 
- Any time accessibility 
- Reduced negotiation efforts and time  
 
The client initiates a negotiation session by sending out a negotiating mobile agent 
with a Request for Offer (RFO) to hosts of potential vendors in the marketplace. The 
RFO has the attributes of goods/services, and client's preferences and constraints. 
Attributes refer to the description of goods/services of interest. Preferences are such 
as a preferred shipping or payment method. Constraints are such as upper/lower price 
limits or maximum delivery time. Vendor agents submit offers that meet the client’s 
preferences and constraints and set end time of the validity of their respective offers. 
The negotiating mobile agent verifies and evaluates the collected offers, and then 
short-lists offers of top utilities autonomously. Next, it negotiates certain attributes 
with the short-listed vendors till it congregates an agreement with the winning 
vendor of the top utility offer or aborts the negotiation. The negotiation can be single 
attribute negotiation such as the purely price-based negotiation or multi- attribute 
negotiation that considers multiple attributes such as price, quality of service, 
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shipping fees, payment method, warranty, etc. The negotiating mobile agent may 
carry out multiple negotiation rounds with the short-listed vendors trying to reach the 
client’s maximum possible utility. It has the capability of consummating the deal on 
behalf of the client without the need to return to it. Once it decides on the winning 
vendor, it commits to its offer and then sends a payment order to client's bank host. 
6.2 Security Threats 
In e-Trade negotiation, negotiating mobile agents are expected to run in partially 
unknown and untrustworthy environments. They transport from one host to another 
host through insecure channels and may execute on non-trusted hosts. The 
negotiating mobile agents might go through many rounds of negotiation before the 
final decision is taken and would probably exchange very sensitive data. The data 
they exchange during e-Trade negotiation is susceptible to several malicious acts of 
both intruders and non-trusted hosts, which might perform any of the following 
fraudulent acts (Jaljouli, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Bellavista, Corradi, Federici, 
Montanari, & Tibaldi, 2004; Poslad, Charlton, & Calisti, 2002):  
 Attacks to vendor’s offer 
- Spy out the data enclosed in collected offers or confidential issue/s of 
agreements 
- Truncate or delete an offer of a competing vendor 
- Append a fake offer and then repudiate it 
- Sign other’s offer with the private key of an adversary 
- Tamper with collected offer/s 
- Spy out attributes of a collected offer 
- Replace a submitted offer with a new competing offer 
 
 Attacks to client’s data  
- Spy out the client's bank account details 
- Disclose the identity of the client host 
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- Tamper with Request for Offer (RFO) including attributes, preferences, 
constraints, e.g. client’s negotiation deadline, identity of the client host, or the 
random nonce identifying a protocol run 
 
 Attacks to decision-making data    
- Disclose identities of short-listed vendors 
- Spy out and/or tamper with attributes to negotiate with short-listed vendors 
- Tamper with a payment order or purchase order 
 
It is fundamental to protect the data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation from 
various fraudulent acts of intruders and non-trusted hosts, and ensure the security of 
data so trading partners can have trust in electronic markets and business.  
6.3 Security Properties 
It is important to highlight the difference between the security requirements of data 
collected by search agents, auction agents, and negotiating agents. The search agent 
acts on behalf of a client that needs to buy goods/services with the lowest price. The 
client submits a RFO and then the search agent traverses the Internet searching for 
goods/services and returns to the client with some offers it collected. The security 
requirements of search agents are to maintain: (1) integrity; (2) privacy; (3) 
authenticity; (4) non-repudiation of the collected offers. The auction agent acts on 
behalf of a vendor that seeks to sell an advertised product for the highest price 
offered. The vendor submits bids on the product at on-line auctions and the 
negotiation continues till no higher price is made since the last negotiation round. 
The security requirements of auction agents are to maintain: (1) integrity of bids; (2) 
privacy of identities of parties involved in the negotiation; (3) privacy of a 
transaction details. On the other hand, the client submits a RFO and the negotiating 
agent collects offers from potential vendors in the marketplace. It then analyzes and 
evaluates the collected offers autonomously, negotiates certain attributes with 
vendors and other agents, and consummates the deal on the behalf of the client 
without the need to return to it. The negotiation might go through many rounds of 
negotiation and it is fundamental to ensure the security of the collected offers, the 
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attributes to be negotiated with vendors, and others. The security requirements of 
negotiating agents are to maintain to the following properties (Poslad et al., 2002):  
 
 Privacy refers to the privacy of data exchanged during the negotiation sessions. 
An adversary should not be able to reveal any of the following: (1) attributes the 
negotiating agents intend to negotiate with vendors; (2) client's bank account 
details; (3) attributes of an offer submitted by a visited vendor; (4) attributes of a 
purchase order or an agreement; (5) attributes of a payment order. 
 Non-repudiation refers to the availability of a proof on: (1) identity of the vendor 
that submitted an offer; (2) identity of the client that made the RFO, purchase 
order, or payment order. 
 Authenticity refers to the ability of the agent to accurately determine the identity 
of: (1) vendor that signed an offer; (2) client that signed the RFO, purchase order, 
or payment order. 
 Strong integrity refers to the ability of the agent to prevent or at least detect any 
tampering with: (1) RFO attributes; (2) client’s negotiation deadline; (3) client’s 
name; (4) client’s bank account details; (5) agent itinerary; (6) attributes of a 
collected offer and the identity of the respective vendor; (7) negotiation 
attributes; (8) winning vendor identity; (9) purchase order attributes; (10) 
payment order attributes. The tampering includes deletion, insertion, replacement 
or manipulation acts. 
 Anonymity refers to the ability to obscure an intruder or malicious host from 
revealing the identities of the client and the negotiated vendors. 
6.4 The Proposed Security Protocol 
The security of data exchanged in e-Trade negotiation is of high concern to both 
clients and vendors. Hence, we propose a comprehensive security protocol (Jaljouli 
& Abawajy, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) that takes into consideration the various 
fraudulent acts of intruders and non-trusted hosts and protects the data exchanged by 
the negotiating mobile agents. The security protocol ensures that decisions taken by 
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negotiating agents are based on genuine data and, thus introduces the following 
benefits: 
 
 Optimizing the negotiation process 
 Achieving maximum utilities of negotiating entities (client and vendors) 
 Offering fair opportunities for various vendors contributing in bidding and 
negotiation  
 Enhancing trust of negotiating entities in e-Trade negotiation 
 
The security protocol is based on the following assumptions: 
 
1. Negotiating agents are free-roaming agents that can autonomously choose an 
agent itinerary based on the collected offers and the client’s preferences and 
constraints.  
2. Agents migrate through public channels and data exchanged during negotiation 
rounds is represented as communicated messages.  
3. Agent's code remains intact throughout the agent itinerary.  
4. Each host possesses two encryption keys, a public encryption key and a private 
signing key. The identity of the signer of a message can be deduced from its 
signature, and the public encryption key of a host can be found in the server’s 
known-hosts list or is distributed to the host upon request from the relevant host.  
5. The privacy of negotiation strategies and decision making functions can be 
preserved by splitting critical and non-critical negotiation data and functions into 
two agents. Vogler et al. in (1999) proposed two agents: Worker agent and 
Controller agent. The Worker agent stores non-critical data and functions and is 
responsible of collecting offers from potential vendors. The Controller agent 
stores critical data and functions and is responsible of verifying the collected 
offers. 
6. In a negotiation round, a vendor host is only visited once. 
The proposed security protocol implements the following security techniques:  
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- Utilization of four mobile agents among which critical and non-critical 
negotiation data and functions are split and each agent is responsible of a specific 
task. The four agents are listed below. 
 Supervisor Agent (SPA)  
 Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA)  
 Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA) 
 Purchasing Agent (PA) 
The four mobile agents act on behalf of the client and cooperate in conducting 
the negotiation. The SNA and IRA agents store all collected offers and the actual 
agent itinerary, respectively. The SPA agent integrates and verifies the 
search/negotiation outcomes of SNA and IRA agents before it makes a decision 
on the winning vendor to ensure that the results have not been subject to any 
malicious act. The PA agent securely stores the bank account details of the client 
and resides at the client’s bank host, which is considered a trusted host. The role 
of each agent will be discussed in details in the next section. 
 
- Implementation of cryptography to ensure the security of exchanged data. 
 Each vendor host signs its offer with its private signing key and then encrypts 
it with public key of a Trusted Server.  
 The attributes to negotiate with each vendor are encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the respective vendor host. 
- Utilization of a Trusted Server (TS) (Pagnia et al., 2000) that provides a secure 
environment for carrying out the sensitive processes of negotiation including: 
decryption and verification of collected offers, evaluation and ranking collected 
offers, short-listing vendors, selecting attributes for negotiation, decision-making 
on the winning vendor, issuing purchase orders and payment orders. Further 
details on Trusted Servers were given in Section 2 of Chapter 3. 
- Securely storing a record of the actual agent itinerary so it can be compared 
with the initial agent itinerary and the integrity of collected offers can be 
verified upon the completion of negotiation. 
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- Binding a collected offer to initial negotiation parameters for verifications upon 
the completion of negotiation. The parameters would be verified with the 
corresponding parameters that are securely stored within the SPA agent. The 
parameters include: protocol nonce, identity of the client host, client’s 
negotiation deadline, and the client’s Request for Offer (RFO). 
- Securely storing the bank account details of the client with the PA agent that 
resides at the client’s bank host, which is considered a trusted host to prevent any 
unauthorized transactions or illegal access to the account. 
6.5 The System Architecture of the Protocol 
We show the high-level system architecture of the proposed security protocol and 
the itinerary of the four mobile agents, which corporate in conducting the different 
processes of e-Trade negotiation, in Figure 6.1. The protocol comprises of three 
rounds. The arrows represent the flow of data between the negotiating entities as they 
negotiate with each other for the purchase of goods/services. The labels on the 
arrows represent the order in which the mobile agents perform their tasks from start 
to the completion of the processes of e-Trade negotiation.  
 
Figure 6.1 High-system architecture of the proposed security protocol 
The system includes four types of hosts: 
- Client host  
- Vendor host  
- Trusted Server (TS) 
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- Client's bank host  
 
Initially, the client makes a RFO through the interface of e-Trade applications at 
the client host. The application then initiates four mobile agents: Supervisor Agent 
(SPA), Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA), Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA), and 
Purchasing Agent (PA), which act on behalf of the client and are assigned particular 
tasks as follows:  
- The Supervisor Agent (SPA)  
 Securely stores critical data (e.g. protocol nonce, identity of the client host, 
client’s RFO, and client’s negotiation deadline TEN) and critical functions 
(e.g., scoring functions, decision functions, and part of tactic function).  
 Integrates the results of Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) and Itinerary 
Registry Agent (IRA). 
 Evaluates, verifies and ranks the collected offers, short-lists vendors, selects 
attributes for negotiation, makes a decision on the winning vendor, and issues 
purchase and payment orders. 
- The Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) 
 Stores non-critical negotiation data and a part of tactic function.  
 Securely stores the offers it collects from the visited vendors. 
 
- The Itinerary Registry Agent (IRA) 
 Collects a partial itinerary registry from each visited vendor host, which 
includes the identity of each visited vendor host as well as the time at which 
the SNA agent got executed at the respective vendor host. 
 Securely stores all partial itinerary registries as a proof on the actual agent 
itinerary. 
 
- The Purchasing Agent (PA) 
 Securely stores the bank account details of the client. 
 Issues payment orders to the client’s bank host on behalf of the client 
whenever the SPA agent instructs it to do so. 
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The client host in step (1) dispatches the four mobile agents as follows: (a) 
dispatches the SPA agent to a Trusted Server; (b) dispatches the PA agent to the 
client’s bank host; (c) dispatches the SNA and IRA agents to the hosts of potential 
vendors {V1, … , Vj, … , Vn} in the marketplace to collect offers from vendors. At a 
visited vendor host, the vendor host executes the SNA and IRA agents and then the 
vendor agent submits an offer that satisfies the RFO. Upon the completion of offer 
collection from the potential vendors, the last visited vendor host in step (2) 
dispatches the SNA and IRA agents to the Trusted Server (TS) that provides a secure 
environment for carrying out sensitive processes including offers decryption and 
verification, selection of negotiation attributes, and decision-making. The SNA and 
IRA agents in step (3) provide the search/negotiation outcomes to the SPA agent that 
resides at the Trusted Server (TS). The SPA agent then decrypts, verifies, and 
evaluates the search/negotiation outcomes and makes a decision on either carrying 
out another round of negotiation or awarding the bid to the winning vendor of top 
utility offer. If a decision is made on carrying out another negotiation round, then the 
SPA agent short-lists vendors of top utility offers and advises the SNA agent on the 
attributes to negotiate with each short-listed vendor. The two agents are then 
dispatched to the hosts of the short-listed vendors (Vm , … , Vz) to negotiate the 
attributes with each vendor. The agents are expected to collect more favourable 
offers. If a decision is made on awarding the bid, the SNA agent in step (4) is sent to 
the host of the winning vendor with a purchase order confirming acceptance of its 
offer. It would return to the Trusted Server (TS) with an acceptance/rejection of the 
purchase order. The SPA agent in step (5) sends a message to the PA agent at the 
client’s bank host requesting it to issue a payment order for the benefit of the 
winning vendor (Vw), and accordingly the PA agent issues the payment order and 
presents it to the client’s bank host. The BA agent in step (6) processes the payment 
for the winning vendor. The BA agent represents the Client’s Bank Agent as 
discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 3. The winning vendor (Vw) in step (7) provides 
goods/services to the client and the client then confirms receipt of goods/services. 
Finally, the four agents get terminated. 
We present an example to illustrate the different steps of negotiation and the 
agent itinerary of the four mobile agents. Let's assume Alice plans to travel from 
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Melbourne to Sydney and seeks the cheapest offer within six hours of her Request 
for Offer (RFO) for certain departure and return dates. She interacts with the IA 
agent of e-Trade applications at the client host in step (1) and places a request for 
offer (RFO). The IA agent represents the Interface Agent as discussed in Section 2 of 
Chapter 3. The IA agent maps the Alice’s RFO into attributes of goods/services, 
preferences (e.g. a particular payment method), and constraints (e.g. deadline of 
Alice’s RFO). The IA agent then selects a Trusted Server (TS) and consults 
Collaboration and Heuristic agents, which were discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 3, 
on an agent itinerary of hosts of potential vendors, negotiation deadline (TEN) based 
on the deadline of Alice’s RFO, and values of Alice’s qualitative preferences. The IA 
agent then starts a negotiating round by instantiating four mobile agents: SPA, SNA, 
PA, and IRA. The client host then dispatches the SPA agent to the Trusted Server 
and the PA agent to the client’s bank host. It dispatches the SNA and IRA agents to a 
set of hosts of potential vendors {V1, … , Vj, … , Vn} to collect offers from the vendors. 
Each visited vendor host that chose to transact with the client host will admit and 
execute the SNA and IRA agents to learn the attributes, preferences and constraints 
of the client’s RFO. Each vendor agent then provides the SNA agent with an offer 
that meets the client's preferences and constraints and sets an end time of the validity 
of its offer. The vendor implements an encryption scheme to ensure the security of 
the offer it provides. Also, the vendor provides the IRA agent with an encrypted 
partial itinerary registry that confirms the execution of the agents at its host. The 
partial itinerary registries constitute the actual agent itinerary. Upon the completion 
of search of potential vendors, the SNA and IRA agents in step (2) migrate to the 
Trusted Server (TS) and provide the collected offers and actual agent itinerary to the 
SPA agent that resides at the Trusted Server. The SPA agent securely decrypts and 
verifies the collected offers and actual agent itinerary. It then evaluates and ranks 
offers. The collected offers should be verified before being accepted as correct so 
that an accurate decision can be made on the winning vendor from which to buy the 
goods/services. The SPA agent might go for a second round of negotiation in step (3) 
with two or more of the competing vendors, with the intention of maximizing Alice’s 
utility. The SPA agent then short-lists vendors {Vm, … , Vz} of top utility offers. The 
SNA and IRA agents then migrate to the hosts of the short-listed vendors to collect 
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more favourable offers from the vendors. Upon the completion of negotiation with 
the short-listed vendors, the SNA and IRA agents migrate to the Trusted Server (TS). 
The SPA agent then decrypts, verifies, evaluates, ranks the new offers. The agent 
would make a decision on either awarding the bid to the winning vendor (Vw) of top 
utility offer or proceeding on another negotiation round. If a decision is made on the 
winning vendor, the SPA agent issues a purchase order including Alice's personal 
details and sends it with the SNA agent in step (4) to the winning vendor host. The 
SPA agent then sends a message to the PA agent in step (5) requesting it to issue a 
payment order for the benefit of the winning vendor, and accordingly the PA agent 
issues the payment order and presents it to Alice's BA agent on behalf of Alice. The 
BA agent processes the payment in step (6) to the winning vendor (௪). Next, the 
winning vendor (Vw) proceeds on confirming the booking of the ticket for Alice in 
step (7) and Alice sends an acknowledgement to the IA agent on the receipt of the 
requested ticket. Finally, the IA agent terminates the SPA, SNA, IRA, and PA 
agents. 
6.6 Description of the Security Protocol & Algorithms 
Negotiation involves the following very sensitive processes: 
- Evaluating and ranking the collected offers  
- Generating a short-list of vendors to negotiate 
- Selecting attributes to negotiate with the short-listed vendors 
- Making a decision on the winning vendor 
- Issuing purchase orders 
- Issuing payment orders 
 
It is fundamental to ensure that the data exchanged in these processes is truly 
secured. Thus, we propose and discuss a public key infrastructure-based security 
protocol that aims to protect the data exchanged between the different agents 
engaged in e-Trade negotiation. The protocol uses particular parameters to ensure 
accurate verifications of data exchanged during the negotiation. The parameters are 
outlined below. 
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- A freshly generated random nonce (r) that identifies a protocol run 
- Time of execution of the SNA agent at a vendor host ( ௝ܶ) 
- Hash of the identity of the client host which initiated the Request for Offer 
൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ 
- Public encryption and private signature keys are used to achieve the security 
properties: privacy, non-repudiation, authenticity, strong integrity, and anonymity 
of the data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation. 
 Table 6.1 summarizes the notations used to describe the proposed security 
protocol for e-Trade negotiation. Refer to Glossary for the full list of notations. The 
proposed security protocol is composed of three rounds: Round 1, Round 2, and 
Round 3 as shown in Figure 6.1. The Round 1 focuses on planning, bidding, 
collection of offers, and migration to the Trusted Server (TS). 
The Round 1 of the proposed security protocol consists of two phases:  
1. Request initiation phase: deals with initiation of the four mobile agents (SPA, 
SNA, IRA, and PA). 
2. Offer-collection phase: deals with searching and collecting offers from potential 
vendors {V1, … , Vj, … , Vn} in the marketplace and then migrating to the Trusted 
Server (TS). 
The Round 2 of the proposed security protocol focuses on verification of the 
collected offers and negotiation. The round consists of three phases:  
1. Offer-verification phase: deals with decrypting and verifying the security 
properties of the collected offers. 
2. Itinerary-verification phase: deals with decrypting and verifying the integrity of 
the agent itinerary based on the outcomes of the SNA and IRA agents. 
3. Offer-negotiation phase: deals with evaluating and ranking the collected offers, 
negotiating with the short-listed vendors, making a decision on the winning 
vendor, and awarding the bid. 
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Table 6.1 Notations of the proposed security protocol 
Description Notation 
Agent itinerary vector {V1, … , Vj, … , Vn} V  
Names of client, visited vendor, and winning vendor, respectively I0, Ij, Iw 
Price of the winning offer ܵ௔௪ 
Client’s bank  ஼஻ 
Winning vendor ୵ 
Number of vendor hosts to visit in Round 1 of the security protocol cn 
Request for Offer the client sets for biding and negotiation RFO 
Client’s negotiation deadline 
Client’s expected delivery time of goods/services delivery 
A freshly generated nonce that identifies a protocol run 
Identity of the client host, which initiated the negotiating mobile agents 
Hash of the identity of the client host 
Time at which the SNA agent got executed at the host of vendor (Vj) 
TEN 
TE 
r 
i0 
h(i0) 
௝ܶ 
Private signing key of the client host (i0) ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ 
Private signing key of the host of vendor (Vj) ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ 
Private signing key of the host of winning vendor (Vw) ܵ݅݃௪ିଵ 
Public encryption key of the Trusted Server (TS) ܭ்ௌା  
Public encryption key of the host of winning vendor (Vw) ܭ௪ା 
Public encryption key of the host of vendor (Vj) ܭ௝ା 
Public encryption key of the host of client’s bank (஼஻) 
Client’s bank account details 
Client's contact details  
RFO vector  
End time of offer validity of vendor (Vj) 
Attributes of  the offer of vendor (Vj) 
Offer vector 
Itinerary registry vector 
Verification attributes vector 
Bank account vector 
ܭ஼஻ା  
Ad 
Cd 
ܻ 
ாܶ௏
௝  
ܵ௔௝ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠௝  
ܺ 
ܼ 
Q 
H 
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The Round 3 of the proposed security protocol focuses on Bid-award phase that 
deals with the following:  
1. Purchase order: issuing and sending a purchase order to the winning vendor and 
then collecting acceptance/rejection from the vendor. 
2. Payment order: issuing a payment order to client's bank host for the benefit of the 
winning vendor.  
3. Money transfer: processing the payment order for the winning vendor through the 
client's bank host. 
4. Delivery and acknowledgement: delivering goods/services to the client and then 
collecting acknowledgement from the client on the receipt of goods/services.  
The pseudo code of the proposed security protocol algorithm is shown in Figure 
6.2.  It carries out the steps outlined below. 
1. Initializes “Candidate” variable to zero. 
2. Selects a Trusted Server (்ௌ) and learns its public encryption key (ܭ்ௌା ሻ. 
3. Runs request-initiation algorithm. 
4. Runs offer-collection algorithm. 
5. Runs offer-verification algorithm and then verifies that the algorithm returns the 
value of “Offers” as True. If the verification passes, it runs itinerary-verification 
algorithm; otherwise it runs offer-collection algorithm again. 
6. Verifies that the itinerary-verification algorithm returns the value of “Itinerary” 
as True. If the verification passes, it runs offer-negotiation algorithm; otherwise it 
runs offer-collection algorithm again. 
7. Repeat steps (4) to (6) as long as the value of “Candidate” is equal to zero. If the 
value of “Candidate” is equal to 1, it runs bid-award algorithm. 
8. Sends the value of “Delivery”, which the bid-award algorithm returns, to the host 
of the winning vendor (௪). 
The security protocol algorithm calls the following algorithms: 
- Request-initiation algorithm 
- Offer-collection algorithm 
- Offer-verification algorithm 
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- Itinerary-verification algorithm 
- Offer-negotiation algorithm 
- Bid-award algorithm 
Algorithm security-protocol 
INPUT: RFO 
OUTPUT: ௪ 
BEGIN 
Candidate = 0 
்ௌ ึ ሺሻ 
Initiation (RFO) 
DO 
offer-collection ሺሻ 
offer-verification ሺܺሻ 
IF (Offers = True) THEN  
itinerary-verification ሺܼሻ 
IF (Itinerary = True) THEN  
offer-negotiation ሺሻ 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
WHILE (Candidate == 0) 
bid-award ሺܫ଴ǡ ܫ୵ሻ 
୵ ึSend Delivery 
 END security-protocol 
Figure 6.2 Pseudo code of the security protocol algorithm 
The full details of the algorithms are discussed below.  
Request-initiation algorithm: At the client host, the e-Trade application performs the 
steps outlined below, which are depicted in Figure 6.3 of the pseudo code of the 
request-initiation algorithm. The steps are carried out upon receipt of a request for 
goods/services (RFO) from the  client. 
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1. Initializes six vectors: agent itinerary vector (V), RFO vector (ܻ), offer vector 
(X), itinerary registry vector ሺܼሻ, verification attributes vector (ܳ), and bank 
account vector (H) to empty. 
2. Computes a hash of the identity of the client host (i0). 
3. Initiates four mobile agents: SPA, SNA, PA, and IRA. The client host is regarded 
as the initiator of the four mobile agents. 
4. Selects an agent itinerary (V) for the SNA and IRA agents that consists of a set of 
hosts of potential vendors {V1 , … , Vj , … , Vn} from which to collect offers. 
5. Sets a client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) based of the client’s expected delivery 
time of goods/services. 
6. Generate a random nonce (ݎ) that uniquely identifies the protocol run. 
7. Generates multiple copies of the client's RFO and assigns each copy to (RFOj) 
for (ͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݊ሻ, where (n) refers to the number of vendor hosts to visit in Round 
1 of the security protocol. It then generates (n) tuples each comprised of: (RFOj), 
protocol nonce (r), client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே), hash of the identity of the 
client host h(݅଴), and the public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. It 
then encrypts each tuple with the public encryption key (ܭ௝ା) of the 
corresponding vendor host to visit (௝) and assigns the encrypted tuple to ൫ ௝ܻ൯. 
Next, it appends the tuple ൫ ௝ܻ൯ for (ͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݊ሻ to the RFO vector ሺܻሻ. 
8. Generates a tuple that consists of: client's RFO, protocol nonce (r), client’s 
negotiation deadline ( ாܶேሻ, client's name (ܫ଴), client's contact details (Cd), and 
agent itinerary vector (V). It then signs the tuple with the private signing key of 
the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵሻ and then signs it with the public encryption key of the 
Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. Next, it appends the encrypted tuple to the verification 
attributes vector (Q). 
9. Generates a tuple that consists of: client's bank account details (Ad), client's name 
(ܫ଴), and protocol nonce (r). It signs the tuple with the private signing key of the 
client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵሻ and then signs it with the public encryption key of the host of 
client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. Next, it appends the encrypted tuple to the bank account 
vector (H). 
10. Stores the verification attributes vector ሺܳሻ in the SPA agent. 
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Algorithm request-initiation 
INPUT: 	ǡ ܫ଴ǡ ܣ݀ǡ ܥ݀ǡ ݅଴ǡ ܭ்ௌା  
BEGIN 
Vึ ׎ 
ܺ ึ ׎ 
ܼ ึ ׎ 
ܳ ึ ׎ 
ܻ ึ ׎ 
ܪ ึ ׎ 
݄ሺ݅଴ሻ ึ Compute hash of (݅଴) 
Initiation of negotiating mobile agents: (SPA, SNA, IRA, PA) 
 ึ{V1 , … , Vj , … , Vn}//agent itinerary vector 
ாܶே ึ Set a client’s negotiation deadline 
ݎ ึ Generate a random nonce 
FOR ሺ݆ ൌ ͳ݊ሻ DO 
	௝ ึ ሺ	ሻ 
௝ܻ ึ ௄ೕశ൫	௝ǡ ݎǡ ாܶேǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻǡ ܭ்ௌା ൯//ܭ௝ାpublic key of vendor host 
ܻ ึ ൫ ௝ܻ൯ 
	 
ܳ ึ ௄೅ೄశ ቀௌ௜௚೔బషభሺ	ǡ ݎǡ ாܶேǡ ܫ଴ǡ ܥ݀ǡ ሻቁ 
ܪ ึ ௄೅ೄశ ቀௌ௜௚೔బషభሺݎǡ ܫ଴ǡ ܣ݀ሻቁ 
 ึ ሺܳሻ 
 ึ ሺܻǡ ܺሻ 
 ึ ሺܼሻ 
 ึ ሺܪሻ 
்ௌ   ึ (SPA)// dispatch the SPA agent to the Trusted Server 
஼஻   ึ(PA)// dispatch the PA agent to client’s bank host 
ଵ ึ (SNA, IRA)// dispatch the agents to the first vendor host 
 END request-initiation 
Figure 6.3 Pseudo code of the request-initiation algorithm of Round 1  
 of the security protocol 
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11. Stores the bank account vector ሺܪሻ in the PA agent 
12. Stores the RFO vector ሺܻሻ and offer vector ሺܺሻ in the SNA agent. 
13. Stores the itinerary registry vector ሺܼሻin the IRA agent. 
14. Dispatches the SPA agent to the Trusted Server. 
15. Dispatches the PA agent to the client’s bank host. 
16. Requests the client host to dispatch the SNA and IRA agents to the host of the 
first vendor (ଵ) in the agent itinerary vector (V) to collect an offer. 
Offer-collection algorithm: At the host of a visited vendor (௝), the following steps 
are carried out, which are depicted in Figure 6.4 of the pseudo code of the offer-
collection algorithm. 
1. The host of the visited vendor ൫௝൯ verifies the authenticity of the SNA and IRA 
agents and then executes the two agents. It then decrypts the corresponding tuple 
( ௝ܻ) with its public decryption key (ܭ௝ି ). 
2. The vendor host does the following: 
a. Extracts ൫	௝൯ from the tuple ( ௝ܻ), which is enclosed with the SNA agent, to 
learn the attributes, preferences, and constraints of client's RFO. 
b. Extracts the public encryption key ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ of the Trusted Server from the tuple 
( ௝ܻ), which is enclosed with the SNA agent. 
c. Extracts the protocol nonce ሺݎሻ from the tuple ( ௝ܻ), which is enclosed with the 
SNA agent. 
d. Extracts the hash of the identity of the client host ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ from the tuple ( ௝ܻ), 
which is enclosed with the SNA agent. 
3. The vendor agent at the host provides an offer that consists of: client’s Request 
for offer (RFO) and its client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶேሻ, vendor's name ൫ܫ௝൯, 
values of offer attributes {ܵ௔௝ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠௝ }, protocol nonce (r), hash of the identity of 
the client host h(i0), and end time of offer validity ( ாܶ௏
௝ ). It then signs the offer 
with the private signing key ሺܵ݅݃௝ି ଵሻ of the host of vendor ൫௝൯. It then encrypts 
the offer with the public key of the Trusted Server (ܭ்ௌା ). Next, it assigns the 
encrypted offer to ( ௝ܺ). 
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4. The vendor host appends the encrypted offer ( ௝ܺ) to the offer vector (X), which is 
enclosed with the SNA agent. It then scrambles the sequence of the collected 
offers ( ௝ܺ) in the offer vector (X). 
5. The vendor host generates a partial itinerary registry tuple that consists of: 
vendor (௝), protocol nonce (r), hash of the identity of the client host h(݅଴), and 
time ሺ ௝ܶሻ at which the SNA agent got executed at the vendor host. It then signs 
the partial itinerary registry tuple with the private signing key ሺܵ݅݃௝ି ଵሻ of the host 
of vendor ൫௝൯and then encrypts it with the public encryption key of the Trusted 
Server (ܭ்ௌା ). Next, it assigns the encrypted partial itinerary registry tuple to ( ௝ܼ). 
Algorithm offer-collection 
INPUT: SNA, IRA 
BEGIN 
FOR ൫ ௝ܻ א ܻ൯DO 
Verify authenticity (SNA, IRA) 
Execute (SNA, IRA) 
௝ܻ ึ ௄ೕష൫ ௝ܻ൯ //ܭ௝ି public decryption key of the host of vendor (௝) 
	௝ ึ ൫ ௝ܻǡ 	௝൯// Extract RFO from ൫ ௝ܻ൯ 
ܭ்ௌା ึ ൫ ௝ܻǡ ܭ்ௌା ൯// Extract public encryption key (ܭ்ௌା ) from  ൫ ௝ܻ൯ 
ݎ ึ ൫ ௝ܻǡ ݎ൯// Extract protocol nonce (r) from൫ ௝ܻ൯  
݄ሺ݅଴ሻ ึ Extractቀ ௝ܻǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻቁ// hash of the identity of the client host 
௝ܺ ึ ௄೅ೄశ ൬ௌ௜௚ೕషభ൫	௝ǡ ாܶேǡ ܫ௝ǡ ൛ܵ௔
௝ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠௝ ൟǡ ݎǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻǡ ாܶ௏௝ ൯൰ 
ܺ ึ ൫ ௝ܺ൯ 
ܺ ึ ൫൛ܺଵǡڮ ǡ ௝ܺǡڮ ǡ ܺ௡ൟ൯ 
௝ܼ ึ ௄೅ೄశ ൬ௌ௜௚ೕషభ൫௝ǡ ݎǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻǡ ௝൯൰ 
Zึ ൫ ௝ܼ൯ 
ܼ ึ ൫൛ܼଵǡڮ ǡ ௝ܼ ǡڮ ǡ ܼ௡ൟ൯ 
ENDFOR 
୘ୗ ึ ሺǡ ሻ 
END offer-collection 
Figure 6.4 Pseudo code of offer-collection algorithm of Round 1 of the security protocol 
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6. The vendor host appends the encrypted partial itinerary registry tuple ( ௝ܼ) to the 
itinerary registry vector (ܼ), which is enclosed with the IRA agent. It then 
scrambles the sequence of the partial itinerary registry tuples in the itinerary 
registry vector (ܼ). 
7. The vendor host dispatches the SNA and IRA agents to the host of the next vendor 
in the agent itinerary vector (V).  
8. The steps (1) to (6) of the offer-collection algorithm are repeated till all vendor 
hosts in the agent itinerary vector (V) are visited.  
9. Upon completion of the agent itinerary, the host of the last vendor in the itinerary 
dispatches the SNA and IRA agents to the Trusted Server (TS) where the SPA 
agent decrypts, integrates, verifies, evaluates, and ranks the data collected by the 
SNA and IRA agents. It would make a decision if to proceed on another 
negotiation round or award the bid. 
Offer-verification algorithm: Upon arrival of the SNA and IRA agents to the Trusted 
Server (TS), the SPA agent carries out the steps outlined below and are depicted in 
Figure 6.5 of the pseudo code of the offer-verification algorithm. 
1.   Initializes “Offers” to False 
2. Requests the Trusted Server (TS) to perform the following: 
a. Decrypts the verification attributes vector (Q), which is enclosed with the SPA 
agent, with its private decryption key (ܭ்ௌି). The SPA agent then deduces the 
identity of the client host ሺ݅଴ሻ  from its signature and computes a hash of the 
deduced identity ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯. Next, it extracts the parameters:ܳሺ	ሻ, protocol 
nonce ܳሺݎሻ, and client’s negotiation deadline ܳሺ ாܶேሻ from the verification 
attributes vector (Q). 
b. Decrypts the collected offer ( ௝ܺ) for (ͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݊ሻ, which is enclosed with the 
SNA agent, with its private decryption key (ܭ்ௌି). The SPA Agent then 
extracts the hash parameter ௝ܺ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯.  
3. The SPA agent performs the following verifications on each collected offer ( ௝ܺ) 
included in the offer vector (ܺ): 
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a. Verifies that the collected offer ( ௝ܺ) has been submitted for the client host 
ሺ݅଴ሻ. The verification is done by testing if the hash of the identity of the client 
host, which is extracted from the offer being verified ൫ ௝ܺ൯, matches that 
deduced from the verification attributes vector (ܳ), ቀǤ Ǥ ௝ܺ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ൌ
ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ቁ.  
b. Verifies that the collected offer ( ௝ܺ) has been generated for the client’s RFO, 
which is enclosed with the SPA agent. The verification is done by testing if 
	௝ǡwhich are extracted from the offer being verified ൫ ௝ܺ൯, matches the 
client's RFO that is extracted from the verification attributes vector (Q), 
ቀǤ Ǥ ௝ܺ൫	௝൯ ൌ ሺ	൯ቁ. 
c. Verifies that the collected offer ( ௝ܺ) meets the client’s RFO, which is 
enclosed with the SPA agent. The verification is done by testing if the offer’s 
attributes൫ܵ௝൯, which are extracted from the offer being verified ൫ ௝ܺ൯, satisfy 
the attributes of the client’s RFO that are extracted from the verification 
attributes vector (Q), (i.e. If  ௝ܺ൫ܵ௝൯ሺ	ሻ).  
d. Verifies that the collected offer ( ௝ܺ) belongs to the protocol run. The verification 
is done by testing if the protocol nonce ሺݎሻ, which is extracted from the offer 
being verified ൫ ௝ܺ൯, matches that extracted from the verification attributes vector 
(Q), (i.e. If  ௝ܺሺݎሻ ൌ ܳሺݎሻ). 
e. Verifies that the collected offer ( ௝ܺ) has been generated based on the genuine 
negotiation deadline (TEN). The verification is done by testing if the client’s 
negotiation deadline, which is extracted from the offer being verified ൫ ௝ܺ൯, 
matches the client’s negotiation deadline extracted from the verification 
attributes vector (Q), (i.e. If  ௝ܺሺTENሻ ൌ ܳሺTENሻ). 
If all the verifications pass, the SPA agent sets “Offers” to True. If any of the 
verifications fails, the SPA agent breaks the algorithm and excludes the collected 
offers. 
4. Returns the value of “Offers”.  
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Algorithm offer-verification 
INPUT: X, Q,ܭ்ௌି 
OUTPUT: Offers 
Offers = False 
BEGIN 
ܳ ึ ௄೅ೄష ሺܳሻ 
ሺ݅଴ሻ ึ  ึ Extract  ൫ܳǡ ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ൯// extract ൫ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ൯from ሺܳሻ 
ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ึCompute ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ 
ܳሺ	ሻ ึ ሺܳǡ 	ሻ // extract ሺ	ሻfrom ሺܳሻ 
ܳሺݎሻ ึ ሺܳǡ ݎሻ // extract ሺݎሻfrom ሺܳሻ 
ܳሺTENሻ ึ ሺܳǡTENሻ // extract ሺ ாܶேሻ from ሺܳሻ 
FOR ൫ ௝ܺ א ܺ൯DO 
௝ܺ ึ ௄೅ೄష ൫ ௝ܺ൯ 
௝ܺ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ึ  ቀ ௝ܺǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻቁ ึ Extract  ൫ ௝ܺǡ ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ൯ 
IFቀ ௝ܺ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ൌ ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ቁ  THEN  // verify the client host 
௝ܺ൫	௝൯ ึ ൫ ௝ܺǡ 	௝൯ // extract ൫	௝൯ from ൫ ௝ܺ൯ 
IF ቀ ௝ܺ൫	௝൯ ൌ ሺ	൯ቁ THEN // verify RFO 
௝ܺ൫ܵ௝൯ ึ ൫ ௝ܺǡ ൛ܵ௔௝ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠௝ ൟ൯//offer attributes 
IF ቀ ௝ܺ൫ܵ௝൯ሺ	ሻቁ THEN // verify that offer satisfies RFO 
௝ܺሺݎሻ ึ ൫ ௝ܺǡ ݎ൯ 
IF ቀ ௝ܺሺݎሻ ൌ ܳሺݎሻቁTHEN // verify the protocol nonce 
௝ܺሺTENሻ ึ ൫ ௝ܺǡTEN൯ 
IF ቀ ௝ܺሺTENሻ ൌ ܳሺTENሻቁ THEN Offers = True // verify (TENሻ 
ENDIF  
ENDIF  
ENDIF  
ENDIF  
IF (Offers = False) THEN BREAK 
END FOR 
RETURN Offers 
END offer-verification 
Figure 6.5. Pseudo code of offer-verification algorithm of Round 2  
 of the security protocol 
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Itinerary-verification algorithm: The SPA agent carries out the steps outlined below, 
which are depicted in Figure 6.6 of the pseudo code of the itinerary-verification 
algorithm. 
1. Initializes “Itinerary” to False 
2. Requests the Trusted Server (TS) to decrypt each partial itinerary registry ( ௝ܼ), 
which is enclosed with the IRA agent, with its private decryption key (ܭ்ௌି). 
3. Extracts the protocol nonce (r) from each partial itinerary registry ( ௝ܼ) and then 
verifies that each partial itinerary registry belongs to the protocol run. The 
verification is done by testing if the protocol nonce ሺݎሻ, which is extracted from the 
partial itinerary being verified ( ௝ܼ), matches that extracted from the verification 
attributes vector (Q), i.e. If  ቀ ௝ܼሺݎሻ ൌ ܳሺݎሻቁ. It then sets “Itinerary” to True if the 
verification passes. 
4. Extracts the hash of the identity of the client host ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ from each partial 
itinerary registry ( ௝ܼ) and then verifies that each collected offer has been 
submitted for the client host ሺ݅଴ሻ. The verification is done by testing if the hash 
of the identity of the client host ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ, which is extracted from the partial 
itinerary being verified ( ௝ܼ), matches that deduced from the verification attributes 
vector ሺܳሻ, i.e. If ቀ ௝ܼ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ൌ ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ቁ. It then sets “Itinerary” to True if the 
verification passes. 
5. If the value of “Itinerary” is False it then breaks the algorithm and returns the 
value of “Itinerary”. 
6. Sorts the itinerary registry vector (Z) by the execution time of agents ሺ௝) 
7. Deduces the identity of the hosts of each visited vendor (௝), which provided a 
partial itinerary registry ( ௝ܼ). It then appends the deduced identity ൫௝൯ to ሺሻ 
vector. 
8. Deduces agent itinerary ሺሻ from the tuple ሺܳሻǤ 
9. Verifies that the assembled the agent itinerary ሺሻmatches the agent itinerary ܳሺሻ 
that has been set at the initiation time of the mobile agents. If the verification 
passes, the SPA agent sets the value of “Itinerary” to True. The verification 
indicates that the agent itinerary and collected offers are both intact. If the two 
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itineraries do not match, it indicates that the agent itinerary and/or collected 
offers have been tampered with, and hence the collected offers will be discarded.  
10. Return the value of “Itinerary”. 
Algorithm itinerary-verification 
INPUT: Z, ܳሺ݅ሻ, ܳሺݎሻ, ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯, ܳ 
OUTPUT: Itinerary 
BEGIN 
Itinerary = False 
FOR ൫ ௝ܼ א ܼ൯DO 
௝ܼ ึ ௄೅ೄష ൫ ௝ܼ൯ 
௝ܼሺݎሻ ึ ൫ ௝ܼǡ ݎ൯ 
IF ቀ ௝ܼሺݎሻ ൌ ܳሺݎሻቁ THEN Itinerary = True// verify the protocol nonce 
௝ܼ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ึ  ቀ ௝ܼ ǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻቁ 
IF ቀ ௝ܼ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ ൌ ܳ൫݄ሺ݅଴ሻ൯ቁ THEN Itinerary = True//verify the client host 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
IF (Itinerary = False) THEN BREAK 
ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
 ึ Sort ሺሻሺ ௝ܶ) // sort by execution times of agents 
FOR ൫ ௝ܼ א ܼ൯ DO 
൫௝൯ ึ ሺ݆ሻ ึ ൫ ௝ܼ ǡ ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ൯ 
ሺሻ ึ Append (௝) 
ENDFOR 
ܳሺሻ ึ ሺܳǡ ሻ 
IF (ሺሻ ൌ ܳሺሻ) THEN Itinerary = True//verify agent itinerary 
ENDIF 
RETURN Itinerary 
END itinerary-verification 
Figure 6.6 Pseudo code of itinerary-verification of Round 2 of the security protocol 
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Offer-negotiation algorithm: The SPA agent carries out the steps outlined below, 
which are depicted in Figure 6.7 of the pseudo code of the offer-negotiation 
algorithm. 
1. Initializes a utility vector ሺሻto empty. 
2. Initializes the value of “Candidate” to zero. 
3. Computes the utility ൫୨൯ of each collected offer ൫ ௝ܺ൯, using the utility function 
discussed in Chapter 5, and then appends the computed utility ൫୨൯ to the utility 
vector ሺሻ. 
4. Ranks offers ( ௝ܺ) by their utilities (୨). 
5. Runs decision functions and decides whether to award the bid or proceed on 
negotiation. 
6. If the SPA agent decided to award the bid to the winning vendor (௪), then it sets 
(Candidate = 1) and runs the bid-award algorithm. But if the SPA agent did not 
award the bid and intends to proceed on the negotiation, then it performs the 
following: 
a. Short-lists offers of top utilities and the corresponding vendors. It then 
updates the agent itinerary vector (V) to only have the short-listed vendors 
and amends the client’s negotiation deadline ሺTENሻ. 
b. Chooses particular attributes it intends to negotiate with each short-listed 
vendor and generates a new Request for Offer (	௝) for each vendor to 
negotiateሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݊ሻ. It then appends (	௝) to RFO vector. 
c. Generates a tuple that includes the following parameters: 
	௝ሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݊ሻǡ ݎǡ TENǡ ܫ଴ǡ ܥ݀ǡ . It then signs the tuple with the 
private signing key of the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ) and then encrypts it with the 
public encryption key of the Trusted Server (ܭ்ௌା ). Next, it assigns the 
encrypted tuple to the verification attributes vector (Q). 
d. The SPA agent then generates a tuple that consists of the following:	௝ 
(attributes to negotiate with a short-listed vendor), protocol nonce (r), client’s 
amended negotiation deadline (TEN), hash of the identity of the client host 
h(݅଴), and the public encryption key of the Trusted Server (ܭ்ௌା ). It then 
encrypts the tuple with the public encryption key (ܭ௝ା) of the host of short-
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listed vendor (௝) and assigns the encrypted tuple to ൫ ௝ܻ൯. The SPA agent 
generates different tuples for the short-listed vendors. 
Algorithm offer-negotiation 
INPUT: X,ݎǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻǡ ܭ்ௌା  
OUTPUT: Candidate 
BEGIN 
 ึ ׎ 
Candidate = 0 
FOR ൫ ௝ܺ א ܺ൯DO 
୨ ึ Compute utility ( ௝ܺ) 
 ึ Append (୨) 
END FOR 
Ranks offers ( ௝ܺ) by (୨) 
Run decision function //making a decision on further negotiation or bid award 
IF ൫ሺ୵ሻ൯ THEN  
Candidate = 1 
ELSE 
 ึ Short-list vendors// only vendors to negotiate  
TEN ึ ሺTENሻ 
FOR ൫௝ א ൯ DO 
	௝ ึ Select attributes for negotiation with (௝) 
	 ึ ൫	௝൯ 
ܳ ึAmend 
(ܳሻ ึ ௄೅ೄశ ቀௌ௜௚೔బషభሺ	ǡ ݎǡ ாܶேǡ ܫ଴ǡ ܥ݀ǡ ሻቁ 
௝ ึ ௄ೕశ൫	௝ǡ ݎǡTENǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻǡ ܭ்ௌା ൯ 
 ึ ൫௝൯ 
ENDFOR 
ܺ ึ ׎ 
ܼ ึ ׎ 
V1 ึ (SNA, IRA)// host of the first short-listed vendor 
 ENDIF 
RETURN Candidate 
  END offer-negotiation 
Figure 6.7 Pseudo code of offer-negotiation of Round 3 of the security protocol 
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e. Appends each tuple ( ௝ܻ) to the RFO vector (ܻ). Clears the offer vector (X) and 
itinerary registry vector (Z) for storing new offers and the corresponding 
partial itinerary registry that will be collected from the short-listed vendors. 
f. Requests the Trusted Server (TS) to dispatch the SNA and IRA agents to the 
host of the first vendor in the short-listed vendors to be negotiated. 
13.  Return the value of “Candidate”. 
Bid-award algorithm: Upon achieving the utility the clients seeks, the following 
steps are carried out and are depicted in Figure 6.8 of the pseudo code of the bid-
award algorithm. 
1. The SPA agent performs as follows. 
a. Selects the winning vendor (Vw) and then deduces the name of the winning 
vendor (Iw). 
b. Encloses the client's name (ܫ଴) and client's contact details (Cd) with the offer 
of the winning vendor (ܺ୵) and then signs it with the private signing key of 
the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ). It then encrypts it with the public encryption key of 
the host of the winning vendor (ܭ୵ା). Next, it assigns the encrypted offer to 
(ܺ୵) and sends it with the SNA agent to the winning vendor host as a 
purchase order. It then waits for an acceptance from the winning vendor (Vw) 
on the purchase order. If the winning vendor accepts the purchase order, then 
it decrypts the purchase order with the private decryption key (ܭ୵ି) of its host 
and then encrypts with its public encryption key of the Trusted server (ܭ୘ୗା ). 
c. Upon receipt of acceptance from the winning vendor (Vw), the SPA agent 
sends a message to the PA agent requesting it to issue a payment order for the 
benefit of the winning vendor. The message includes: amount of money to be 
paid to the winning vendor (ܵ௔୵ሻ, name of winning vendor (ܫ୵), and protocol 
nonce (ݎ). The message is signed with the private signing key of the client 
host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ) and then encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of 
the client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ). The PA agent verifies that the protocol nonce 
enclosed in the received message matches the corresponding nonce it stores. 
If the verification passes, then it issues the payment order on behalf of the 
client and presents it to the client’s bank host ሺ஼஻ሻ. The order includes: 
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amount of money to be transferred to the winning vendor (ܵ௔୵), name of the 
winning vendor (ܫ୵), client’s name (I0), and client’s bank account details 
(Ad). The details include credit card number and security code.  
d. The client's bank host transfers the money to the winning vendor (ܫ୵) who 
subsequently delivers goods/services to the client (ܫ଴).  
Algorithm bid-award 
INPUT: Vw, Xw,஼஻, ܣ݀ǡ ܭ୵ାǡ ܭ஼஻ା ǡ ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ 
OUTPUT: Delivery 
BEGIN 
Delivery = False 
Select (Vw)// winning vendor  
Deduce (Iw)// name of winning vendor  
ܺ୵ ึ ௄౭శ ቆௌ௜௚೔బషభ ൬ܫ଴ǡ ܥ݀ ቀௌ௜௚౭షభሺܫ୵ǡ ሼܵ௔
୵ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠୵ሽǡ ݎǡ ݄ሺ݅଴ሻǡ ாܶ௏୵ ሻቁ൰ቇ 
୵ ึ ሺܺ୵ሻ // purchase order related to offer ሺܺ୵ሻ 
୵ ื௄౐౏శ ቀ௄౭షሺܺ୵ሻቁ //  (Vw) 
ǣ ൬௄಴ಳశ ቀௌ௜௚೔బషభሺܵ௔
୵ǡ ܫ୵ǡ ݎሻቁ൰ to PA agent 
PA agent verifies if nonce (r) enclosed in the message matches the nonce it stores  
஼஻ ึ  ൬௄಴ಳశ ቀௌ௜௚೔బషభሺܵ௔
୵ǡ ܫ୵ǡ ܣ݀ǡ ܫ଴ሻቁ൰//payment order by PA agent 
ܫ୵ ึ ሺܵ௔୵ሻ //money transfer by client’s bank host 
ܫ଴ ึ Ȁ // sent to client by ܫ୵ 
IF (goods/services delivered) THEN  
Delivery = True 
Terminate agents (SPA, SNA, IRA, PA) 
ENDIF 
RETURN Delivery 
END bid-award 
Figure 6.8 Pseudo code of bid-award of the Round 3 of the security protocol 
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e. Upon receipt of goods/services, the client notifies the IA agent that the 
request is completed successfully.  
f. The SPA agent sets the value of “Delivery” to True and returns the value of 
“Delivery”.  
2. The IA agent terminates the SPA, SNA, IRA, and PA mobile agents. 
The security protocol can be described by representing the messages exchanged 
between the negotiating entities (client host, vendor hosts, Trusted Server, and 
client's bank host) as depicted in Figure 6.9.  
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Figure 6.9 Messages exchanged in the security protocol 
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The sequence of processes of the bid-award phase is depicted in Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10 Bid-award phase 
6.7 Arguments on the Security the Proposed Protocol 
We show that the proposed protocol can achieve the aimed for security properties 
as follows. 
 
Claim 1: The proposed protocol ensures strong integrity. 
 
Proof: An adversary could violate the integrity of the data exchanged during e-Trade 
negotiation by performing any of the malicious actions outlined below. 
- Tampering with the following exchanged data: 
 
 Client's name (I0) 
 Client’s RFO (attributes, preferences, and constraints) 
 Client's bank account details (Ad) 
 Client's contact details (Cd) 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ that uniquely identifies a protocol run 
 Client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ 
 Identity of client host ሺ݅଴ሻ that initiated the RFO 
 Agent itinerary () 
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 Public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
 Attributes of a collected offer and the respective vendor's name 
 Identity of a visited vendor (Vj) 
 Attributes to negotiate with short-listed vendors 
 Name of the winning vendor ሺܫ௪ሻ 
 Attributes of a purchase order  
 Attributes of a payment order 
 
- Revealing the offer of a competing vendor and then submitting an offer that 
competes with it, or replacing the offer it has already submitted with a new 
competing offer. 
- Appending a fake offer. 
- Appending an offer illegally. 
- Truncating or deleting an offer of a competing vendor. 
The proposed security protocol ensures strong integrity by preventing/detecting 
any of the malicious actions as follows. 
 Tampering with data exchanged during negotiation 
- An intruder that intercepts the SNA agent would not be able to tamper with 
the following parameters, which are enclosed in each tuple ( ௝ܻ) of the RFO 
vector (Y):  
 Client's RFO 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ሺ݅଴ሻ 
 Public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Actually, the tuple ( ௝ܻ) is encrypted with the public encryption key ൫ܭ௝ା൯ 
of the host of vendor ൫௝൯ from which the SNA agent intends to collect an 
offer. Thus, the vendor host is the only one that can decrypt the tuple ( ௝ܻ) and 
have access to the parameters.  
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- An intruder that intercepts the SPA or PA agents would not be able to tamper 
with the following parameters, which are enclosed in the verification 
attributes vector ሺܳሻ or the bank account vector (H):  
 Client's RFO 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Client’s negotiation deadlineሺ ாܶேሻ 
 Client's name ሺܫ଴ሻ 
 Client's bank account details (Ad) 
 Client's contact details (Cd) 
 Agent itinerary ()  
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ൫ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ൯ 
Actually, the vector (Q) is encrypted with the public encryption key ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
of the Trusted Server. Thus, the Trusted Server (TS) is the only one that can 
decrypt the vector (Q) and it is assumed to be trusted. Also, the vector (H) is 
encrypted with the public encryption key ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ of the host of the client’s 
bank. Thus, the client’s bank is the only one that can decrypt the vector (H) 
and it is assumed to be trusted. The vectors will only be decrypted at the 
Trusted Server or client’s bank host and upon requests from the SPA and PA 
agents, respectively.  
- A non-trusted visited vendor (௝) may tamper with any of the following 
parameters, which are enclosed in each tuple (Yj) of the RFO vector (Y):  
 Client's RFO 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ 
 Public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Though, the tampering will be detected during the verifications carried out at 
the Trusted Server. Actually, the SPA agent verifies that the parameters 
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enclosed in each tuple ( ௝ܻ) match the corresponding parameters enclosed in 
verification attributes vector (Q). 
- An intruder that intercepts the SNA agent, or a non-trusted host that executes 
the agent would not be able to tamper with the following parameters, which 
are enclosed in a collected offer ൫ ௝ܺ൯:  
 Client’s 	௝ 
 Client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ 
 Vendor's name (ܫ௝) 
 Offer attributes ൛ܵ௔௝ǡ ڮ ǡ ܵ௠௝ ൟ 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ 
 End time of offer validity ( ாܶ௏
௝ ) 
 Identity of a visited vendor host, which is included as ሺܵ݅݃௝ି ଵሻ in its offer 
Actually, the offer ൫ ௝ܺ൯ is encrypted with the public encryption key ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
of the Trusted Server. Thus, the Trusted Server (TS) is the only one that can 
decrypt the offer ൫ ௝ܺ൯. The offer will only be decrypted at the Trusted Server 
and upon the request of the SPA agent. 
- An intruder that intercepts the IRA agent, or a non-trusted host that executes 
the agent would not be able to tamper with the following parameters, which 
are enclosed in each partial itinerary registry ൫ ௝ܼ൯ of the itinerary registry 
vector ሺܼሻ:  
 Identity of a visited vendor host, which is included as (௝) or ሺܵ݅݃௝ି ଵሻ in 
its partial itinerary registry 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ 
 Time ሺ ௝ܶሻ at which the host of vendor ൫௝൯ executed the SNA agent  
Actually, the partial itinerary registry ൫ ௝ܼ൯ is encrypted with the public 
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encryption key ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ of the Trusted Server. Thus, the Trusted Server (TS) is 
the only one that can decrypt the partial itinerary registry൫ ௝ܼ൯. The vector will 
only be decrypted at the Trusted Server and upon the request of the SPA 
agent. 
- An intruder that intercepts the SNA agent would not be able to tamper with 
the following parameters, which are enclosed in the purchase order ሺܺ୵ሻ:  
 Client's name ሺܫ଴ሻ 
 Client's contact details ሺܥ݀ሻ 
 Name of winning vendor ሺܫ௪ሻ 
 Attributes of the winning offer ሼܵ௔୵ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠୵ሽ 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ and ሺܵ݅݃௜బିଵሻ 
 End time of the validity ( ாܶ௏௪ ) of the winning offer  
 Identity of the host of the winning vendor, which is included as ሺܵ݅݃௪ିଵሻ 
Actually, the purchase order ሺܺ୵ሻ is encrypted with the public encryption 
key ሺܭ௪ାሻ of the host of the winning vendor. Thus, the host of the winning 
vendor (Vw) is the only one that can decrypt the purchase order ሺܺ୵ሻ and 
have access to the parameters. 
- An intruder that intercepts the PA agent would not be able to tamper with the 
following parameters, which are enclosed in the agent:  
 Protocol nonce ሺݎሻ 
 Client’s name (I0) 
 Client's bank account details (Ad) 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ሺܵ݅݃௜బିଵሻ 
Actually, the parameters are encrypted with the public encryption key of 
the host of the client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. Thus, the client's bank host is the only one 
that can decrypt the parameters.  The parameters will only be decrypted at the 
client’s bank host and upon the request of the PA agent. 
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- An intruder that intercepts the message, which the SPA agent sends to the PA 
agent requesting it to issue a payment order for the benefit of the winning 
vendor, would not be able to tamper with the following parameters, which are 
enclosed in the message:  
 Price of winning offer ሺܵ௔୵ሻ 
 Name of the winning vendor (ܫ௪) 
 Client's bank account details (r) 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ሺܵ݅݃௜బିଵሻ 
Actually, the message is encrypted with the public encryption key of the 
host of client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. Thus, the client's bank host is the only one that 
can decrypt the message. The message will only be decrypted at the client’s 
bank host and upon the request of the PA agent. 
 Revealing the offer of a competing vendor to submit an offer that competes with it  
A non-trusted visited vendor would not be able to perform the malicious act in 
two probable attack scenarios described below.  
Attack scenario (a): A non-trusted vendor (Vj) may try to reveal the offer of a 
competing vendor (Vk). The host of vendor (Vj) would first replace the public 
encryption key of the Trusted Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ, which is enclosed in the tuple (Yj), 
with the public encryption key of the host of a colluding vendor in the agent 
itinerary and then encrypt the tuple with the public key of the host of competing 
vendor. It then replaces the genuine tuple (Yk) with the new tuple and sends it 
with the SNA agent to the competing vendor (Vk). The vendor agent of vendor 
(Vk) would provide its offer ሺܺ௞ሻ encrypted with public encryption key of the 
host of colluding vendor. The host of the colluding vendor would then send the 
SNA agent back to the host of vendor (Vj). The host of vendor (Vj) then decrypts 
the offer of the competing vendor using the decryption key of the host of 
colluding vendor and reveals the offer ሺܺ௞ሻ of the competing vendor. It then 
encrypts the offer ሺܺ௞ሻ with the public encryption key of the Trusted 
Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. Finally, it submits a competitive offer or replaces the offer it has 
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already submitted with a new offer that competes with the offer of the competing 
vendor. 
Detection scheme: the malicious act would be detected during the verifications 
carried out at the Trusted Server. The SPA agent would find that the agent 
itinerary deduced from the offer vector (X) or itinerary registry vector (Z) does 
not match the agent itinerary deduced from the verification attributes vector ሺܳሻ. 
The vendor hosts are actually visited in a different sequence than that has been 
initially defined in the agent itinerary (), which is enclosed in the verification 
attributes vector ሺܳሻ. Also, the SPA agent would detect that a vendor host is 
visited twice, which conflicts with the protocol initial assumptions. 
Attack scenario (b): A severe colluding attack can take place and it has been hard 
to detect, if two non-trusted vendor hosts colluded in attacking the SNA agent. A 
vendor host may send the SNA agent to an earlier vendor host in the agent 
itinerary so as to replace its previous offer with a more competing offer. The 
earlier vendor host would truncate the offers collected from intermediary vendor 
hosts and replace the current dynamic data of the SNA agent with the data that 
the SNA agent had when it firstly visited the host; supposedly the vendor host 
had already stored the dynamic data including the register contents and stack.  
 
Detection scheme: The proposed protocol can detect the attack since the itinerary 
registry vector (Z) records the identities of the actually visited vendor hosts and 
the times at which the SNA agent got executed at the respective vendor hosts. 
During the itinerary verification phase, the SPA agent would find out that the 
SNA and IRA agents had stayed at a particular vendor host for a time longer than 
expected, and hence it suspects that a malicious act has taken place. A security 
mechanism that surely restrains the colluding attack is based on requesting each 
visited vendor host to clear its memory from any data acquired as a result of 
executing the SNA and IRA agents before the agents are dispatched to the 
succeeding vendor host in the agent itinerary. A non-trusted vendor host would 
not be able to replace the current dynamic data of the two agents with the data the 
agents had when they firstly visited the host. Thus, the colluding attack would not 
be possible. Nevertheless, non-trusted hosts may not respond to the clearing 
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request. A further security mechanism that can detect any denial of the clearing 
request is that each visited vendor host creates and signs the execution trace of 
the SNA and IRA agents at its host, and then stores it to be forwarded to the SPA 
agent upon request for verification purposes (Vigna, 1998). The execution trace 
would also help in detecting any tampering with agents’ dynamic data during the 
verification phase of negotiation. We recommend that the execution trace only 
includes the line of code of the clearing request; otherwise the trace would be 
extremely long and require large storage space at vendor hosts. It would also 
overburden the communication channels.  
 
 Appending a fake offer 
 
A visited vendor൫௝൯ cannot append a fake offer (Xj) as it has to sign the offer 
with its private signing key of its host ሺܵ݅݃௝ି ଵሻ and thus would be held 
responsible of the offer and cannot repudiate it. 
 
 Appending an offer illegally 
 
- An intruder cannot append an offer as the parameters it needs to prepare an 
offer are not available in plain-text. The parameters are enclosed in the tuple 
( ௝ܻ) of the RFO vector ሺܻሻ and are encrypted with the public encryption key 
of the host of vendor (௝), which is defined in the initial agent itinerary. The 
parameters are listed below. 
 
 Client's RFO 
 Client’s negotiation deadline ሺ ாܶேሻ 
 Protocol nonce (ݎሻ 
 Identity of the client host, which is included as ݄ሺ݅଴ሻ 
 Public encryption key of the Trusted Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
- An intruder may be able to append an offer illegally by colluding with a non-
trusted vendor host that has already been visited to learn the parameters 
needed to prepare an offer. Though, the act would be detected during the 
verifications carried out at the Trusted Server. The SPA agent will find out 
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that the agent itinerary deduced from the offer vector (X) or itinerary registry 
vector (Z) does not match the agent itinerary deduced from the verification 
attributes vector ሺܳሻ. The SPA agent will detect that the intruder is not 
among the vendor hosts that have been initially defined in the agent itinerary 
(), which is enclosed in the verification attributes vector ሺܳሻ. 
 
 Truncating or deleting an offer of a competing vendor 
The malicious act of an intruder or a non-trusted vendor that truncates or deletes 
an offer of a competing vendor host would be detected. The act would be 
detected during the verifications carried out at the Trusted Server. The SPA agent 
will find out that the agent itinerary deduced from the offer vector (X) does not 
match the agent itinerary deduced from the verification attributes vectorሺܳሻ. It 
will find out that an offer is missing from a particular vendor while it is among 
the vendors that have been initially defined in the agent itinerary (V), which is 
enclosed in the verification attributes vector (Q). It will also find out that the 
vendor host is among the visited vendor hosts, which are stored in the itinerary 
registry vector (Z) while its offer is missing.  
 
Claim 2: The proposed protocol ensures non-repudiation. 
 
Proof: The threat to the non-repudiation includes the following actions: 
- A vendor submits a fake offer and then repudiates it.  
- A vendor submits a partial itinerary registry and then repudiates it. 
- The client sends a Request for Offer (RFO) and then repudiates it. 
- The client requests a purchase and then repudiates it.  
- The client requests a payment order and then repudiates it.  
 
The proposed protocol prevents these threats from being materialized as follows. 
 
- Offer (Xj): a vendor agent signs the offer it submits with the private signing key 
(ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ) of the host of vendor (௝) and hence the vendor is held responsible of the 
offer and cannot repudiate it. 
- Partial itinerary registry (Zj): a vendor agent signs the partial itinerary registry it 
CHAPTER 6: Security Protocol for e-Trade Negotiation  
 
195 
 
submits with the private signing key (ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ) of the host of vendor (௝) and hence 
the vendor is held responsible of the partial itinerary registry and cannot 
repudiate it. 
- RFO vector ሺܻሻ: the client agent signs the RFO vector with the private signing 
key of its host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ) and hence the client is held responsible of the RFO vector 
and cannot repudiate it. 
- Purchase order: the SPA agent, which acts on behalf of the client, signs the 
purchase order with the private signing key of the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ) and hence 
the client is held responsible of the purchase order and cannot repudiate it. 
- Payment order: the PA agent, which acts on behalf of the client, signs the 
payment order with the private signing key of the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ) and hence 
the client is held responsible of the payment order and cannot repudiate it. 
 
 
Claim 3: The proposed protocol ensures anonymity of the client host and vendor 
hosts in the agent itinerary. 
 
Proof: The anonymity may be breached by the disclosure of the identity of the client 
host and identities of the visited vendor hosts. Also, the anonymity of the client and 
winning vendor may be breached by the disclosure of the client's name and name of 
winning vendor. 
 
The proposed protocol ensures complete anonymity of the client host and vendor 
hosts so that an executing host would not be able to reveal the identities of any 
proceeding or succeeding hosts in the agent itinerary as follows.  
 
A non-trusted host can learn the identities of vendor hosts in the agent itinerary by 
analyzing agent’s dynamic data just before and after the agent visited it. Also, the 
identity of the preceding host will be revealed on the network layer. Yang (2005) has 
developed the reversible-onion protocol to preserve the anonymity property; 
however the protocol cannot achieve the anonymity of the most recently visited 
host or the immediately succeeding host in the agent itinerary. The protocol can 
only achieve anonymity of non-neighbors hosts in the agent itinerary. It is true 
since any host would not accept to execute an anonymous agent unless it knows the 
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identity of the preceding host to ensure accountability of the agent for any 
malicious act it may perform at the host. Also, the host has to know the identity of 
the succeeding host in agent itinerary for agent migration purposes. Our security 
scheme to achieve complete anonymity is by encrypting the agent itinerary (V), 
which is stored in the verification attributes vector (Q), with the public key of the 
Trusted Server and dispatching the SNA, IRA and SPA agents initially to the Trusted 
Server. The server then decrypts the (Q) vector, which is enclosed with the SPA 
agent to reveal the agent itinerary and learn the identities of vendor hosts to which it 
should dispatch the SNA and IRA agents. The server then dispatches the SNA and 
IRA agents to the first vendor host in the agent itinerary. The server then removes the 
the vendor host from the agent itinerary and encrypts the resulting agent itinerary 
with its public encryption key. Next, the server stores the encrypted version of agent 
itinerary in its memory and clears up its connection table after it dispatches the SNA 
and IRA agents. The two agents would be moving back and forth between the 
Trusted Server and vendor hosts till all vendors in the agent itinerary are visited. The 
approach would lead to an increase in network latency and communication loads, but 
it is a practicable approach to ensure complete anonymity. The approach should only 
be implemented when the anonymity of the immediately preceding and succeeding 
hosts in the agent itinerary is critical. 
 
The proposed protocol also ensures the anonymity of the client host, where its 
identity is enclosed in the following: RFO vector ሺܻሻ, verification attributes vector 
(Q), offer vector (X), itinerary registry vector (Z), bank account vector (H), payment 
request, and purchase order as follows. 
 
- RFO vector ሺܻሻ: the identity of the client host is not enclosed in the tuple ൫ ௝ܻ൯ in 
plain-text but rather as a hash of its identity h(݅଴). Hence, the identity of the client 
host cannot be revealed.   
- Verification attributes vector (Q): the vector is signed with the private signing 
key of the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ); though its identity cannot be revealed as the signed 
vector is then encrypted with the public encryption key of the Trusted 
Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. Hence, the identity of the client host can only be deduced by the 
Trusted Server that has the private decryption key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ.  
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- Offer (X) vector: the identity of the client host is not enclosed in the offer (Xj) in 
plain-text but rather as a hash of its identity h(݅଴). Hence, the identity of the client 
host cannot be revealed.   
- Itinerary registry vector (Z): the identity of the client host is not enclosed in the 
partial itinerary registry (Zj) in plain-text but rather as a hash of its identity h(݅଴). 
Hence, the identity of the client host cannot be revealed.   
- Bank account vector (H): the vector is signed with the private signing key of the 
client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ); though its identity cannot be revealed as the signed vector is 
then encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of client’s bankሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. 
Hence, the identity of the client host can only be deduced by the host of the 
client’s bank that has the private decryption key ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. 
- Payment request: the request, which the SPA agent sends to the PA agent as a 
message, is signed with the private signing key of the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బ
ିଵ); though 
its identity cannot be revealed as the message is then encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. Hence, the identity of the client 
host can only be deduced by the host of client's bank that has the private 
decryption key ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. 
- Purchase order: the purchase order is signed with the private signing key of the 
client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ); though its identity cannot be revealed as the signed order is 
then encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of winning vendor 
ሺܭ௪ାሻ. Hence, the identity of the client host can only be deduced by the host of 
winning vendor that has the private decryption key ሺܭ௪ିሻ. 
 
The proposed security protocol also ensures the anonymity of a visited vendor 
host, where its identity is enclosed in its offer (Xj) and partial itinerary registry (Zj), 
and the purchase order it receives as follows. 
 
- Offer (Xj): the offer of a vendor is signed with the private signing key of its host 
(ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ); though its identity cannot be revealed as the signed offer is then 
encrypted with the public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. Hence, the 
identity of the vendor host can only be deduced by the Trusted Server that has the 
private decryption key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ. 
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- Partial itinerary registry (Zj): the partial itinerary registry of a vendor is signed 
with the private signing key of its host (ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ); though its identity cannot be 
revealed as the signed partial itinerary registry is then encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. Hence, the identity of the vendor 
host can only be deduced by the Trusted Server that has the private decryption 
key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ. 
- Purchase order (Xw): the purchase order is signed with the private signing key of the 
host of winning vendor (ܵ݅݃ௐିଵ); though its identity cannot be revealed as the signed 
purchase order is then encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of 
winning vendor ሺܭ௪ାሻ. Hence, the identity of the host of the winning vendor can 
only be deduced by its host that has the private decryption key ሺܭ௪ିሻ. 
The proposed protocol ensures the anonymity of the client's name, where it is 
enclosed in the verification attributes vector (Q), bank account vector (H), and 
purchase order as follows. 
- Verification attributes vector (Q): the client's name (ܫ଴) is encrypted with the 
public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. Thus, the client's name can 
only be deduced by the Trusted Server that has the private decryption key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ. 
- Bank account vector (H): the client's name (ܫ଴) is encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. Thus, the client's name can 
only be deduced by the host of client’s bank that has the private decryption key 
ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. 
- Purchase order (Xw): the client's name (ܫ଴) is encrypted with the public encryption 
key of the host of winning vendor ሺܭ୵ାሻ. Thus, the client's name can only be 
deduced by the host of winning vendor that has the private decryption key ሺܭ௪ିሻ. 
The proposed protocol ensures the anonymity of a vendor’s name, where it is 
enclosed in its offer (Xj) as follows. 
- Offer (Xj): the vendor's name (ܫ௝) is encrypted with the public encryption key of 
the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻǤ Hence, the vendor's name can only be deduced by the 
Trusted Server that has the private decryption key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ. 
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 The proposed protocol ensures the anonymity of the name of the winning vendor, 
where is enclosed in the purchase order, acceptance of purchase order, payment 
request, and payment order as follows. 
- Purchase order: the name of the winning vendor (ܫ୵) is encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of winning vendor ሺܭ௪ାሻ. Thus, the name of the 
winning vendor can only be deduced by the host of winning vendor that has the 
private decryption key ሺܭ௪ିሻ. 
- Acceptance of a purchase order: the name of the winning vendor (ܫ௪) is 
encrypted with the public encryption key of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻǤ Hence, the 
name of the winning vendor can only be deduced by the Trusted Server that has 
the private decryption key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ.  
- Payment request or payment order: the name of the winning vendor (ܫ୵) is 
encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of the client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. 
Thus, the name of the winning vendor can only be deduced by the host of client's 
bank that has the private decryption key ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. 
 
Claim 4: The proposed protocol ensures privacy of the data exchanged during e-
Trade negotiation. 
 
Proof: An intruder could breach the privacy by spying out negotiation data such as 
the attributes to negotiate with vendors, client’s bank account details, or attributes of 
collected offers. It could also breach the privacy of the attributes of the purchase 
order or payment order. The proposed security protocol prevents privacy breaches of 
the data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation as follows. 
 
- Negotiation attributes൫	௝൯: the attributes to negotiate with vendor (Vj), which 
are enclosed in the tuple (Yj), are encrypted with the public encryption key of the 
host of the respective vendor ൫ܭ௝ା൯. The attributes can only be decrypted by the 
host of intended vendor that has the private decryption key ൫ܭ௝ି ൯. Hence, the 
privacy of the attributes is preserved and the attributes would only be revealed to 
the host of vendor (Vj). 
- Client's bank account details (ܣ݀): the details, which are enclosed in the bank 
CHAPTER 6: Security Protocol for e-Trade Negotiation  
 
200 
 
account vector (H), are encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of 
client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. The account details can only be decrypted by the host of 
client’s bank that has the private decryption key ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. Hence, the privacy of the 
account details is preserved and the account details would only be revealed to the 
client’s bank (VCB). Also, the details (Ad) that are enclosed in the payment order 
are encrypted with the public encryption key of the host of client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. 
The attributes can only be decrypted by the host of client's bank that has the 
private decryption key ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. 
- Attributes of a collected offer ൛ܵ௔௝ǡڮ ǡ ܵ௠௝ ൟ: the attributes of an offer ൫ ௝ܺ൯, which a 
vendor agent provides, are encrypted with the public encryption key of the 
Trusted Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ. The attributes can only be decrypted by the Trusted Server 
that has the private decryption key ሺܭ்ௌିሻ. Hence, the privacy of the attributes is 
preserved and the attributes would only be revealed to the Trusted Server (TS). 
- Attributes of a purchase order: the attributes, which are enclosed in offer (Xw) and 
are sent to the winning vendor (ܫ୵), are encrypted with the public encryption key 
of the host of winning vendor ሺܭ௪ାሻ. The attributes can only be decrypted by the 
host of winning vendor that has the private decryption key ሺܭ௪ିሻ. Hence, the 
privacy of the attributes is preserved and the attributes would only be revealed to 
the host of winning vendor (Vw). 
- Attributes of a payment order: the attributes, which are sent to the client's bank 
host for the benefit of the winning vendor, are encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ. The attributes can only be 
decrypted by the client's bank that has the private decryption key ሺܭ஼஻ିሻ. Hence, 
the privacy of the attributes is preserved and the attributes would only be 
revealed to the host of client's bank (VCB).  
 
Claim 5: The proposed protocol hinders the security threats to authenticity. 
Proof: collected offers, payment orders, or purchase orders might be erroneously 
authenticated. 
 
The proposed protocol ensures accurate authentication as follows. 
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- Collected offer: without proper countermeasures, an intruder might intercept an 
offer signed by a vendor host and then strip off the vendor’s signature to sign it 
with its private signing key. Hence, the SPA agent, which acts on behalf of the 
client, would erroneously authenticate a signed offer. The proposed security 
protocol prevents this from occurring as a vendor agent signs the offer of its 
vendor (Vj) with the private signing key of its host ൫ܵ݅݃௝ି ଵ൯and then encrypts it 
with the public key of the Trusted Server (ܭ்ௌା ). Hence, an intruder would not be 
able to sign offers of other vendors with its private signing key. The SPA agent 
would only receive offers signed by the genuine vendor hosts. 
- Purchase order: without proper countermeasures, an intruder might intercept a 
purchase order signed by the client host and then strips off the signature of the 
client host to sign it with its private signing key. Hence, the host of the winning 
vendor would erroneously authenticate a signed purchase order. The proposed 
security protocol prevents this from occurring as the SPA agent, which acts on 
behalf of the client, signs the purchase order with the private signing key of the 
client host ൫ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ൯and then encrypts it with the public encryption key of the 
host of winning vendor (ܭ௪ା). Hence, an intruder would not be able to sign the 
client's purchase order with its private signing key. The host of the winning 
vendor would only receive purchase orders signed by the genuine client host. 
- Payment order: without proper countermeasures, an intruder might intercept a 
payment order signed by the client host and then strips off the signature of the 
client host to sign it with its private signing key. Hence, the client's bank host 
would erroneously authenticate a signed payment order. The proposed security 
protocol prevents this from occurring as the PA agent, which acts on behalf of the 
client, signs the payment order with the private signing key of the client host  
൫ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ൯and then encrypts it with the public encryption key of the host of client's 
bank (ܭ஼஻ା ). Hence, an intruder would not be able to sign the client’s payment 
order with its private signing key. The host of client's bank would only receive 
payment orders signed by the genuine client host. 
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6.8 The Protocol Security Scheme 
We summarize the security techniques the security protocol implements in Table 
6.2 that would prevent or at least detect any of the malicious acts of intruders and 
non-trusted hosts. 
 
Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
x Strong integrity 
- Tampering 
Prevented SNA 
agent  
The parameters are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
of the host of a vendor to be 
visited ൫ܭ௝ା൯ 
Intruder tampers with the 
parameters of the RFO 
vector ൫ ௝ܻ൯: client's RFOj, 
protocol nonce, client’s 
negotiation deadline, 
identity of the client host, or 
public encryption key of the 
Trusted Server 
Prevented SPA agent The parameters are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Intruder tampers with the 
parameters of the verification 
attributes vector (Q): client's 
FRO, protocol nonce, client’s 
negotiation deadline, client's 
name, client's contact details, 
agent itinerary,  or identity of 
the client host 
Detected  SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The parameters are verified at 
the Trusted Server (TS) with 
the corresponding parameters 
enclosed in the verification 
attributes vector (Q) 
Non-trusted vendor tampers 
with the parameters of the 
RFO vector (Yj): client's RFO, 
protocol nonce, client’s 
negotiation deadline, identity 
of the client host, or public 
encryption key of the Trusted 
Server 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
Prevented  SNA 
agent 
The parameters are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
of the Trusted Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Intruder or non-trusted vendor 
tampers with the parameters 
of an offer (Xj): RFOj, client’s 
negotiation deadline, vendor's 
name, attributes of the offer, 
protocol nonce, identity of the 
client host,  end time of offer 
validity, or identity of the 
vendor host 
Prevented  IRA 
agent 
The parameters are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
of the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Intruder or non-trusted vendor 
tampers with the parameters 
of a partial itinerary registry  
(Zj): identity of the vendor 
host, protocol nonce, identity 
of the client host, time at 
which the SNA agent got 
executed at the vendor host 
Prevented  SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The parameters are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
of the host of winning vendor 
ሺܭ௪ାሻ 
Intruder or non-trusted vendor 
tampers with the parameters 
of the purchase order (Xw): 
client's name, client's contact 
details, name of the winning 
vendor, attributes of the offer  
of the winning vendor, 
protocol nonce, identity of 
the client host, end time of 
validity of the offer, or 
identity of the host of 
winning vendor 
Prevented  PA agent The parameters are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
Intruder or non-trusted vendor 
tampers with the parameters 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
of the host of client's bank 
ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
of the payment order for the 
winning vendor: price of the 
offer, name of the winning 
vendor, client's bank account 
details, or identity of the 
client host  
- Revealing a competitive offer 
Detected SPA, SNA 
& IRA 
agents 
The verifications carried out at 
the Trusted Server (TS) would 
detect that the vendors are 
visited in a different sequence 
than that defined in the agent 
itinerary (V) and also the 
vendor is visited twice, which 
conflicts with the protocol 
initial assumptions 
Non-trusted vendor reveals 
the offer of  a competing 
vendor and submits a 
competitive offer, or  replaces 
the offer it has already 
submitted with a new offer 
that competes with it 
- Appending a fake offer 
Prevented  SNA 
agent 
The vendor has to sign its offer 
and is held responsible of the 
offer 
Non-trusted vendor appends a 
fake offer 
- Appending an offer illegally 
Prevented  SNA 
agent 
The parameters that are needed 
to prepare an offer are not 
available in plain-text 
Intruder appends an offer 
illegally 
Detected  SPA, 
SNA, & 
IRA 
agents 
The verifications carried out at 
the Trusted Server (TS) would 
detect that the actual agent 
itinerary does not match the 
initial agent itinerary. It also 
includes a vendor host, which 
has not been among the vendor 
hosts in the initial agent itinerary 
Intruder colludes with a non-
trusted vendor host that has 
already been visited to learn 
the parameters that are 
needed to prepare an offer 
illegally 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
- Truncating a competitive offer 
Detected  SPA, 
SNA, & 
IRA 
agents 
The verifications carried out at 
the Trusted Server (TS) would 
detect that the actual agent 
itinerary does not match the 
initial agent itinerary. It finds 
out that an offer of a vendor is 
missing while it has been 
among the vendors in the 
initial agent itinerary and also 
the vendor is among the  
visited vendor hosts in the 
itinerary registry vector (Z) 
 Truncate or delete an offer of 
a competing vendor 
x Non-repudiation 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
Vendor agent has to sign the 
offer with the private signing 
key of its host 
 A vendor agent submits a 
fake offer and then repudiates 
it 
Prevented IRA agent Vendor agent has to sign the 
partial itinerary registry with 
the private signing key of its 
host 
 A vendor agent submits a 
partial itinerary registry and 
then repudiates it 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
Client host has to sign the 
RFO with its private signing 
key 
Client sends a RFO and then 
repudiates it 
Prevented  SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The SPA agent has to sign the 
purchase order with the private 
signing key of the client host 
Client sends a purchase order 
and then repudiates it 
Prevented PA agent The PA agent has to sign the 
payment order with the private 
signing key of the client host 
Client sends a payment order 
and then repudiates it 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
x Anonymity 
- Client host 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
The identity of the client host  is 
not enclosed in plain-text but 
rather as a hash of its identity  
 Disclosed from the RFO 
vector ሺܻሻ 
 
Prevented SPA agent The verification attributes 
vector (Q) is signed with the 
private signing key of the 
client host and is then 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the Trusted 
Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Disclosed from the 
verification attributes vector 
(Q) 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
The identity of the client host  
is not enclosed in plain-text 
but rather as a hash of its 
identity 
Disclosed from the offer 
vector (X) 
Prevented IRA agent The identity of the client host  
is not enclosed in plain-text 
but rather as a hash of its 
identity  
Disclosed from the itinerary 
registry vector (ܼ) 
Prevented PA agent The vector (H) is signed with 
the private signing key of the 
client host and is then 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of 
client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
Disclosed from the bank 
account vector (H) 
Prevented SPA agent The request is signed with the 
private signing key of the client 
host and is then encrypted with 
the public encryption key of the 
host of client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
Disclosed from the payment 
request 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
Prevented SPA and 
SNA 
agents 
The purchase order that is 
signed with the private signing 
key of the client host is then 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of  
winning vendor ሺܭௐାሻ 
Disclosed from the purchase 
order (Xw) 
Prevented PA agent The payment order that is 
signed with the private signing   
of the client host is then 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of 
client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
Disclosed from the payment 
order 
- Negotiated vendor hosts 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
The offer that is signed with 
the private signing key of the 
host of vendor is then 
encrypted with public key of 
the Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
 Disclosed from the offer 
vector (X) 
 
Prevented IRA agent The partial itinerary registry 
that is signed with the private 
signing key of the host of 
vendor is then encrypted with 
public key of the Trusted 
Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
 Disclosed from the offer 
vector (Z) 
Prevented SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The purchase order that is 
signed with the private signing 
key of the host of winning 
vendor is then encrypted with 
public key of the host of  
winning vendor ሺܭௐାሻ 
Disclosed from the purchase 
order (Xw) 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
- Client's  name 
Prevented SPA agent The client's name (ܫ଴) is 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the Trusted 
Server  ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Disclosed from the 
verification attributes vector 
(Q) 
Prevented PA agent The client's name (ܫ଴) is 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of 
client’s bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
Disclosed from the bank 
account vector (H) 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
The client's name (ܫ଴) is 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host 
winning vendor ሺܭ୵ାሻ 
Disclosed from the purchase 
order (Xw) 
- Vendor’s name 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
vendor's name (ܫ௝) is 
 encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the 
Trusted Server ሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Disclosed from the Offer (Xj) 
- Name of the winning vendor 
Prevented SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The name of the winning 
vendor (ܫ୵) is encrypted 
with the public encryption 
key of the host of winning 
vendor ሺܭ௪ାሻ. 
Disclosed from the purchase 
order 
Prevented SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
the name of the winning 
vendor (ܫ௪) is encrypted 
with the public encryption 
key of the Trusted Server 
ሺܭ்ௌା ሻǤ  
Disclosed from the 
acceptance of a purchase 
order 
Prevented SPA & 
PA agents 
The name of the winning 
vendor (ܫ୵) is encrypted with 
the public encryption key of the 
host of client's bank ሺܭେ୆ା ሻ 
Disclosed from the payment 
request or payment order 
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Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
x Privacy 
Prevented SNA 
entga
The attributes to negotiate with 
each vendor agent  are 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of 
respective vendor  
 Spy out the attributes to be 
negotiated with short-listed 
vendors 
Prevented PA agent 1. Client's bank account details, 
which are enclosed in the 
bank account vector (H),  
are encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of 
client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
- Spy out the client's bank 
account details 
 
Prevented PA agent 2. Client's bank account details, 
which are enclosed in the 
payment order are encrypted 
with the public encryption key 
of the host of client's bank 
ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
Prevented SNA 
agent 
The attributes of a collected 
offer are encrypted with the 
public encryption key of the 
Trusted Serverሺܭ்ௌା ሻ 
Spy out the attributes of a 
collected offer 
Prevented SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The attributes of the purchase 
order are encrypted with the 
public encryption key of the 
host of winning vendor ሺܭ௪ାሻ 
Spy out the attributes of a 
purchase order 
Prevented PA agent 
The attributes of the payment 
order are encrypted with the 
public encryption key of the 
host of client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ሻ 
Spy out the attributes of a 
payment order  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: Security Protocol for e-Trade Negotiation  
 
210 
 
Table 6.2 Security threats and protocol's implemented security mechanisms 
Prevented/
Detected 
Agent-in-
charge 
Security Mechanism   Security Threat 
x  Authenticity 
Prevented SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The offer that is signed with 
the private signing key of the 
vendor host is then encrypted 
with public key of the Trusted 
Server  (ܭ்ௌା ) 
 The client erroneously 
authenticates a collected 
signed offer 
Prevented SPA & 
SNA 
agents 
The purchase order that is 
signed with the private signing 
key of the client host is then 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of 
the winning vendor (ܭ௪ା) 
The winning vendor  host 
erroneously authenticates a  
signed purchase order  
Prevented PA agent The payment order that is 
signed with the private signing 
key of the client host is then 
encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the host of  
client's bank ሺܭ஼஻ା ) 
The client's bank host 
erroneously authenticates a 
signed payment order 
6.9 Efficiency of the Security Protocol  
The proposed protocol does not require complex and intensive computations. The 
communication and processing costs and time incurred are nominal. It only applies 
moderately intensive computations (encryption and decryption) to the data 
exchanged during negotiation so as to accomplish the required security properties. 
Also, the offer of a vendor only consists of fundamental data: vendor's name, offer 
attributes, freshly generated random nonce identifying the protocol run, hash of the 
identity of the client host, and end time of the validity of the offer. Also, the partial 
itinerary registry only consists of fundamental data: (a) identity of a visited vendor 
host; (b) freshly generated random nonce identifying the protocol run; (c) hash of the 
identity of the client host; (d) time at which a vendor host executed the SNA agent. 
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The proposed protocol facilitates the verification process by carrying out the 
verifications at a Trusted Server (TS) rather than at the client host. The initial 
verification parameters: client's RFO (attributes, preferences, and constraints), 
freshly generated random nonce identifying a protocol run, client’s negotiation 
deadline, client's name, client's bank account details, client's contact details, and 
agent itinerary are signed by the client host and are then encrypted with the public 
encryption key of the Trusted Server. Thus, these parameters can only be decrypted 
by the Trusted Server, which would provide a secure environment for verifications of 
the collected offers.  
 
The proposed security protocol utilizes multiple negotiating mobile agents to 
ensure the security of data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation, negotiation 
strategies, and decision making functions. The security is preserved by splitting 
critical and non-critical negotiation data and functions among four mobile agents: 
Supervisor agent (SPA), Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA), Itinerary Registry 
Agent (IRA), and Purchasing Agent (PA). The Supervisor Agent securely stores 
verification attributes and controls the negotiation processes that include: verification 
and ranking of the collected offers, negotiation with vendor agents, decision making, 
and issuing purchase orders and payment orders. Also, it securely stores negotiation 
strategies, tactics, and decision functions. The SNA agent stores the client's RFO and 
collected offers. The IRA agent keeps a track of any visited vendor host. The PA 
securely stores the bank account details of the client. 
 
The proposed security protocol does not require complex coordination between 
the SPA, SNA, IRA, and PA agents. The SNA and IRA agents only present 
search/negotiation outcomes to the SPA agent at the Trusted Server. The SPA agent 
only integrates the results of the SNA and IRA agents at the Trusted Server and 
provides advices to the SNA agent on the appropriate strategy and tactics, attributes 
to negotiate in the next negotiation round, and short-listed vendors. The SPA agent 
just sends a message to the PA agent requesting it to issue a payment order for the 
benefit of the winning vendor 
 
The SPA agent, which acts on behalf of the client, carries out multiple 
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verifications on the collected offers before it ranks the collected offers and makes a 
decision on the winning offer. The verifications are accurate as an offer would only 
be accepted if the verifications show the following:  
- The offer is generated for the genuine client host.  
- The offer satisfies the attributes, preferences and constraints of client's RFO. 
- The offer belongs to the protocol run identified by the protocol nonce. 
 
Also, the collected offers would not be considered if the verifications detect any 
integrity attack to the exchanged data such as tampering with the parameters of RFO, 
illegal insertion of an offer, deletion or truncation of a collected offer, or submission 
of an offer after revealing an offer of a competitive vendor.  
 
The security protocol prevents the security attacks that includes: (a) breach of 
privacy of exchanged data, (b) erroneous authentication or repudiation of client's 
RFO, offers, purchase order, and payment order, (c) disclosure of identities of the 
client and negotiated vendors, (d) tampering with verification attributes, attributes of 
the collected offers, attributes of purchase order, or attributes of payment order. 
 
Last but not least, the security protocol would not result in money frittering, 
commonly induced by different malicious acts of intruders and non-trusted vendor 
hosts including: (1) tampering with the client's RFO or collected offers; (2) breach of 
the privacy of the collected offers, client's bank account details, or negotiated 
attributes; (3) erroneous authentication of the client and negotiated vendors; (4) 
disclosure of identities of the client and negotiated vendors. 
6.10 Summary 
The security of negotiation has not addressed adequately in the literature as discussed 
in Section 3 of Chapter 2. Some efforts have been on the privacy of contracts and the 
security of bank transactions. In this chapter, we proposed a security protocol for 
MA-based e-Trade negotiation. The security protocol considers various threats to the 
security of data exchanged during negotiation and aims for preventing or at least 
detecting any of the security threats. The security protocol incorporates a set of the 
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security mechanisms that were discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 2 including: (a) 
deployment of four cooperative mobile agents; (b) splitting critical and non-critical 
negotiation data and functions among the four agents; (c) carrying out sensitive 
processes such as offer verifications at a Trusted Server; (d) implementing 
encryption methods for preserving the security properties of data exchanged during 
negotiation; (e) securely storing a record of the actual agent itinerary with the IRA 
agent including the identities of visited vendor hosts and the times at which the SNA 
agent got executed at the respective vendor hosts, for the purpose of detecting 
truncation attacks at the verification phase of negotiation; (f) binding a collected 
offer to initial negotiation parameters including: a protocol nonce, identity of client 
host, client’s negotiation deadline and the Request for Offer of concern for detecting 
integrity attacks during the verification phase of negotiation; (g) securely storing 
initial negotiation parameters for detecting data masquerading or tampering attacks at 
the verification phase of negotiation. Also, further security mechanisms are proposed 
that ensure: (1) absolute anonymity of the client host and all vendor hosts in the 
agent itinerary including the most recently visited host and the immediately 
succeeding host; (2) resilience to severe colluding attacks that have been difficult to 
detect by the existing security protocols. The mechanisms include: (a) revealing the 
agent itinerary only to the Trusted Server that would handle the agent migration and 
clear the identity of the preceding host from the connection table; (b) requesting each 
visited vendor host to clear its memory from any data acquired as a result of 
executing the mobile agents before the mobile agents are dispatched to the 
succeeding vendor host in the agent itinerary; (c) requesting each visited vendor host 
to create and sign an execution trace of the agents that shows if the agents’ dynamic 
data has been replaced or any denial of the clearing request has taken place. The 
protocol is reasoned for the various security threats and the security measures that 
can surely prevent or detect the corresponding security threats are highlighted. The 
security protocol has appropriate security measures that can accurately maintain the 
various security properties including strong integrity, privacy, authenticity, non-
repudiation, and anonymity of data exchanged during negotiation. The protocol can 
also recover from malicious attacks of non-trusted hosts that might capture the SNA 
agent and prevent it from completing its task. The protocol would utilize the offers 
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that have been provided to the SPA agent prior to the attack.  The protocol does not 
need complex and intensive calculations and only includes the fundamental data. The 
protocol provides a secure environment for conducting e-Trade negotiation. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Formal Verification of Security 
Protocol 
 
 
 
Formal methods have been successfully employed in the verification of the security 
properties. The purpose of this chapter is to prove that the proposed negotiation 
security protocol discussed in Chapter 6 accomplishes the aimed for security 
properties of data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation. To this end, we model the 
proposed protocol, specify the security properties of the protocol, and present a 
formal proof that the proposed protocol is free of security flaws (Jaljouli & Abawajy, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c). The verification results assert that the proposed security 
protocol accomplishes the aimed for security properties of data exchanged during e-
trade negotiation. 
7.1   STA and Existing Formal Methods 
In Section 4.5 of Chapter 2, we discussed the different formal methods and their 
characteristics. We utilize the STA (Symbolic Trace Analyzer) tool in the analysis of 
the proposed security negotiation protocol (Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b; Boreale, 
2001; STA documentation, 2001). It is based on infinite-state exploration methods. It 
is a simple and an efficient tool for the analysis of security protocols. It is 
characterized by the following (Jaljouli, 2006b): 
 
 It avoids state explosion problem that exists in other formal methods, e.g. model 
checker and process algebra (Durante et al., 2000). The analysis is based on 
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symbolic techniques that formulate security properties such that every input 
action leads to a single output action (Boreale & Gorla, 2002; Boreale & 
Buscemi, 2002b). 
 It does not require acquaintance with logic theories or expert guidance as 
theorem proving (Aziz et al., 2001; Durante et al., 2000). 
 
 It does not require modeling the intruder explicitly as opposed to model checker 
methods (Boreale & Gorla, 2002; Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b; Mitchell et al., 
1997).  
 
 The verification is automatic and does need hand-written proofs as modal logic or 
process algebra (Durante et al., 2000). 
7.2 Syntax of STA Automatic Verifier 
The syntax of the STA (STA Documentation, 2001) is similar to the syntax of 
Spi-calculus (Abadi & Gordon, 1999) with minor differences and is shown in 
Table 7.1.  
 
In the STA, a security protocol can be specified using four kinds of declarations 
(STA Documentation, 2001). The syntax of the declarations is given Table 7.2 and 
the declarations are defined below.  
▪  Identifiers are such as names, variables, and labels. A name refers to an 
encryption key, identity of a participating host, or the data generated at a host. A 
variable refers to a received term that might differ from the genuine transmitted term 
due to malicious acts of intruders. A label refers to I/O action. The rules of declaring 
identifiers are: (a) Names start with a capital letter; (b) Variables start with one of the 
letters u, x, y, w or z; (c) Labels may have any of the remaining letters. 
▪ Process is the honest behavior of a trusted host. It can be declared as val Pr = P; 
where P refers to the sequence of I/O actions at host Pr. 
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Table 7.1 Syntax of the STA 
K new_in  
a! M 
Fresh name  
Message transmitted through an output channel (a!) 
a? x Variable (x) received through an input channel (a?) 
Stop Terminated process 
>> Sequence of actions 
P1 || P2 Parallel composition of the processes P1 and P2 
(M is N) Equality test of the terms M and N 
(M1, M2)  Pairing of the terms M1 and M2 
.(M)^+K  
(M)^+SigK 
Asymmetric encryption of M with the public key +K 
Digital signing of M with the private signing key +SigK 
hsh (M) Hash of the term M 
M pkdecr (x, -K) Decrypting the message M with the public key –K, 
then binding the result to the variable x (asymmetric 
decryption) 
M pkdecr (x, -SigK) Decrypting the message M with the signature 
verification key –SigK, then binding the result to the 
variable x  (asymmetric decryption) 
 
▪  Configuration is a pair of initial environment’s knowledge (s) and a description of 
processes at a trusted host (Pr). It can be declared as val Conf = (L @ Pr); where L 
refers to the initial environment’s knowledge representing the intruder’s knowledge. The 
parameter Pr refers to a process or the parallel composition of declared processes. 
 
▪  Property is security property that is modeled as a correspondence assertion where every 
instance of an output action (B) in an execution trace should be preceded by the 
corresponding instance of an input action (A). A property can be declared as val Prop = 
(AmB); 
 
The STA command to analyze a security property is: CHECK Conf Prop. STA 
would report “No attack was found” if no attack against a particular security property 
exists; otherwise it reports an execution trace of the attack that breached the security 
property. 
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Table 7.2 STA declarations 
Identifiers 
Named 
Variables 
Labels 
 
DecName $ K1, K2, … , Km $;  
DecVar $ x1, x2, … , xr $; 
DecLabel $ a1, a2, … , an $;  
Processes val Pr = P; 
Configuration val Conf = (L @ Pr); 
Properties val Prop = (AmB); 
7.3 Modeling the Protocol Formally 
The STA does not require any assumptions on the possible actions of intruders. It 
only requires specifying the initial knowledge of intruders (Boreale & Buscemi, 
2002a; Fiore & Abadi, 2001). It implements symbolic trace analysis, which 
considers that every input action should be preceded by a single output action.  
 
We carried out the verification for a particular instance of the proposed 
security negotiation protocol. We tried to select a reasonable instance size that 
would not slow down the execution of the model and at the same time allow for 
the analysis of the various malicious acts of intruders, particularly colluding 
attacks. The instance consists of six participating hosts: client host, three vendor 
hosts, Trusted Server, and client’s bank host. It is recommended to avoid large 
number of participants as the number of the corresponding identifiers would 
increase and the execution slows down (Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b). The choice of 
three vendor hosts is made to allow for the colluding attack. For example, the first 
and third vendor hosts might be malicious and try to attack the offer provided by 
the second vendor. An instance of two vendor hosts only would not allow for the 
colluding attack. It is assumed that any of the vendor hosts can be malicious and 
may individually try to attack the data exchanged during negotiation. A malicious 
vendor host may try to perform any of the following malicious acts: (1) amend the 
offer it already provided; (2) delete the offers acquired at intermediate vendor 
hosts; (3) spy out any of the collected offers; (4) insert fake offer into the gathered 
offers; (5) truncate the trailing offers; (6) append arbitrary offer; (7) impersonate 
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the genuine client host; (8) spy out some of the negotiation confidential data; (9) 
tamper with the Request for Offer (RFO), purchase order, or payment order.  
 
The model we considered is depicted in Figure 7.1. It is composed on client host, 
three vendor hosts, Trusted Server, and client’s bank host. Firstly, the Request for Offer 
(RFO) is initialized by the client host and then the SPA and PA agents are dispatched to 
the Trusted Server (TS) and host of client’s bank (VCB), respectively. The SNA and IRA 
agents are dispatched to hosts of potential vendors (V1, V2, V3) to collect offers. Upon 
the completion of offer collection, the SNA and IRA agents are then dispatched to the 
Trusted Server. The two agents provide search outcomes to the SPA agent, which is 
responsible of integration and verification of the collected offers and short-listing 
vendors. Next, the SNA and IRA agents migrate to the hosts of short-listed vendors (V1, 
V3) and then return to the Trusted Server. The two agents provide negotiation outcomes 
to the SPA agent, which integrates and verifies the collected offers and makes a decision 
on the winning vendor. The SNA agent is then sent with a purchase order to the host of 
the winning vendor and then collects an acceptance/rejection from the winning vendor 
on the purchase order. Finally, the SPA agent requests the PA agent to issue a payment 
order for the benefit of the winning vendor and accordingly the PA agent issues a 
payment order to the client’s bank on behalf of the client. The protocol is modeled as 
input/output actions at the hosts that are involved in the negotiation process. The 
input/output actions are depicted in Figure 7.1. 
For illustration, the I/O actions at the host of vendor V2 are: b1? is an input 
action, and b2! is an output action. An example of the disclose output action is 
disclose!(Rold), which denotes an output action that leaks the old nonce Rold to the 
environment. The action would represent the initial environment’s knowledge.  
 
In STA, an identifier that begins with x, y, z, or w is a variable representing a 
received term that might differ from the originally sent term due to malicious acts 
of adversaries (Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b). For example, M1 is a name that host A 
transmits to host B, then the name would be received at host B as a variable 
denoted as yM1. Figure 7.2 lists the notations of labels and names, which are used 
in the STA script for specifying and modeling the security protocol. 
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s6!
V1
V3
V2
Hosts of potential vendors
Hosts of short-listed vendors
Host of winning 
vendor
Client host Trusted Server
 i1!
 
a1?
 a4!
c2!
 b1?
 a2!
 b2!
 c1?
 s1?
V1
V3
 s2!  a3?
 
c3?
  c4! s3?
  c5? s4!
V3
  c6! s5?
 d1? Client’s bank host
 
Figure 7.1 Input/output actions of an instance of the verified protocol 
Labels  
i1 (I/O) actions at the client host  
a1, a2, a3, a4 (I/O) actions at the host of vendor V1 
b1, b2 (I/O) actions at the host of vendor V2 
c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6 (I/O) actions at the host of vendor V3 
s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6 (I/O) actions at the Trusted Server  
d1 (I/O) actions at client’s bank host  
guard? Input action ‘guardian’ that can detect if the 
environment learns some of confidential data 
disclose! Output action that leaks some sensible data to 
the environment 
Figure 7.2 Notations of labels and names in the STA script of the protocol 
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Names 
V1, V2, V3  
 
V1, V3 
 
I1, I2, I3  
R, Rold  
 
I  
I0  
hsh(I)  
Ad  
Cd  
+SigI, +SigV1, +SigV2, +SigV3  
 
+KCB, +KTS, +KV1, +KV2, +KV3 
 
-SigI, -SigV1, -SigV2, -SigV3  
 
RFO  
 
RFO1, RFO3  
 
 
Tn  
 
Tn'  
 
Te1. Te2, Te3  
 
Potential vendors (V1, V2, V3) in Round 1 of 
the protocol 
Short-listed vendors (V1, V3) in Round 2 of  
the protocol 
Names of potential vendors (V1, V2, V3) 
A freshly generated protocol nonce (r) and an  
old nonce 
Identity of the client host  
Client’s name 
hash of the identity of client host  
Client’s bank account details (Ad) 
Client's contact details (Cd) 
Private signing keys of the client host and 
hosts of potential vendors, respectively 
Public encryption key of hosts of VCB, VTS, V1, 
V2, and V3 respectively 
Signature verification keys of the client host 
and hosts of potential vendors,, respectively 
Request for Offer (RFO) the client sets for  
biding and negotiation 
New Request for Offer to negotiate with the  
short-listed vendor  V1 and V3,  
respectively 
Client’s negotiation deadline ( ாܶே) for Round 1  
of the protocol 
Client’s amended negotiation deadline for  
Round 2 of the protocol  
Times at which the SNA agent got executed 
at hosts of potential vendors  V1, V2, and V3, 
respectively in Round 1 of the protocol 
Figure 7.2 Notations of labels and names in the STA script of the protocol (Contd.) 
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Names 
T'e1, T'e3 Times at which the SNA agent got executed 
at the hosts of short-listed vendors V1 and V3, 
respectively in Round 2 of the protocol 
Ma1, Mb1, Mc1  Attributes of the offer of vendor (V1) in 
Round 1 
Ma2, Mb2, Mc2 Attributes of the offer of vendor (V2) in 
Round 1 
Ma3, Mb3, Mc3 Attributes of the offer of vendor (V3) in 
Round 1 
M'a1, M'b1, M'c1 Attributes of the new offer of vendor (V1 ) in 
Round 2 
M'a3, M'b3, M'c3 Attributes of the new offer of vendor (V3 ) in 
Round 2 
Tv1, Tv2, Tv3 End time of the validity of the offers of 
vendors V1, V2, and V3, respectively in 
Round 1 of the protocol 
T'v1, T'v3 End time of the validity of the new offers of 
short-listed vendors V1 and V3, respectively 
in Round 2 of the protocol 
Figure 7.2 Notations of labels and names in the STA script of the protocol (Contd.) 
7.3.1   Modeling the System 
The declarations of labels, names, and variables used in the STA script of the proposed 
protocol are as given in Figure 7.3. 
 
DeclLabel $ i1, a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, d1,     
 disclose, guard $ ; 
 
DeclName  $ SigI, SigV1, SigV2, SigV3,  
  I, V1, V2, V3,  
Figure 7.3 Declaration of labels, names, and variables of the protocol 
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  I0, I1, I2, I3  
  KCB, KTS, KV1, KV2, KV3,  
  RFO, R, Rold, Tn, Ad, Cd,   
  Te1, Ma1, Mb1, Mc1, Tv1,  
  Te2, Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, Tv2, 
  Te3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, Tv3, 
  RFO1, RFO3, Tn', 
  T'e1, M'a1, M'b1, M'c1, T'v1, 
  T'e3, M'a3, M'b3, M'c3, T'v3 $; 
 
 
DeclVar $   y, 
  xRFO, xR, xTn, xI0, xAd, xI, 
  yRFO, yR, yTn, yV1, yI, 
  yTe1, yTv1, yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yI1, 
  zRFO, zR, zTn, zV1, zV2, zI, 
  zTe1, zTv1, zMa1, zMb1, zMc1, zI1, 
  zTe2, zTv2, zMa2, zMb2, zMc2, zI2, 
  uRFO, uR, uTn, uI0, uCd, uI,  
  uV1, uTe1, uTv1, uMa1, uMb1, uMc1, uI1, 
  uV2, uTe2, uTv2, uMa2, uMb2, uMc2, uI2, 
  uV3, uTe3, uTv3, uMa3, uMb3, uMc3, uI3, 
  wRFO1, wRFO3, wR, wTn', wI, 
  vRFO1, vRFO3, vR, vTn', vI,  
  vV1, vT'e1, vI1, vM'a1, vM'b1, vM'c1, vT'v1,  
  nI0, nCd, nI3, nM'a3, nM'b3, nM'c3, nR, nI, nT'v3, 
  rM'a3, rI3, rR, 
  sRFO1, sRFO3, sR, sTn', sI,   
  sM'a1, sM'b1, sM'c1, sT'v1, sT'e1, sV1, sI1,  
  sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sT'v3, sT'e3, sV3, sI3, 
  w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8,  
  w'1, w'2, w'3, w'4, w'5, w'6, w'7, w'8  $; 
Figure 7.3 Declaration of labels, names and variables of the protocol (Contd.) 
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 The declaration of the I/O actions at the client host (I) is as given in Figure 7.4. 
The declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V1) is given in Figure 7.5. 
The declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V2) is given in Figure 7.6. 
The declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V3) is given in Figure 7.7. 
 
 
val iI = RFO new_in R new_in Tn new_in Ad new_in Cd new_in V1 new_in V2 
  new_in V3 new_in I0 new_in I new_in   
              i1!((( RFO, R, Tn, I0, Cd, V1, V2, V3)^+SigI)^+KTS), 
              (((R, I0, Ad)^+SigI)^+KCB), 
  (((RFO, R, Tn, hsh(I), KTS)^+KV1), ((RFO, R, Tn, hsh(I), KTS)^+KV2),  
  ((RFO, R, Tn, hsh(I), KTS)^+KV3))) >> stop; 
Figure 7.4 Declaration of the I/O actions at the client host (I) 
val ven1 = Te1 new_in Ma1 new_in Mb1 new_in Mc1 new_in Tv1 new_in 
                  T'e1 new_in M'a1 new_in M'b1 new_in M'c1 new_in T'v1 new_in  
    V1 new_in I1 new_in 
                  a1?(((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV1),  
                        ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV2),  
((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV3)) >> 
                  a2!(((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV1),  
   ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                       ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV3), 
   (((V1, xR, xI, Te1)^+SigV1)^+KTS),  
                       ((xRFO, xTn, I1, Ma1, Mb1, Mc1, xR, xI, Tv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS) >> 
                  a3?((wRFO1, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                        (wRFO3, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV3) 
                  a4!(((wRFO1, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                       ((wRFO3, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV3), 
                       (((V1, wR, wI, T'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS), 
                       ((wRFO1, wTn', I1, M'a1, M'b1, M'c1, wR, wI, T'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS) 
 >>  stop; 
Figure 7.5. Declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V1)  
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val ven2 =  Te2 new_in Ma2 new_in Mb2 new_in Mc2 new_in Tv2 new_in  
   V2 new_in I2 new_in 
                    b1? (((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV1), 
    ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                           ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV3), 
    (((yV1, yR, yI, yTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS),  
                           ((yRFO, yTn, yI1, yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yR, yI, yTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS)                   
     >> 
                    b2! (((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                          ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV2), 
      ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV3), 
      ((yV1, yR, yI, yTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
    ((yRFO, yTn, yI1, yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yR, yI, yTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                          ((V2, yR, yI, Te2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
                          ((yRFO, yTn, I2, Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, yR, yI, Tv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS)  
>> stop; 
Figure 7.6. Declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V2) 
 
val ven3 = Te3 new_in Ma3 new_in Mb3 new_in Mc3 new_in Tv3 new_in  
    V3 new_in I3 new_in T'e3 new_in M'a3 new_in M'b3 new_in 
    M'c3 new_in T'v3 new_in  
                  c1?((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV1,                        
                        ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV2),  
    ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV3),  
                        ((zV1, zR, zI, zTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                        ((zRFO, zTn, zI1, zMa1, zMb1, zMc1, zR, zI, zTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                        ((zV2, zR, zI, zTe2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,   
                           ((zRFO, zTn, zI2, zMa2, zMb2, zMc2, zR, zI, zTv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS) 
    >> 
                  c2!(((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV1),          
                       ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV2), 
Figure 7.7 Declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V3)  
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    ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV3),  
                        ((zV1, zR, zI, zTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                           ((zRFO, zTn, zI1, zMa1, zMb1, zMc1, zR, zI, zTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                        ((zV2, zR, zI, zTe2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
                        ((zRFO, zTn, zI2, zMa2, zMb2, zMc2, zR, zI, zTv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS, 
                        ((V3, zR, zI, Te3)^+SigV3)^+KTS,  
            ((zRFO, zTn, I3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, zR, zI, Tv3)^+SigV3)^+KTS) >> 
                  c3?(((vRFO1, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                        ((vRFO3, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV3), 
                        (((vV1, vR, vI, vT'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS), 
                               ((vRFO1, vTn', vI1, vM'a1, vM'b1, vM'c1, vR, vI, vT'v1)^ +SigV1)^ +KTS)  
 >> 
                  c4!((vRFO1, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                        (vRFO3, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV3, 
                        ((vV1, vR, vI, vT'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                             ((vRFO1, vTn', vI1, vM'a1, vM'b1, vM'c1, vR, vI, vT'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                        ((V3, vR, vI, T'e3)^+SigV3)^+KTS, 
                        ((vRFO3, vTn', I3, M'a3, M'b3, M'c3, vR, vI, T'v3)^+SigV3)^+KTS)  
    >> 
                   c5?((nI0, nCd,(nI3, nM'a3, nM'b3, nM'c3, nR, nI, nT'v3)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KV3 
  >> 
      c6!((nI0, nCd,(I3, nM'a3, nM'b3, nM'c3, nR, nI, nT'v3)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KTS   
 >> stop; 
Figure 7.7 Declaration of the I/O actions at the host of vendor (V3) (Contd.) 
 
The declaration of the I/O actions at the Trusted Server (TS) is given in Figure 7.8.  
 
val hTS = Tn' new_in RFO1 new_in RFO3 new_in 
                 s1?(((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI0, uCd, uV1, uV2, uV3)^+SigI)^+KTS),   
                      (((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                      ((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                      Figure 7.8 Declaration of the I/O actions at the Trusted Server 
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                      ((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI, KTS)^+KV3), 
                      ((uV1, uR, uI, uTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                          ((uRFO, uTn, uI1, uMa1, uMb1, uMc1, uR, uI, uTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                      ((uV2, uR, uI, uTe2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
                          ((uRFO, uTn, uI2, uMa2, uMb2, uMc2, uR, uI, uTv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS, 
                      ((uV3, uR, uI, uTe3)^+SigV3)^+KTS,  
                      ((uRFO, uTn, uI3, uMa3, uMb3, uMc3, uR, uI, uTv3)^+SigV3)^+KTS) >> 
                      (uRFO is RFO) >> (uR is R) >> (uTn is Tn) >> (uI0 is I0) >> 
                      (uI is hsh(I)) >> (uV1 is V1) >> (uV2 is V2) >> (uV3 is V3) >> 
                      (uMa1 is Ma1) >> (uMb1 is Mb1) >> (uMc1 is Mc1) >> 
                      (uMa2 is Ma2) >> (uMb2 is Mb2) >> (uMc2 is Mc2) >> 
                      (uMa3 is Ma3) >> (uMb3 is Mb3) >> (uMc3 is Mc3) >> 
                 s2!((RFO1, uR, Tn', uI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                       (RFO3, uR, Tn', uI, KTS)^+KV3) >>               
                 s3?((sRFO1, sR, sTn', sI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                       (sRFO3, sR, sTn', sI, KTS)^+KV3, 
                       ((sV1, sR, sI, sT'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                       ((sI1, sM'a1, sM'b1, sM'c1, sR, sI, sT'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                       ((sV3, sR, sI, sT'e3)^+SigV3)^+KTS, 
                       ((sI3, sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sR, sI, sT'v3)^+SigV3)^+KTS) >> 
   (sRFO1 is RFO1) >> (sRFO3 is RFO3) >>  
   (sR is R) >> (sTn’ is Tn’) >>  
   (uI is hsh(I)) >> (uV1 is V1) >> (uV3 is V3) >> 
   (sM’a1 is Ma1) >> (sM’b1 is Mb1) >> (sM’c1 is Mc1) >> 
   (sM’a3 is Ma3) >> (sM’b3 is Mb3) >> (sM’c3 is Mc3) >> 
                    s4!((uI0, uCd,(sI3, sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sR, sI, sT'v3)^ +SigV3)^ +SigI)^ +KV3      
                 >> 
                     s5?((uI0, uCd,(sI3, sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sR, sI, sT'v3)^ +SigV3)^ +SigI)^ +KTS  
                     >>  
                 s6!((sM'a3, sI3, sR)^+SigI)^+KCB >> stop; 
Figure 7.8 Declaration of the I/O actions at the Trusted Server (Contd.) 
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The declaration of the I/O actions at the client’s bank host (VCB) is given in Figure 7.9. 
val bank = d1?((xR, xI0, xAd)^+SigI)^+KCB, 
                        ((rM'a3, rI3, rR)^+SigI)^+KCB >> (rR is xR) >> stop; 
Figure 7.9 Declaration of the I/O actions at Client’s bank host 
 The system declaration consists of: (1) the parallel composition of the role of 
hosts participating in the security protocol and their respective public keys; (2) a 
‘guardian’ that can detect if the environment learns some sensible data, like (y). The 
declaration of the system Sys is given in Figure 7.10. 
 
val Sys = KV1 new_in KV2 new_in KV3 new_in KTS new_in KCB new_in 
iI||ven1||ven2||ven3||hTS||bank||guard?y >> stop; 
Figure 7.10 Declaration of the system (Sys) 
 The initial configuration of the system consists of: (a) the environment’s initial 
knowledge where the disclose! output action leaks data to the environment, such as 
an old nonce, and the identities of  hosts participating in the security protocol and 
their respective public encryption keys and signature verification keys; (b) the role of 
the system Sys. The declaration of the configuration Conf  is given n Figure 7.11. 
 
val Conf = ([disclose!(Rold, +KV1, +KV2, +KV3, +KTS, +KCB, -SigI, -SigV1, 
  -SigV2, -SigV3)]@Sys); 
Figure 7.11 Declaration of the configuration (Conf) 
7.3.2   Modeling the Security Properties of the Protocol 
In this section, we model the various security properties of the proposed protocol for 
the purpose of verifying the protocol and ensuring that it is free from any security 
flaw. The verifications would be able to detect any possible malicious act on the 
security of data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation.  
 
 We model the necessary security conditions that relate to following security 
properties: 
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 Authenticity 
- A collected offer is genuinely submitted by the designated vendor host. 
- The purchase order has truly been issued by the client host. 
- The acceptance/rejection of a purchase order has truly been issued by the 
designated winning vendor. 
- The payment order has truly been issued by the client host. 
 
 Anonymity 
- The client host is anonymous to non-designated hosts. 
- The negotiated vendor hosts are anonymous to non-designated hosts.  
 
 Non-repudiation 
- A vendor host cannot repudiate an offer it has already submitted. 
- The client cannot repudiate a purchase order it has already issued. 
- The client cannot repudiate a payment order it has already issued. 
 
 Privacy 
- The attributes of a collected offer have been confidential and have not been 
revealed to non-designated hosts. 
- The client’s bank account details have been confidential and have not been 
revealed to non-designated host. 
- The client’s name has been confidential and has only been revealed to the 
winning vendor. 
- The name of the winning vendor is confidential and has only been known to 
the client host. 
- The attributes of a new offer, which is collected from the host of a short-listed 
vendor during a negotiation round, have been confidential and have not been 
revealed to non-designated hosts. 
- The attributes of the purchase order have been confidential. 
- The attributes of the payment order have been confidential. 
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 Strong integrity 
- The collected offers have been submitted for Request for Offer (RFO) of 
concern, which has not been tampered with. 
- The collected offers have been submitted for the protocol run of concern, 
which has not been tampered with. 
- The collected offers have been submitted for the client host, which has not 
been tampered with. 
- The collected offers have been submitted based on the client’s negotiation 
deadline of concern, which has not been tampered with. 
- A collected offer is intact and has not been tampered with. 
- The actual agent itinerary matches the initial agent itinerary. 
- A collected offer has not been replaced/deleted/truncated during negotiation 
- The client’s negotiation deadline has not been tampered with during 
negotiation 
 
The various security properties are modeled as outlined below. 
 
Authenticity 
 A collected offer is genuinely submitted by the designated vendor host. 
Boreale and Buscemi state in (Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b) that authentication 
necessitates that every action in a trace should be preceded by the corresponding 
action for every generated trace. In our model, hosts of the potential vendors 
(V1, V2, V3) transmit their offers in Round 1 through the output actions: a2!, 
b2!, and c2!. The Trusted Server then receives the three offers through input 
actions: s1?. Let’s denote the transmitted offers as w1, w2, and w3, respectively 
and the received offers as w'1, w'2, and w'3. Thus, the SPA agent authenticates 
the offer of vendor (V1) provided that the input action s1?w'1 is truly preceded 
by the corresponding output action a2!w1. The authentication property can be 
expressed in STA as in (1). 
 
val Auth1 = (a2!(((w1)^+SigV1)^+KTS) <-- s1?(((w'1)^+SigV1)^+KTS)); (1) 
 
CHAPTER 7: Formal Verification of Security Protocol  
 
231 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (2) at the ML interaction window. 
 
> CHECK Conf Auth1;  (2) 
 
The SPA agent authenticates the offer of vendor (V2) provided that the 
input action s1?w'2 is truly preceded by the corresponding output action b2!w2. 
The authentication property can be expressed in STA as in (3). 
 
val Auth2 = (b2!(((w2)^+SigV2)^+KTS) <-- s1?(((w'2)^+SigV2)^+KTS)); (3) 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (4) at the ML interaction window. 
 
 > CHECK Conf Auth2;  (4) 
 
The SPA agent authenticates the offer of vendor (V3) provided that the 
input action s1?w'3 is truly preceded by the corresponding output action c2!w3. 
The authentication property can be expressed in STA as in (5). 
 
val Auth3 = (c2!(((w3)^+SigV3)^+KTS) <-- s1?(((w'3)^+SigV3)^+KTS)); (5) 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (6) at the ML interaction window. 
 
 > CHECK Conf Auth3;  (6) 
 
Also, the hosts of the short-listed vendors (V1, V3) transmit their new offers 
in Round 2 through the output actions: a4!, and c4!. The Trusted Server then 
receives the two offers through input actions: s3?. Let’s denote the transmitted 
offers as w4 and w5, respectively and the received offers as w'4, and w'5. Thus, 
the SPA agent authenticates the new offer of vendor (V1) provided that the 
input action s3?w'4 is truly preceded by the corresponding output action a4!w4. 
The authentication property can be expressed in STA as in (7). 
 
val Auth4 = (a4!(((w4)^+SigV1)^+KTS) <-- s3?(((w'4)^+SigV1)^+KTS)); (7) 
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The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (8) at the ML interaction window. 
 
> CHECK Conf Auth4;  (8) 
 
The SPA agent authenticates the new offer of vendor (V3) provided that the 
input action s3?w'5 is truly preceded by the corresponding output action c4!w5. 
The authentication property can be expressed in STA as in (9). 
 
val Auth5 = (c4!(((w5)^+SigV1)^+KTS) <-- s3?(((w'5)^+SigV1)^+KTS)); (9) 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (10) at the ML interaction window. 
 
> CHECK Conf Auth5;  (10) 
 
 The purchase order has truly been issued by the client host. 
The SPA agent in Round 3 sends the SNA agent with a purchase order to the 
host of the winning vendor (V3) through the output action s4!. The host of the 
winning vendor then receives the purchase order through the input action c5?. 
Let’s denote the transmitted purchase order as (w6) and the received purchase 
order as (w'6). Thus, the agent of winning vendor (V3) authenticates the 
purchase order provided that the input action c5?w'6 is truly preceded by the 
corresponding output action s4!w6. The authentication property can be 
expressed in STA as in (11). 
 
val Auth6 = (s4!(((w6)^+SigI)^+KV3) <-- c5?(((w'6)^+SigI)^+KV3)); (11) 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (12) at the ML interaction window. 
 
> CHECK Conf Auth6;  (12) 
 
 The acceptance/rejection of a purchase order has truly been issued by the 
designated winning vendor. 
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The host of the winning vendor (V3) in Round 3 transmits an 
acceptance/rejection of the purchase order to the Trusted Server through the 
output action c6!. The Trusted Server then receives the acceptance/rejection 
through the input action s5?. Let’s denote the transmitted acceptance/rejection 
as (w7) and the received acceptance/rejection as (w'7). Thus, the SPA agent 
authenticates the acceptance/rejection provided that the input action s5?w'7 is 
truly preceded by the corresponding output action c6!w7. The authentication 
property can be expressed in STA as in (13). 
 
val Auth7 = (c6!((((w7)^ +SigV3)^ +SigI)^ +KTS) <--  
                     s5?((((w'7)^ +SigV3)^ +SigI)^ +KTS)); (13) 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (14) at the ML interaction window. 
 
> CHECK Conf Auth7;  (14) 
 
 The payment request has truly been issued by the client host. 
The SPA agent in Round 3 transmits a payment request to the PA at the client’s 
bank host through the output action s6!. The PA at then receives the payment 
request through the input action d1?. Let’s denote the transmitted payment 
request as (w8) and the received payment request as (w'8). Thus, the PA agent 
authenticates the payment request provided that the input action d1?w'8 is truly 
preceded by the corresponding output action s6!w8. The authentication property 
can be expressed in STA as in (15). 
 
val Auth8 = (s6!(((w8)^+SigI)^+KCB) <-- d1?(((w'8)^+SigI)^+KCB)); (15) 
 
The property can be verified for the declared configuration Conf by giving 
the command in (16) at the ML interaction window. 
 
> CHECK Conf Auth8;  (16) 
 
Anonymity 
 The client host is anonymous to non-designated hosts. 
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The identity of the client host (I) is enclosed in the verification attributes vector 
(Q) as a private signing key (SigI), which is transmitted to the Trusted Server. It 
is also enclosed in the purchase order, acceptance/rejection message, and 
payment request, which are transmitted to the host of the winning vendor, 
Trusted Server, and client’s bank host, respectively. The anonymity of the 
client host (I) is such that an intruder cannot reveal its identity. It should not be 
revealed except to the Trusted Server. The anonymity can be verified by 
assuming a guardian that can at any time intercept a transmitted message and 
try to synthesize the identity (I), though it will never be able to reveal the 
identity. The anonymity of the client host is expressed in STA as in (17). 
 
 val Secrecy1 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigI);  (17) 
 
The input action guard?SigI is such that the identity (I) is learnt through the 
input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?SigI is such that the 
input action guard?SigI never takes place. To verify the anonymity of client host 
for the declared configuration Conf, the command in (18) should be given at the 
ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy1; (18) 
 
A check passes if the guardian never learns the identity of the client host. If 
the verification in (18) fails, then the anonymity property is breached. 
 
 The hosts of potential vendors are anonymous to non-designated hosts. 
The identities of the hosts of potential vendors are enclosed as (V1, V2, V3) in 
the partial itinerary registries, which are transmitted to the Trusted Server. The 
identities of the hosts of potential vendors are also enclosed as private signing 
keys (SigV1, SigV2, SigV3) in the respective offers and partial itinerary 
registries. In addition, the identity of the host of the winning vendor is enclosed 
as a private signing key (SigV3) in the purchase order and acceptance/rejection 
message, which are transmitted to the host of the winning vendor and Trusted 
Server, respectively. The anonymity of the host of a potential vendor is such 
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that an intruder cannot reveal its identity. It should not be revealed except to the 
Trusted Server. The anonymity can be verified by assuming a guardian that can 
at any time intercept a transmitted message and try to synthesize the identity of 
the host of a potential vendor, though it will never be able to reveal the identity. 
The anonymity of hosts of poential vendors is expressed in STA as in (19), 
(20), (21), (22), (23), and (24). 
 
val Secrecy2 = (Absurd <-- guard?V1);  (19) 
val Secrecy3 = (Absurd <-- guard?V2);  (20) 
val Secrecy4 = (Absurd <-- guard?V3);  (21) 
val Secrecy5 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigV1);  (22) 
val Secrecy6 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigV2);  (23) 
val Secrecy7 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigV3);  (24) 
 
For example, the input action guard?V1 is such that the identity (V1) is learnt 
through the input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?V1 is such 
that the input action guard?V1 never takes place. To verify the anonymity of 
hosts of potential vendors for the declared configuration Conf, the commands in 
(25), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30) should be given at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy2; (25) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy3; (26) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy4; (27) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy5; (28) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy6; (29) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy7; (30) 
 
The checks pass if the guardian never learns the identities of the hosts of 
potential vendors (V1, V2, V3). If the verifications in (25), (26), (27), (28), (29), 
and (30) fail, then the anonymity of hosts of potential vendors is breached. 
 
Non-repudiation 
 A vendor host cannot repudiate an offer it has already submitted. 
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A vendor cannot repudiate an offer it has provided if there exists a proof that 
the offer has truly originated from the vendor. Thus, the non-repudiation 
property can be verified by testing the authenticity of the provided offer. The 
non-repudiation properties of the offers of vendors: V1, V2, and V3 are 
expressed in STA as given in (1), (3), and (5), respectively. The non-
repudiation of the offers of vendors: V1, V2, and V3 can be verified by giving 
the commands in (2), (4), and (6) at the ML interaction window. 
 
 The client cannot repudiate a purchase order it has already issued. 
The client cannot repudiate a purchase order it has issued if there exists a proof 
that the purchase order has truly originated from the client. Thus, the non-
repudiation property can be verified by testing the authenticity of the issued 
purchase order. The non-repudiation property of the purchase order is expressed 
in STA as given in (11). The non-repudiation property of the purchase order can 
be verified by giving the command in (12) at the ML interaction window. 
 
 The client cannot repudiate a payment request it has already issued. 
The client cannot repudiate a payment request it has issued if there exists a 
proof that the payment request has truly originated from the client. Thus, the 
non-repudiation property can be verified by testing the authenticity of the 
issued payment request. The non-repudiation property of the payment request is 
expressed in STA as given in (15). The non-repudiation property of the 
payment request can be verified by giving the command in (16) at the ML 
interaction window. 
 
Privacy 
 The attributes of a collected offer have been confidential and have not been 
revealed to non-designated hosts. 
The attributes of the offer of vendor (V1) should remain confidential, 
particularly the attributes: I1, Ma1, Mb1, Mc1, and Tv1. They should not be 
revealed except to the Trusted Server. Boreale and Buscemi state in (Boreale & 
Buscemi, 2002b) that privacy, is such that an intruder can not reveal any 
communicated confidential term. The privacy of the offer attributes can be 
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verified by assuming a guardian that can at any time intercept a transmitted 
message and try to synthesize an offer attribute, though it will never be able to 
reveal the attribute. The privacy of the offer attributes of vendor (V1) is 
expressed in STA as in (31), (32), (33), (34), and (35), respectively.   
 
 val Secrecy8 = (Absurd <-- guard?I1);  (31) 
 val Secrecy9 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma1);  (32) 
 val Secrecy10 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mb1);  (33) 
 val Secrecy11 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc1);   (34) 
 val Secrecy12 = (Absurd <-- guard?Tv1);  (35) 
 
For example, the input action guard?Ma1 is such that the attribute (Ma1) is 
learnt through the input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?Ma1 
is such that the input action guard?Ma1 never takes place. To verify the privacy 
of the offer attribute of vendor (V1) for the declared configuration Conf, the 
commands in (36), (37), (38), (39) and (40) should be given at the ML interaction 
window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy8; (36) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy9; (37) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy10; (38) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy11; (39) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy12; (40) 
 
The checks pass if the guardian never learns the offer attributes of vendor 
(V1). If the verifications in (36), (37), (38), (39) and (40) fail, then the privacy of 
the offer attributes is breached. 
 
Also, the attributes of the offer of vendor (V2) should remain confidential, 
particularly the attributes: I2, Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, and Tv2. They should not be 
revealed except to the Trusted Server. The privacy of the offer attributes of 
vendor (V2) is expressed in STA as in (41), (42), (43), (44), and (45), 
respectively.   
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 val Secrecy13 = (Absurd <-- guard?I2);  (41) 
 val Secrecy14 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma2);  (42) 
 val Secrecy15 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mb2);  (43) 
 val Secrecy16 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc2);   (44) 
 val Secrecy17 = (Absurd <-- guard?Tv2);  (45) 
 
To verify the privacy of the offer attributes of vendor (V2) for the declared 
configuration Conf, the commands in (46), (47), (48), (49) and (50) should be 
given at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy13; (46) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy14; (47) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy15; (48) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy16; (49) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy17; (50) 
 
Also, the attributes of the offer of vendor (V3) should remain confidential, 
particularly the attributes: I3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, and Tv3. They should not be 
revealed except to the Trusted Server. The privacy of the offer attributes of 
vendor (V3) is expressed in STA as in (51), (52), (53), (54), and (55), 
respectively.   
 
 val Secrecy18 = (Absurd <-- guard?I3);  (51) 
 val Secrecy19 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma3);  (52) 
 val Secrecy20 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mb3);  (53) 
 val Secrecy21 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc3);   (54) 
 val Secrecy22 = (Absurd <-- guard?Tv3);  (55) 
 
To verify the privacy of the offer attributes of vendor (V3) for the declared 
configuration Conf, the commands in (56), (57), (58), (59) and (60) should be 
given at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy18; (56) 
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> CHECK Conf Secrecy19; (57) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy20; (58) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy21; (59) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy22; (60) 
 
 The client’s bank account details have been confidential and have not been 
revealed to non-designated host. 
The client’s bank account details (Ad), which is enclosed in the bank account 
vector (H) and payment order, should remain confidential. It should not be 
revealed except to the client’s bank. Boreale and Buscemi state in (Boreale & 
Buscemi, 2002b) that privacy, is such that an intruder can not reveal any 
communicated confidential term. The privacy of the client’s account details can 
be verified by assuming a guardian that can at any time intercept a transmitted 
message and try to synthesize the client’s bank account details, though it will 
never be able to reveal the bank account details. The privacy of the client’s 
bank account details is expressed in STA as in (61).   
 
 val Secrecy23 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ad);  (61) 
 
The input action guard?Ad is such that the attribute (Ad) is learnt through the 
input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?Ad is such that the 
input action guard?Ad never takes place. To verify the privacy of the client’s 
bank account details for the declared configuration Conf, the command in (62) 
should be given at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy23; (62) 
 
The check passes if the guardian never learns the client’s bank account 
details. If the verification in (62) fails, then the privacy of the client’s bank 
account details is breached. 
 
 The client’s name has been confidential and has only been revealed to the 
winning vendor. 
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The client’s name (I0) is enclosed in the verification attributes vector (Q), 
which is transmitted to the Trusted Server. It is also enclosed in the purchase 
order, which is transmitted to the host of the winning vendor. Moreover, it is 
enclosed in the acceptance/rejection message, which is transmitted to the 
Trusted Server. The privacy of the client’s name (I0) is such that an intruder 
cannot reveal the client’s name. It should not be revealed except to the Trusted 
Server and the winning vendor. The privacy of the client’s name can be verified 
by assuming a guardian that can at any time intercept a transmitted message and 
try to synthesize the client’s name (I0), though it will never be able to reveal the 
client’s name. The privacy of the client’s name is expressed in STA as in (63). 
 
val Secrecy24 = (Absurd <-- guard?I0);  (63) 
 
The input action guard?I0 is such that the client’s name (I0) is learnt through 
the input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?I0 is such that the 
input action guard?I0 never takes place. To verify the privacy of the client’s 
name for the declared configuration Conf, the command in (64) should be given 
at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy24; (64) 
  
A check passes if the guardian never learns the client’s name. If the 
verification in (64) fails, then the privacy property is breached. 
 
 The name of the winning vendor is confidential and has only been known to the 
client host. 
The name of the winning vendor (I3) is enclosed in the purchase order, 
acceptance/rejection message, payment request, and payment order. It is 
enclosed in the purchase order, which is transmitted to the host of the winning 
vendor. It is also enclosed in the acceptance/rejection message, which is 
transmitted to the Trusted Server. In addition, it is enclosed in the payment 
request and payment order, which are transmitted to the client’s bank host. The 
privacy of the name of the winning vendor (I3) is such that an intruder cannot 
reveal the name of the winning vendor. It should not be revealed except to the 
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Trusted Server. The privacy of the name of the winning vendor can be verified 
by assuming a guardian that can at any time intercept a transmitted message and 
try to synthesize the name of the winning vendor (I3), though it will never be 
able to reveal the name of the winning vendor. The privacy of the name of the 
winning vendor is expressed in STA as in (65). 
 
val Secrecy25 = (Absurd <-- guard?I3);  (65) 
 
The input action guard?I3 is such that the name of the winning vendor (I3) is 
learnt through the input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?I3 is 
such that the input action guard?I3 never takes place. To verify the privacy of the 
name of the winning vendor for the declared configuration Conf, the command in 
(66) should be given at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy25; (66) 
 
A check passes if the guardian never learns the client’s name. If the 
verification in (66) fails, then the privacy property is breached. 
 
 The attributes of a new offer, which is collected from a short-listed vendor 
during a negotiation round, have been confidential and have not been revealed 
to non-designated hosts. 
The attributes of the new offer which the host of vendor (V1) sends in Round 2 
of the protocol should remain confidential, particularly the attributes: I1, M'a1, 
M'b1, M'c1, and T'v1. They should not be revealed except to the Trusted 
Server. Boreale and Buscemi state in (Boreale & Buscemi, 2002b) that privacy, 
is such that an intruder can not reveal any communicated confidential term. The 
privacy of the offer attributes can be verified by assuming a guardian that can at 
any time intercept a transmitted message and try to synthesize an offer attribute, 
though it will never be able to reveal the attribute. The privacy of the offer 
attributes of vendor (V1) is expressed in STA as in (67), (68), (69), (70), and 
(71), respectively.   
 
 val Secrecy26 = (Absurd <-- guard?I1);  (67) 
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 val Secrecy27 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'a1);  (68) 
 val Secrecy28 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'b1);  (69) 
 val Secrecy29 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'c1);   (70) 
 val Secrecy30 = (Absurd <-- guard?T'v1);  (71) 
 
For example, the input action guard?M'a1 is such that the attribute (M'a1) is 
learnt through the input action ‘guard’, and the property: Absurd <-- guard?M'a1 
is such that the input action guard?M'a1 never takes place. To verify the privacy 
of the offer attribute of vendor (V1) for the declared configuration Conf, the 
commands in (72), (73), (74), (75) and (76) should be given at the ML interaction 
window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy26; (72) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy27; (73) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy28; (74) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy29; (75) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy30; (76) 
 
The checks pass if the guardian never learns the offer attributes of vendor 
(V1). If the verifications in (72), (73), (74), (75) and (76) fail, then the privacy of 
the offer attributes is breached. 
 
Also, the attributes of the offer which the host of vendor (V3) sends should 
remain confidential, particularly the attributes: I3, M'a3, M'b3, M'c3, and T'v3. 
They should not be revealed except to the Trusted Server. The privacy of the 
offer attributes of vendor (V2) is expressed in STA as in (77), (78), (79), (80), 
and (81), respectively.   
 
 val Secrecy31 = (Absurd <-- guard?I3);  (77) 
 val Secrecy32 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'a3);  (78) 
 val Secrecy33 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'b3);  (79) 
 val Secrecy34 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'c3);   (80) 
 val Secrecy35 = (Absurd <-- guard?T'v3);  (81) 
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To verify the privacy of the offer attributes of vendor (V2) for the declared 
configuration Conf, the commands in (82), (83), (84), (85) and (86) should be 
given at the ML interaction window: 
 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy31; (82) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy32; (83) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy33; (84) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy34; (85) 
> CHECK Conf Secrecy35; (86) 
 
 The attributes of the purchase order have been confidential. 
The privacy of the attributes of the purchase order including: I0, I3, Mc1, Mc2, 
Mc3, Tv3, SigV3, and SigI have already been verified in (63), (51), (52), (53), 
(54), (55), (24), and (17).  
  
 The attributes of the payment order have been confidential. 
The privacy of the attributes of the payment order including: I3, Mc1, Ad, I0, 
and SigI have already been verified in (51), (52), (61), (63) and (17).   
 
Strong Integrity 
The integrity property is verified as described below with reference to the three 
rounds of the security protocol depicted in Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6.  
1. At the beginning of Round 2 and upon the arrival of the SNA and IRA agents at 
the Trusted Server (TS), the SPA agent carries out the following verifications: 
 
 Verifies that the collected offers have been submitted for the initial Request 
for Offer (RFO) that has not been tampered with. The verification is done by 
comparing the Request for Offer (uRFO) that is enclosed in a collected offer 
with the Request for Offer (RFO) of concern that is enclosed in the 
verification attributes vector (Q). The verification is expressed in STA as in 
(87).  
 
((uRFO is RFO) >> (87) 
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If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
 Verifies that the collected offers have been submitted for the protocol run of 
concern. The verification is done by comparing the nonce that is enclosed in 
the offers (uR) with the protocol nonce of concern (R) that is enclosed in the 
verification attributes vector (Q). The verification is expressed in STA as in 
(88).   
 
(uR is R) >> (88) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
 Verifies that the collected offers have been submitted for the genuine client 
host (I). The verification is done by comparing the term (uI) that is enclosed 
in the collected offers with a hash of the identity of the client host (hsh(I)) 
that is enclosed in the verification attributes vector (Q). The verification is 
expressed in STA as in (89).   
 
(uI is hsh(I)) >> (89) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
 Verifies that the collected offers have been submitted based on the client’s 
initial negotiation deadline that has not been tampered with. The verification 
is done by comparing the term (uTn) that is enclosed in the collected offers 
with the client’s initial negotiation deadline (Tn) that is enclosed in the 
verification attributes vector (Q). The verification is expressed in STA as in 
(90).   
 
(uTn is Tn) >> (90) 
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If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 Verifies that the collected offers are intact and have not been tampered with. 
Tampering includes replacing, deleting, or truncating a collected offer 
during negotiation. The verification is done by comparing the attributes of a 
received offer with the corresponding attributes of the offer at the time it was 
provided by the vendor. For example, it compares the attributes: uMa1, 
uMb1, and uMc1 that are enclosed in the received offer of vendor (V1) with 
the corresponding attributes: Ma1, Mb1, and Mc1 of the offer at the time it 
was provided by the vendor. The verification is expressed in STA as in (91).   
 
(uMa1 is Ma1) >> (uMb1 is Mb1) >> (uMc1 is Mc1) >> (91) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. Similar verifications 
are also done for the offers of vendor (V2) and (V3). The verifications are 
expressed in STA as in (92) and (93). 
 
(uMa2 is Ma2) >> (uMb2 is Mb2) >> (uMc2 is Mc2) >> (92) 
(uMa3 is Ma3) >> (uMb3 is Mb3) >> (uMc3 is Mc3) >> (93) 
 
 Verifies that the actual agent itinerary matches the initial agent itinerary. The 
verification is intended to detect if an intruder has tampered with the agent 
itinerary by deleting, inserting, or replacing the identity of a vendor host. 
The verification is done by comparing the identities of the hosts of potential 
vendors with the identities of the vendor hosts from which the offers were 
collected. The verification is expressed in STA as in (94).   
 
(uV1 is V1) >> (uV2 is V2) >> (uV3 is V3) >> (94) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
 Verifies that the client name has not been tampered with. The verification is 
done by comparing the initial client name with the client name enclosed in 
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verification attributes vector (Q), which it receives at the beginning of 
Round 2.  The verification is expressed in STA as in (95).   
 
(uI0 is I0) >> (95) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
2. At the end of Round 2 and upon the arrival of the SNA and IRA agents at the 
Trusted Server (TS), the SPA agent carries out the following verifications: 
 
 Verifies that the new offers, which are collected from the short-listed 
vendors (௝), have been submitted for the new Request for Offer 
൫	௝൯ሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ʹሻ that has not been tampered with. The verification 
is done by comparing the Request for Offer൫	௝൯ that is enclosed in a 
collected offer with the Request for Offer ൫	௝൯ of concern that is 
enclosed in the verification attributes vector (Q). The verification is 
expressed in STA as in (96). 
 
                     ((sRFO1 is RFO1) >> (sRFO3 is RFO3) >> (96) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 Verifies that the new offers, which are collected from the short-listed vendors 
(௝), have been submitted for the protocol run of concern. The verification is 
done by comparing the nonce that is enclosed in the new offers (sR) with the 
protocol nonce of concern (R) that is enclosed in the verification attributes 
vector (Q). The verification is expressed in STA as in (97).   
 
(sR is R) >> (97) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
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 Verifies that the new offers, which are collected from the short-listed vendors 
(௝), have been submitted for the genuine client host (I). The verification is 
done by comparing the term (sI) that is enclosed in the new offers with a hash 
of the identity of the client host (hsh(I)) that is enclosed in the verification 
attributes vector (Q). The verification is expressed in STA as in (98).   
 
(sI is hsh(I)) >> (98) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 Verifies that the new offers, which are collected from the short-listed vendors 
(௝), have been submitted based on the client’s amended negotiation deadline. 
The verification is done by comparing the term (sTn') that is enclosed in the 
collected offers with the client’s amended negotiation deadline (Tn') that is 
enclosed in the verification attributes vector (Q). The verification is expressed 
in STA as in (99).   
 
(sTn' is Tn') >> (99) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
 Verifies that the new offers, which are collected from the short-listed vendors 
(௝), are intact and have not been tampered with. Tampering includes 
replacing, deleting, or truncating a collected offer during negotiation. The 
verification is done by comparing the attributes of a received offer with the 
corresponding attributes of the offer at the time it was provided by the 
vendor. For example, it compares the attributes: sM'a1, sM'b1, and sM'c1 that 
are enclosed in the received offer of vendor (V1) with the corresponding 
attributes: M'a1, M'b1, and M'c1 of the offer at the time it was provided by 
the vendor. The verification is expressed in STA as in (100).   
 
(sM'a1 is M'a1) >> (sM'b1 is M'b1) >> (sM'c1 is M'c1) >> (100) 
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If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. Similar verification is 
also done for the offer of vendor (V3). The verifications are expressed in STA 
as in (101). 
 
(sM'a3 is M'a3) >> (sM'b3 is M'b3) >> (sM'c3 is M'c3) >> (101) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
 Verifies that the identities of hosts of negotiated vendors in Round 2 match 
the identities of hosts of short-listed vendors. The verification is intended to 
detect if an intruder has tampered with the agent itinerary by deleting, 
inserting, or replacing the identity of a vendor host. The verification is done 
by comparing the identities of the hosts of short-listed vendors with the 
identities of the vendor hosts from which the new offers are collected. The 
verification is expressed in STA as in (102).   
 
(sV1 is V1) >> (sV3 is V3) >> (102) 
 
If the verification fails the SPA agent excludes the collected offers and aborts 
negotiation, otherwise it continues on the verifications. 
 
3. At the beginning of Round 3 and upon the receipt of a payment request from the 
SPA agent to the PA agent at the client’s bank host, the PA agent verifies that the 
protocol nonce in the payment request matches the protocol nonce enclosed in 
the bank account vector (H). The verification is expressed in STA as in (103).   
 
(rR is xR) >> (103) 
 
If the verification fails the PA agent discards the payment request, otherwise it 
proceeds on issuing a payment order for the benefit of the winning vendor.  
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7.3.3   Verifying the Proposed Protocol in a Key Configuration 
We analyze the proposed protocol for a key configuration that would generate a 
system susceptible to the most common and critical attacks, which existing protocols 
fail to hinder or even detect. The configurations focus on the following: 
 
 Presence of a malicious host 
 Presence of two co-operating malicious hosts 
 
The induced security threats are related to system specifications as explained below.  
 
1. The presence of a malicious host may result in security threats such as breach of 
privacy, erroneous authentication, etc. 
 
2. The presence of co-operating hosts may result in data truncation or replacement. 
 
3. The presence of an old protocol run may result in replacing of the gathered data 
with the data of a similar agent. 
 
 We analyzed the protocol for a configuration of a protocol run with a client host, 
Trusted Server, client’s bank, and three vendor hosts. The agent itinerary and the I/O 
actions of the protocol run are depicted in Figure 7.1. The protocol run is identified 
by a fresh nonce R that has been randomly chosen by the client host.  
 
The role of a malicious host is not explicitly modeled. It is implicitly modeled by 
the environment’s knowledge that is described in the Conf configuration given in 
Figure 7.11. 
 
The STA script of the protocol run is shown in the Appendix, including the 
declaration of identifiers, system processes, configuration, and properties. In the 
configuration we set the environment’s initial knowledge to: (a) old nonce Rold, (b) 
identities of participating hosts and the associated public keys and signature 
verification keys, and (c) an intercepted message.  
 
The verification of the security properties: authenticity, strong integrity and 
privacy, anonymity, and non-repudiation of data exchanged in e-Trade negotiation 
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using STA reported no attacks. The results of verifications of the proposed protocol 
with the reached symbolic configurations are shown in Figure 7.12.  
 
The proposed protocol is verified for various conditions of the security properties, 
which are summarized in Figure 7.13. The protocol passes all the security verifications.  
The results of the analysis of the small instance of the protocol show that the 
proposed protocol is free of security flaws and would guarantee correctness of the 
security protocol as regards the small instance. Moreover, the results of analysis 
provide a motivation for a proof of correctness of the security protocol for a general 
model. 
> val it = "No attack was found  2926904 symbolic configurations reached." : string 
Figure 7.12 Result of analyzing a key configuration of the protocol run 
7.3.4   Reasoning the Correctness of Protocol for a General Model 
We are concerned with the security of a general model of the proposed protocol. We 
consider the security flaws revealed in the existing security protocols and carefully 
reason the correctness of the security protocol for a general model. The reasoning is 
detailed in Table 2 of section 8 of chapter 6 previously discussed in the thesis. The 
reasoning shows that the security scheme of the proposed protocol has sufficient 
security measures that are capable of preventing or at least detecting the attacks 
which existing security protocols fail to prevent or detect. 
7.4 Summary 
It is fundamental in devising new security protocols to present proofs on their 
soundness. The formal methods presented in the literature provide rigorous analysis 
of security protocols and can detect any probable security flaws. We utilized the STA 
formal method to model, analyze, and verify the security protocol we presented in 
Chapter 6. We choose the STA method from the other formal methods as it exhibits 
special characteristics. The method is automatic and does not require modeling the 
intruder explicitly. Also the method does not require acquaintance with logic theories 
or expert guidance. Moreover, it does not suffer from state explosion problem. 
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 We modeled an instance of the security protocol that is susceptible to the various 
malicious threats of intruders and in particular the colluding attack, which is the most 
difficult to prevent or detect. We specified the security properties the protocol asserts 
including: strong integrity, privacy, authentication, non-repudiability, and anonymity 
of the data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation. We carried out extensive 
verification of the security of different types of messages exchanged in e-Trade 
negotiation, which includes Request for Offer (RFO), vendor offers, purchase order, 
acceptance of purchase order, and payment order. The verification of the protocol for 
the various security properties showed that the protocol is free from any security 
attack. The verification results present a proof on the soundness of the protocol as 
regards the analyzed instance and motivate a proof on the soundness of the security 
protocol for a general model. 
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Authenticity
Collected offers
Purchase order
Acceptance/rejection of purchase order
Payment order
Anonymity
Client host
Negotiated vendor hosts
Non-repudiation
Collected offers
Purchase order
Acceptance/rejection of purchase order
Payment order
Privacy
Collected offers
Purchase order
Name of winning vendor
Payment order
Client’s bank account details
Client’s name
Strong integrity
Intact agent itinerary
Intact offers
Request for Offer
Negotiation deadline
Client name
Protocol run
Client host
Collected offers relate to
the initially defined terms
 
Figure 7.13 Verified conditions of the security properties of the protocol 
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Chapter 8  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
E-Negotiation is a strategic stage in e-Trade applications and aims for exploring 
more favorable alternatives the opponents may offer and reaching mutual agreements 
between negotiating entities. It deploys software intelligent agents to conduct e-
Negotiation autonomously on behalf of clients. Agents implement different 
negotiation strategies that provide advice during negotiation on the best course of 
action that would lead to the client’s maximum utility and conclude an agreement.  
 
In this thesis, we investigated one-to-many bilateral negotiation system that has 
been modeled as multiple one-to-one negotiation threads carried out simultaneously 
by stationary agents. We found that the existing negotiation system is not efficient 
and the client’s maximum utility would not be truly achieved. Firstly, the existing 
negotiation systems deploy stationary agents that induce large communication 
complexity; whereas research has shown that the deployment of mobile agents 
results in more efficient negotiation systems (Chen & Huang, 2009; Du et al., 2005). 
In fact, mobile agents exhibit distinctive characteristics including: autonomy, 
learning ability, mobility, cloning ability, dynamic adaptation, and co-operation. 
They also carry out negotiation sequentially rather than simultaneously so 
communication loads are reduced. Secondly, the existing strategies assume that the 
vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. offer expiry time) is private and thus do not 
consider its effect on negotiation outcomes and the related risk of missing out on top 
utility offers that might expire before the client’s negotiation deadline. They delay 
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offer evaluation till the client’s negotiation deadline and hence would not achieve the 
client’s maximum utility. Thirdly, the strategies evaluate the collected offers based 
on utility functions that assign the same value to two similar offers of different 
validities; though the offer of longer validity should have the greater value as it 
allows for broader market search space. Fourthly, the strategies assume that the data 
exchanged during negotiation is intact; though it is not really intact. The data is 
subject to various malicious acts of intruders and non-trusted hosts that would result 
in data truncation, deletion, or tampering. The acts may also result in breach of 
privacy of sensitive data or erroneous authentication. The security issue of e-
Negotiation is not sufficiently addressed and hence negotiation strategies would not 
be able to achieve the client’s maximum utility. 
 
In this thesis, we presented multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral e-Trade 
negotiation framework that truly result in the client’s maximum utility. The 
framework includes five components: mobile-agent based system architecture and 
negotiating agent architecture, negotiation protocol, flexible and rational negotiation 
strategy, enhanced utility function, and sound security protocol. We only outlined the 
general rules of the negotiation protocol as the thesis mainly concentrates on the four 
previously discussed problems that relate to: system architecture, negotiation 
strategy, utility function, and security protocol. 
8.1 Conclusion 
8.1.1 Mobile Agent-based System Architecture 
The proposed system architecture focuses on one-to-many bilateral negotiation and  
has particular characteristics that distinguish it from the existing architectures 
including: (1) deployment of mobile agents that have been found more efficient in 
conducting e-Negotiation when compared to stationary agents, which are deployed in 
the existing architectures; (2) identification of the various phases of negotiation, 
some of which have been missed out in the existing negotiation architectures; (3) 
deployment of multiple mobile agents that cooperate in carrying out the different 
phases of negotiation; (4) consulting collaboration and heuristic agents at the e-
Marketplace that can provide advice on the following: rank of values of discrete 
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enumerated attributes, weights of negotiated attributes, agent itinerary comprised of 
the hosts of the most competitive vendors in the marketplace, and client’s negotiation 
deadline based on the expected delivery time (TED) the client has initially set; (5) 
utilization of a Trusted Server that provides a secure environment for the execution 
of sensitive phases of negotiation such as the verification and negotiation phase or 
settlement phase; (6) generation of Replica Agent (RA), which is a duplicate of the 
Search and Negotiation Agent (SNA) and assists it by searching a sub-set of vendor 
hosts in the agent itinerary so that negotiation can be completed in a shorter time and 
the top utility offer that might expire before the client’s negotiation deadline would 
not be missed out; (7) integration of mobile agents into the system architecture and 
providing full details of the interactions between the various agents participating in 
negotiation. 
8.1.2 Negotiation Strategy 
The proposed negotiation strategy addresses multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral 
negotiations with a focus on critical scenarios where the expiry time of the top utility 
offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline. The strategy tries to avoid loss 
of such an offer so that the client’s maximum utility can be achieved. The strategy 
manages such critical scenarios in a flexible and rational manner as it performs as 
follows: (1) evaluates an offer as soon as it is collected as opposed to the patient 
strategy which delays offer evaluation till all offers are collected; (2) does not 
immediately abort the negotiation to award the bid for such an offer as opposed to the 
partially patient strategy; (3) considers key factors: trading competition between 
vendors in the marketplace, market search space, client’s negotiation deadline, 
vendor’s negotiation deadline, and network time delay, which relates to processing, 
queuing, transmission, and propagation delays in addition to client’s price limits and 
vendor’s offer price; (4) evaluates the trading competition between the vendors of top 
utility offers in terms of utilities and vendors’ negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer expiry 
times); (5) estimates the time needed for bid settlement taking into account the 
network time delay; (6) sets alerts near the expiry time of top utility offers to allow 
sometime for bid settlement; (7) monitors the client’s negotiation deadline and the 
negotiation deadlines of vendors of top utility offers that expire before the client’s 
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negotiation deadline during negotiation; (8) extends negotiation near the negotiation 
deadline of the vendor of top utility offer trying to search for alternatives of better 
utilities; (9) allows early bid award to avoid loss of a top utility offer that expires 
before the client’s negotiation deadline having satisfied the conditions on market 
search space and trading competition; (10) aborts negotiation before the client’s 
negotiation deadline and at a time that is earlier than the expiry time of top utility 
offer to award the bid only if two conditions are satisfied: (a) the offer considerably 
competes with the so far collected offers or has a validity that is slightly shorter than 
that of the other top utility offers; (b) an adequate market search space is completed; 
(11) updates the target utility in each negotiation round based on the achieved utility 
in the preceding negotiation round whenever the achieved utility is greater than the 
target utility; (12) implements time-dependent tactics in generating counter-offers 
whenever an agreement is not reached.  
 
 We simulated the negotiation system and carried out experiments to compare the 
performance of the proposed negotiation strategy to that of patient and partially 
patient strategies in various negotiation settings. The client’s utility is tested for the 
impact of four key factors: trading competition, market search space, client’s 
negotiation deadline, and vendors’ negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer expiry times). 
The network time delay is assumed fixed for simplicity. The experiments showed the 
effectiveness of the proposed strategy in boosting client’s utility, shortening 
negotiation time, and ensuring adequate market search. We also reasoned about the 
correctness of the proposed strategy. We compared the strategy outcomes to those 
of patient and desperate strategies. The results showed that the proposed strategy 
outperforms the other two strategies with regards to the client’s utility, market 
search space, search and negotiation time, and client satisfaction. The strategy also 
reduces communication loads and resource consumption. 
 
 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address the risk of missing out 
on a top utility offer that expires earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline in one-
to-many bilateral e-Trade negotiation and present a negotiation strategy that 
manages the risk effectively. The actions that the strategy makes are influenced by: 
trading competition, market search space, client’s negotiation deadline, vendor’s 
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negotiation deadline, and network time delay in addition to client’s price limits and 
vendor’s offer price. The trading competition assesses how far the top utility offer, 
which expires before the client’s negotiation deadline, competes with other top 
utility offers in terms of utilities and vendors’ negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer expiry 
times). 
8.1.3 Utility Function 
The proposed utility function addresses multi-constraint one-to-many bilateral 
negotiation. It focuses on critical negotiation scenarios where the expiry time of the 
top utility offer is earlier than the client’s negotiation deadline and presents 
enhancements to the existing utility functions. It introduces new factors including: 
client’s negotiation deadline, vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. offer expiry time), 
and completed market search space in addition to values of offer attributes and 
client’s constraints that are already considered in the existing utility functions. The 
proposed utility function assigns different values to similar offers that have same 
values of attributes but have different vendors’ negotiation deadlines (i.e. offer 
expiry times). For example, it assigns the greater value to the offer of the later 
vendor’s negotiation deadline as it allows the negotiating agent to proceed on a 
broader market search space without fear of missing out on the offer. Also, the 
function may not assign a greater value to an offer that has least price while there is 
another offer of marginally higher price but of considerably later vendor’s 
negotiation deadline (i.e. offer expiry time). We discussed the theorems to which the 
utility function should conform and presented proofs on the satisfaction of these 
theorems. The proposed function provides accurate estimates of offer utilities that 
would guide the negotiation strategy in ranking the collected offers and selecting the 
truly top utility offer and hence achieving the client’s maximum utility. To the best 
of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the vendor’s negotiation deadline (i.e. 
offer expiry time), client’s negotiation deadline, and completed market search space 
factors into the utility function. 
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8.1.4 Security Protocol 
The proposed security protocol addresses mobile agent-based one-to-many bilateral 
negotiation and assumes that negotiating agents may execute on non-trusted hosts.  It 
considers all possible malicious acts of intruders and adversaries to data exchanged 
during e-Trade negotiation. The protocol aims for preserving authenticity, privacy, 
anonymity, strong integrity, and non-repudiability properties of data exchanged 
during e-Trade negotiation. The security protocol is represented as a sequence of 
messages exchanged between negotiating agents. It implements a set of security 
mechanisms that would enable it to preserve the security of different types of 
messages exchanged during negotiation including client’s Request for Offer (RFO), 
vendors’ offers, purchase orders, payment orders. The security mechanisms include: 
(1) splitting critical and non-critical negotiation data and functions among four 
cooperative mobile agents; (2) carrying out sensitive processes such as verification 
of offers at a Trusted Server that provides a secure execution environment; (3) 
encrypting sensitive data using public encryption and digital signing keys; (4) 
keeping a secure record of the actual agent itinerary with the Itinerary Registry 
Agent (IRA) including the identities of visited vendor hosts and the times at which 
the SNA agent got executed at the respective vendor hosts, for detecting any offer 
truncation attacks at the verification phase of negotiation; (5) securely storing the 
initial negotiation parameters for detecting data masquerading or tampering attacks 
at the verification phase of negotiation; (6) binding a collected offer to initial 
negotiation parameters for detecting integrity attacks during the verification phase of 
negotiation; (7) revealing the agent itinerary only to a Trusted Server, which would 
handle the agent migration and clear the identity of the preceding host from the 
connection table, for ensuring complete anonymity of hosts in the agent itinerary 
including the most recently visited host and the first succeeding host; (8) requesting 
each visited vendor host to clear its memory from any data acquired as a result of 
executing the mobile agents before the mobile agents are dispatched to the 
succeeding vendor host in the agent itinerary for hindering colluding attacks; (9) 
requesting each visited vendor host to create and sign an execution trace of the 
agents at its host so that any denial of the clearing request or tampering with the 
agents’ dynamic data can be detected during the verification phase of negotiation.  
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The security protocol is reasoned through the inspection of its robustness against 
various malicious acts of intruders and non-trusted hosts. The reasoning showed that 
sufficient security mechanisms are in place. Also, the security protocol is formally 
verified for the various security properties using Symbolic Trace Analyzer (STA). A 
key instance of the negotiation model that allows for analysis of the various 
malicious acts of intruders, particularly colluding attacks is considered. The formal 
verification of the security protocol showed that it is free of security flaws. The 
results proved that the protocol can accurately accomplish privacy, strong integrity, 
anonymity, authenticity, and non-repudiation properties of data exchanged during e-
Trade negotiation. The protocol prevents almost all security attacks and detects the 
other attacks such as truncation attack. The results induce a proof of validity of the 
security protocol with regard to a general model. The protocol enhances client’s trust 
in e-Trade negotiation as it ensures that the decisions the negotiation strategy makes 
are based on truly intact data and the privacy of client’s details (i.e. client’s bank 
account details) is maintained during negotiation. The protocol also improves trading 
competition between negotiated vendors as it preserves the privacy of collected 
offers during negotiation and anonymity of the client host and all vendor hosts in the 
agent itinerary including the most recently visited host and the first succeeding host 
in the agent itinerary. Moreover, the protocol manages malicious attacks of non-
trusted hosts that might capture the SNA agent and obstruct it from returning to the 
Trusted Server and completing its task. The protocol would utilize the offers that 
have been provided to the Supervisor Agent (SPA) prior to the attack and hence can 
recover from the attack. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a sound security 
protocol for mobile agent-based one-to-many bilateral negotiation, and present a 
formal proof on its correctness and capability of preserving the different security 
properties of  data exchanged during e-Trade negotiation including: privacy, 
authenticity, strong integrity, anonymity, and non-repudiabilty. 
 
In general, the mobile agent-based one-to-many multi-constraint bilateral 
negotiation framework presented in the thesis is promising and is more efficient than 
the existing negotiation frameworks. 
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8.2 Future Works 
The outcomes of this thesis motivate research in three interesting areas. The first research 
area is to establish a market-driven negotiation tactic and strategy that takes into 
account market status and remaining negotiation deadlines of both the client and 
negotiated vendors. The market status includes competition level between vendors at 
the market, availability of goods/services in the market, trading opportunities at the 
market, and eagerness of the client. Concessions would be less if competitions 
between vendors are high or opportunities in the market are large. On the other hand, 
the concessions would be more if there are just few items of goods/services of 
interest that are remaining in the market, client is so eager for goods/services, or end 
time of negotiation of the most competing vendor is very short. The second research 
area is to incorporate other key factors in the proposed utility function including vendors’ 
profiles, promotions and extra services. The profile is measured based on creditability, 
trading scale, timeliness and service level of a vendor. The third research area is to 
extend the security protocol to avoid deadlocks in large-scale systems such as failure of 
Trusted Servers.  
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Appendix  
 
 
STA Script of Modeling the  
Security Protocol 
 
 
STA script of a model of the proposed security protocol comprising of a client host, three 
vendor hosts, Trusted Server, and client’s bank host. The model consists of three rounds: 
collection of offers, negotiation with short-listed vendors, and bid-award. 
 
 
(* 
1. Notations used in declaring identifiers 
disclose!: an output action that leaks data to the environment 
guard?: an input action ‘guard’ such that a guardian learns some secret data 
Notations specific to Round 1 
i1!: output action at client host  
a1?: input action at the host of vendor (V1) as receiving client’s RFO 
b1?: input action at the host of vendor (V1) as receiving client’s RFO 
c1?: input action at the host of vendor (V1) as receiving client’s RFO 
a2!: output action at the host of vendor (V1) as the vendor submits its offer and partial itinerary 
registry 
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b2!: output action at the host of vendor (V2) as the vendor submits its offer and partial itinerary 
registry 
c2!: output action at the host of vendor (V1) as the vendor submits its offer and partial itinerary 
registry  
s1?: input action at the Trusted Server as receiving the collected offers 
Notations specific to Round 2 
s2!: output action at the Trusted Server as sending a new RFO for negotiation with the short-
listed vendors 
a3?: input action at the host of vendor (V1) as receiving a new RFO for negotiation 
c3?: input action at the host of vendor (V3) as receiving a new RFO for negotiation 
a4!: output action at the host of vendor (V1) as the vendor submits its new offer and partial 
itinerary registry 
c4!: output action at the host of vendor (V3) as the vendor submits its new offer and partial 
itinerary registry 
s3?: input action at the Trusted Server as receiving new offers from the short-listed vendors 
Notations specific to Round 3 
s4!: output action at the Trusted Server as sending a purchase order to the winning vendor 
host 
c5?: input action at the host of vendor (V3) as receiving a purchase order 
c6!: output action at the host of vendor (V3) as sending an acceptance/rejection on the 
purchase order 
s5?: input action at the Trusted Server as receiving an acceptance/rejection from the host of 
the winning vendor on the purchase order  
s6!: output action at the Trusted Server as sending a payment request to the PA agent at the 
client’s bank host for issuing a payment order on behalf of the client and for the benefit of the 
winning vendor 
d1?: input action at the host of client’s bank (VCB) as receiving a payment request from the 
SPA agent for issuing a payment order on behalf of the client and for the benefit of the winning 
vendor 
2. Notations used in declaring names are given below. 
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Notations specific to Round 1 
I0: client’s name  
I1, I2, and I3: names of potential vendors V1, V2, and V3, respectively 
V: agent itinerary (V1, V2, V3) 
V1, V2, and V3: potential vendors V1, V2, and V3, respectively 
RFO: the Request for Offer (RFO) the client sets for biding and negotiation 
Tn: client’s negotiation deadline (TEN) 
R: protocol nonce (r) 
Rold: old protocol nonce 
I: identity of the client host  
hsh(I): hash of identity of the client host  
Te1. Te2, Te3: time at which the SNA agent got executed (ଵǡ ଶǡ ଷሻ at the hosts of 
potential vendors V1, V2, and V3, respectively in Round 1 of the protocol 
SigI: private signing key of the client host (ܵ݅݃௜బିଵ)  
SigV1, SigV2, SigV3: private signing keys (ܵ݅݃ଵି ଵ, ܵ݅݃ଶି ଵǡ ܵ݅݃ଷି ଵ) of hosts of potential vendors 
V1, V2, and V3, respectively 
KTS: public encryption key of the Trusted Server (ܭ்ௌା ) 
KV1, Kv2, Kv3: public encryption keys (ܭଵାǡ ܭଶାǡ ܭଷା) of hosts of potential vendors V1, V2, and 
V3, respectively 
KCB: public encryption key of the client’s bank host (ܭ஼஻ା ) 
Ad: client’s bank account details (Ad) 
Cd: client's contact details (Cd) 
Ma1, Mb1, Mc1: attributes of the offer of vendor (V1) 
Ma2, Mb2, Mc2: attributes of the offer of vendor (V2) 
Ma3, Mb3, Mc3: attributes of the offer of vendor (V3) 
Tv1, Tv2, Tv3: end time of the validity of offers (୉୚ଵ ǡ ୉୚ଶ ǡ ୉୚ଷ ) collected from vendors V1, 
V2, and V3, respectively in Round 1 of the protocol 
Notations specific to Round 2 
V’: short-listed vendors to negotiate with  
V1, and V3: identities of the hosts of short-listed vendors V1 and V3, respectively 
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RFO1, RFO3: new Request for Offer to negotiate with short-listed vendors V1 and V3, 
respectively 
Tn’: new client’s negotiation deadline for the Round 2 of the protocol (TEN) 
T’v1, T’v3: end time of the validity of new offers (୉୚ଵ ୉୚ଷ ) collected from the short-listed 
vendors V1 and V3, respectively in Round 2 of the protocol 
T’e1, T’e3: time at which the SNA agent got executed (ଵǡଷሻat the hosts of short-listed 
vendors V1 and V3, respectively in Round 2 of the protocol 
M’a1, M’b1, M’c1: attributes of the new offer of vendor (V1) 
M’a3, M’b3, M’c3: attributes of the new offer of vendor (V3) 
Notations specific to Round 3 
I3: name of the winning vendor 
M’a3: price of the winning offer (ܵ௔ଷ) 
T’v3: end time of the validity of the offer of the winning vendor (୉୚௪ ) 
SigV3: private signing key of the winning vendor (ܵ݅݃௪ିଵ) 
KV3: public encryption key of the winning vendor (ܭଷା) 
*) 
 
DeclLabel $ i1, a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, d1, 
disclose, guard $ ; 
 
DeclName  $ SigI, SigV1, SigV2, SigV3,  
               I, V1, V2, V3, V'1, V'3, 
               I0, I1, I2, I3  
               KV1, KV2, KTS, KV3, KCB, 
               RFO, R, Rold, Tn, Ad, Cd,   
               Te1, Ma1, Mb1, Mc1, Tv1,  
               Te2, Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, Tv2, 
               Te3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, Tv3, 
               RFO1, RFO3, Tn', 
               T'e1, M'a1, M'b1, M'c1, T'v1, 
               T'e3, M'a3, M'b3, M'c3, T'v3 $; 
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DeclVar $   y,  
              xRFO, xR, xTn, xI0, xAd, xCd, xV1, xV2, xV3, xI, 
             yRFO, yR, yTn, yI0, yAd, yCd, yV1, yV2, yV3, yI, 
             yV1, yTe1, yTv1, yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yI1, 
             zRFO, zR, zTn, zI0, zAd, zCd, zV1, zV2, zV3, zI, 
             zV1, zTe1, zTv1, zMa1, zMb1, zMc1, zI1, 
             zV2, zTe2, zTv2, zMa2, zMb2, zMc2, zI2, 
             uRFO, uR, uTn, uI0, uCd, uV1, uV2, uV3, uI,  
             uV1, uTe1, uTv1, uMa1, uMb1, uMc1,uI1, 
             uV2, uTe2, uTv2, uMa2, uMb2, uMc2, uI2, 
             uV3, uTe3, uTv3, uMa3, uMb3, uMc3, uI3, 
             wRFO1, wRFO3, wR, wTn', wI, wI0, wAd, wCd, 
             vRFO1, vRFO3, vR, vTn', vI, vI0, vAd, vCd, vV'1, vV'3, 
  vV1, vT'e1, vI1, vM'a1, vM'b1, vM'c1, vT'v1,  
             nI0, nCd, nI3, nM'a3, nM'b3, nM'c3, nR, nI, nT'v3, 
             rM'a3, rI3,  
            sRFO1, sRFO3, sR, sTn', sI, sI0, sCd,  
            sM'a1, sM'b1, sM'c1, sT'v1, sT'e1, sV1, sI1,  
            sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sT'v3, sT'e3, sV3, sI3, 
            w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, 
            w'1, w’2, w’3, w’4, w’5, w’6, w’7, w’8  $; 
 
(*Declaration of processes at the client host I*)     
val iI = RFO new_in R new_in Tn new_in Ad new_in Cd new_in V1 new_in V2 new_in  
           V3 new_in I0 new_in I new_in   
           i1!((( RFO, R, Tn, I0, Cd, V1, V2, V3)^+SigI)^+KTS), 
              (((R, I0, Ad)^+SigI)^+KCB), 
  (((RFO, R, Tn, hsh(I), KTS)^+KV1), ((RFO, R, Tn, hsh(I), KTS)^+KV2),  
  ((RFO, R, Tn, hsh(I), KTS)^+KV3))) >> stop; 
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(*Declaration of processes at the host of vendor V1*)                      
val ven1 = Te1 new_in Ma1 new_in Mb1 new_in Mc1 new_in Tv1 new_in 
                 T'e1 new_in M'a1 new_in M'b1 new_in M'c1 new_in T'v1 new_in V1 new_in 
                 I1 new_in 
                 a1?(((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV1),  
                       ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                       ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV3))  
           >> 
                 a2!(((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV1),  
                 ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                      ((xRFO, xR, xTn, xI, KTS)^+KV3), 
           (((V1, xR, xI, Te1)^+SigV1)^+KTS),  
                      ((xRFO, xTn, I1, Ma1, Mb1, Mc1, xR, xI, Tv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS)  
          >> 
                 a3?((wRFO1, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                       (wRFO3, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV3) 
                 a4!(((wRFO1, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                      ((wRFO3, wR, wTn', wI, KTS)^+KV3), 
                      (((V1, wR, wI, T'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS), 
                      ((wRFO1, wTn', I1, M'a1, M'b1, M'c1, wR, wI, T'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS) 
           >>  stop; 
 
(*Declaration of processes at the host of vendor V2*)                      
val ven2 =  Te2 new_in Ma2 new_in Mb2 new_in Mc2 new_in Tv2 new_in  
        V2 new_in I2 new_in 
                 b1? (((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV1), 
      ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                 ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV3), 
      (((yV1, yR, yI, yTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS),  
                 ((yRFO, yTn, yI1, yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yR, yI, yTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS)                     
       >> 
                 b2! (((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV1), 
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                 ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV2), 
      ((yRFO, yR, yTn, yI, KTS)^+KV3), 
      ((yV1, yR, yI, yTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
      ((yRFO, yTn, yI1, yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yR, yI, yTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                 ((V2, yR, yI, Te2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
                 ((yRFO, yTn, I2, Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, yR, yI, Tv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS)  
                 >> stop; 
 
val ven3 = Te3 new_in Ma3 new_in Mb3 new_in Mc3 new_in Tv3 new_in  
      V3 new_in I3 new_in T'e3 new_in M'a3 new_in M'b3 new_in 
      M'c3 new_in T'v3 new_in  
                 c1?((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV1,                        
                       ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV2),  
            ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV3),  
                       ((zV1, zR, zI, zTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                       ((zRFO, zTn, zI1, zMa1, zMb1, zMc1, zR, zI, zTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                       ((zV2, zR, zI, zTe2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,   
                       ((zRFO, zTn, zI2, zMa2, zMb2, zMc2, zR, zI, zTv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS) 
            >> 
                 c2!(((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV1),          
                      ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV2), 
           ((zRFO, zR, zTn, zI, KTS)^+KV3),  
                      ((zV1, zR, zI, zTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                      ((zRFO, zTn, zI1, zMa1, zMb1, zMc1, zR, zI, zTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                      ((zV2, zR, zI, zTe2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
                      ((zRFO, zTn, zI2, zMa2, zMb2, zMc2, zR, zI, zTv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS, 
                      ((V3, zR, zI, Te3)^+SigV3)^+KTS,  
                      ((zRFO, zTn, I3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, zR, zI, Tv3)^+SigV3)^+KTS)  
          >> 
                 c3?(((vRFO1, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                      ((vRFO3, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV3), 
                      (((vV1, vR, vI, vT'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS), 
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                      ((vRFO1, vTn', vI1, vM'a1, vM'b1, vM'c1, vR, vI, vT'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS)  
           >> 
                 c4!((vRFO1, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                      (vRFO3, vR, vTn', vI, KTS)^+KV3, 
                      ((vV1, vR, vI, vT'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                      ((vRFO1, vTn', vI1, vM'a1, vM'b1, vM'c1, vR, vI, vT'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                      ((V3, vR, vI, T'e3)^+SigV3)^+KTS, 
                      ((vRFO3, vTn', I3, M'a3, M'b3, M'c3, vR, vI, T'v3)^+SigV3)^+KTS)  
           >> 
                 c5?((nI0, nCd,(nI3, nM'a3, nM'b3, nM'c3, nR, nI,                
                       nT'v3)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KV3 
                >> 
                 c6!((nI0, nCd,(I3, nM'a3, nM'b3, nM'c3, nR, nI, nT'v3)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KTS   
           >> stop; 
 
val hTS = Tn' new_in RFO1 new_in RFO3 new_in 
                s1?(((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI0, uCd, uV1, uV2, uV3)^+SigI)^+KTS),   
                     (((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI, KTS)^+KV1), 
                     ((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI, KTS)^+KV2),  
                     ((uRFO, uR, uTn, uI, KTS)^+KV3), 
                     ((uV1, uR, uI, uTe1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                     ((uRFO, uTn, uI1, uMa1, uMb1, uMc1, uR, uI, uTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
                     ((uV2, uR, uI, uTe2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
                     ((uRFO, uTn, uI2, uMa2, uMb2, uMc2, uR, uI, uTv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS, 
                     ((uV3, uR, uI, uTe3)^+SigV3)^+KTS,  
                     ((uRFO, uTn, uI3, uMa3, uMb3, uMc3, uR, uI, uTv3)^+SigV3)^+KTS)  
           >> 
                     (uRFO is RFO) >> (uR is R) >> (uTn is Tn) >> (uI0 is I0) >> 
                     (uI is hsh(I)) >> (uV1 is V1) >> (uV2 is V2) >> (uV3 is V3) >> 
                     (uMa1 is Ma1) >> (uMb1 is Mb1) >> (uMc1 is Mc1) >> 
                     (uMa2 is Ma2) >> (uMb2 is Mb2) >> (uMc2 is Mc2) >> 
                     (uMa3 is Ma3) >> (uMb3 is Mb3) >> (uMc3 is Mc3) >> 
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                s2!((RFO1, uR, Tn', uI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                      (RFO3, uR, Tn', uI, KTS)^+KV3)  
          >>               
                s3?((sRFO1, sR, sTn', sI, KTS)^+KV1, 
                      (sRFO3, sR, sTn', sI, KTS)^+KV3, 
                      ((sV1, sR, sI, sT'e1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                      ((sI1, sM'a1, sM'b1, sM'c1, sR, sI, sT'v1)^+SigV1)^+KTS, 
                      ((sV3, sR, sI, sT'e3)^+SigV3)^+KTS, 
                      ((sI3, sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sR, sI, sT'v3)^+SigV3)^+KTS) 
          >> 
           (sRFO1 is RFO1) >> (sRFO3 is RFO3) >>  
            (sR is R) >> (sTn’ is Tn’) >>  
           (uI is hsh(I)) >> (uV1 is V1) >> (uV3 is V3) >> 
           (sM’a1 is Ma1) >> (sM’b1 is Mb1) >> (sM’c1 is Mc1) >> 
           (sM’a3 is Ma3) >> (sM’b3 is Mb3) >> (sM’c3 is Mc3) >> 
                 s4!((uI0, uCd,(sI3, sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sR, sI, sT'v3)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KV3      
                      >> 
                 s5?((uI0, uCd,(sI3, sM'a3, sM'b3, sM'c3, sR, sI, sT'v3)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KTS  
                      >>  
                 s6!((sM'a3, sI3, sR)^+SigI)^+KCB >> stop; 
 
val bank = d1?((xR, xI0, xAd)^+SigI)^+KCB, 
                     ((rM'a3, rI3, rR)^+SigI)^+KCB 
         >>  
         (rR is xR) >> stop; 
 
(*The whole system is declared as: (1) the parallel composition of the role of hosts 
participating in the security protocol and their respective public keys; (2) a ‘guardian’ that can 
detect if the environment learns some piece of sensible data, like y*) 
val Sys = KV1 new_in KV2 new_in KV3 new_in KTS new_in KCB new_in  
   iI||ven1||ven2||ven3||hTS||bank||guard?y >> stop; 
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(*The initial configuration consists of: (1) the environment’s initial knowledge where the 
disclose channel leaks data to the environment, such as an old protocol nonce and the 
identities of participating hosts and their respective public encryption keys and signature 
verification keys; (2) the role of the system Sys*) 
val Conf = ([disclose!(Rold, +KV1, +KV2, +KV3, +KTS, +KCB, -SigI, -SigV1, -SigV2,  
-SigV3)]@Sys); 
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the offer vendor (V1) has provided in Round 1 of the protocol *) 
val Auth1 = (a2!(((w1)^+SigV1)^+KTS) <-- s1?(((w’1)^+SigV1)^+KTS)); 
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the offer vendor (V1) has provided in Round 1 of the protocol *) 
val Auth2 = (b2!(((w2)^+SigV2)^+KTS) <-- s1?(((w’2)^+SigV2)^+KTS));  
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the offer vendor (V1) has provided in Round 1 of the protocol *) 
val Auth3 = (c2!(((w3)^+SigV3)^+KTS) <-- s1?(((w’3)^+SigV3)^+KTS));  
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the new offer vendor (V1) has provided in Round 2 of the 
protocol *) 
val Auth4 = (a4!(((w4)^+SigV1)^+KTS) <-- s3?(((w’4)^+SigV1)^+KTS));  
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the new offer vendor (V3) has provided in Round 2 of the 
protocol *) 
val Auth5 = (c4!(((w5)^+SigV1)^+KTS) <-- s3?(((w’5)^+SigV1)^+KTS)); 
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the purchase order the host of vendor (V3) receives *) 
val Auth6 = (s4!(((w6)^+SigI)^+KV3) <-- c5?(((w’6)^+SigI)^+KV3)) ; 
 
(* Checks the authenticity of the acceptance of the purchase order the Trusted Server 
receives *) 
val Auth7 = (c6!((((w7)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KTS) <--  
s5?((((w’7)^+SigV3)^+SigI)^+KTS)); 
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(* Checks the authenticity of the payment request the client’s bank host receives *) 
val Auth8 = (s6!(((w8)^+SigI)^+KCB) <-- d1?(((w’8)^+SigI)^+KCB)); 
 
(* Checks the anonymity of the client host through checking the privacy of its identity during 
the protocol run *) 
val Secrecy1 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigI); 
 
(* Checks the anonymity of hosts of short-listed vendors through checking the privacy of their 
identities during the protocol run. It also checks privacy of private signing key of the winning 
vendor SigV3, which is included in the purchase order *) 
val Secrecy2 = (Absurd <-- guard?V1); 
val Secrecy3 = (Absurd <-- guard?V2); 
val Secrecy4 = (Absurd <-- guard?V3); 
val Secrecy5 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigV1); 
val Secrecy6 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigV2); 
val Secrecy7 = (Absurd <-- guard?SigV3); 
 
(* Checks the privacy of the attributes of the offer of vendor (V1) submitted in Round 1 of the 
protocol, particularly I1, Ma1, Mb1, Mc1, and Tv1 *) 
val Secrecy8 = (Absurd <-- guard?I1); 
val Secrecy9 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma1); 
val Secrecy10 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mb1); 
val Secrecy11 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc1); 
val Secrecy12 = (Absurd <-- guard?Tv1);  
 
(* Checks the privacy of the attributes of the offer of vendor (V2) submitted in Round 1 of the 
protocol, particularly I2, Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, and Tv2 *) 
val Secrecy13 = (Absurd <-- guard?I2); 
val Secrecy14 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma2); 
val Secrecy15 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mb2); 
val Secrecy16 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc2); 
val Secrecy17 = (Absurd <-- guard?Tv2); 
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(* Checks the privacy of the attributes of the offer of vendor (V3) submitted in Round 1 of the 
protocol, particularly I3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, and Tv3.It also checks the privacy of particular 
attributes of the purchase order  e.g. I3, Ma3, Mb3, Mc3, and Tv3 and payment order e.g. I3 
*) 
 
val Secrecy18 = (Absurd <-- guard?I3); 
val Secrecy19 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma3); 
val Secrecy20 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mb3); 
val Secrecy21 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc3); 
val Secrecy22 = (Absurd <-- guard?Tv3); 
 
(*Checks the privacy of the client’s bank account details *) 
val Secrecy23 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ad); 
 
(*Checks the privacy of the client’s name) 
val Secrecy24 = (Absurd <-- guard?I0); 
 
(* Checks the privacy of the name of the winning vendor *) 
val Secrecy25 = (Absurd <-- guard?I3); 
 
 (* Checks the privacy of the attributes of the new offer of vendor (V1) submitted in Round 2 of 
the protocol, particularly I1, M'a1, M'b1, M'c1, and Tv1 *) 
val Secrecy26 = (Absurd <-- guard?I1); 
val Secrecy27 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'a1); 
val Secrecy28 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'b1); 
val Secrecy29 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'c1); 
val Secrecy30 = (Absurd <-- guard?T'v1);  
 
(* Checks the privacy of the attributes of the new offer of vendor (V3) submitted in Round 2 of 
the protocol, particularly I3, M'a3, M'b3, M'c3, and Tv3 *) 
val Secrecy31 = (Absurd <-- guard?I3); 
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val Secrecy32 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'a3); 
val Secrecy33 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'b3); 
val Secrecy34 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'c3); 
val Secrecy35 = (Absurd <-- guard?T'v3);  
 
 
